Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of America, Docket No. 104194

• Citation: 563 N.W.2d 683,454 Mich. 626
• Decision Date: 17 June 1997
• Docket Number: Docket No. 104194,No. 1,1
• Parties: Carol PUTKAMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 683

563 N.W.2d 683

454 Mich. 626

Carol PUTKAMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 104194.

Calendar No. 1.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 8, 1997.

Decided June 17, 1997.

Larry R. Farmer, Rogers City, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sullivan, Crowley & Beeby, P.C. by Philip J. Crowley, Traverse City, for Defendant-Appellee.

Granzotto & Nicita, P.C. by Mark Granzotto, Detroit, amicus curiae, for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.

Opinion

RILEY, Justice.

In this appeal, we are asked to examine whether a woman who was injured when she slipped and fell on the ice while she entered her parked motor vehicle may recover the alleged cost of her medical expenses from her no-fault automobile insurer as a first-party claimant under the no-fault act. On the undisputed facts of this case, plaintiff established as a matter of law that her injury arose from the use of her parked motor vehicle as a motor vehicle under the no-fault act. We reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On December 23, 1991, plaintiff Carol Putkamer and her sister, Sandy, drove from Lansing to Alpena to spend Christmas with their parents. After unloading their luggage and gifts at their parents' home, plaintiff and her sister planned to travel to their brother's home. While plaintiff was getting into her vehicle on the driver's side, she fell on the ice and was injured. She described the accident as follows:

Sandy was already seated in the passenger seat of my car, which was parked in my parents' driveway. I then walked to my car, opened the driver's door and started to get in my car. While shifting my weight to my left leg and attempting to place my right foot on the driver's side floor board, I lost my footing and fell. The next thing I knew, I was sitting on the ground with my left hand gripping the inside door closure of my car.

Plaintiff allegedly suffered serious injuries to her back that precipitated a disc herniation on April 5, 1992, which required a foot brace a lumbar brace, extensive medications, and substantial rest. ¹

Consequently, almost one year later, on December 3, 1992, plaintiff sought insurance relief for her medical expenses from her no-fault automobile insurer, defendant Transamerica Insurance Corporation of America. In a letter dated April 21, 1993, defendant insurer refused to provide her benefits, noting that plaintiff "merely fell," and concluded that "[t]here is no concrete evidence that [you] suffered an accidental bodily injury as a result of a motor vehicle accident ... as defined by the Michigan No-Fault Statute."

On April 20, 1993, plaintiff brought this action against defendant insurer for first-party benefits for her injury, claiming that her injury arose out of the use of her motor vehicle under the no-fault act. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the injury occurred when plaintiff slipped on the ice and that the involvement of the parked motor vehicle was only incidental to her injury. In a written opinion, the trial court granted the motion in favor of defendant:

This Court is of the opinion that it makes no difference ... whether [p]laintiff was "entering into" the vehicle at the time she slipped on the ice....

[A] causal connection between the alleged injuries suffered by [p]laintiff and her maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, required to bring her within the scope of the Michigan No-Fault Act, does not exist.

Plaintiff appealed this decision and, on August 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a peremptory order. This order provided in full:

Pursuant to MCR 7.214(E) and 7.216(A)(7), the Court dispenses with oral argument and affirms the Alpena Circuit Court's order for summary disposition in this cause. Granting that plaintiff was "entering into" her automobile at the time of injury, the injury was occasioned by a slip and fall due to icy conditions. Plaintiff's injury thus fails to bear the requisite causal connection to the ownership, maintenance or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle. Daubenspeck v. Automobile Club of Michigan, 179 Mich.App. 453, 455 (1989), Rajhel v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 145 Mich.App. 593, 595 (1985), and Block v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 111 Mich.App. 106, 109 [314 N.W.2d 536 (1981) ]. [Entered August 21, 1995 (Docket No. 170144).]

Plaintiff appealed this decision, and we granted leave to appeal. ²

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Defendant brought its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). In reviewing such a motion, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co., 451 Mich. 358, 362, 547 N.W.2d 314 (1996). A trial court grants the motion where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.

The issue in the instant case is whether there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff's injury was related to the use of her vehicle under the no-fault act, M.C.L. § 500.3101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 24.13101 et seq. As the Court of Appeals has noted, where there is no dispute about the facts, the issue whether an injury arose out of the use of a vehicle is a legal issue for a court to decide and not a factual one for a jury. Krueger v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty & Home Insurance Co., 112 Mich.App. 511, 515, 316 N.W.2d 474 (1982). See also Wills v. State Farm Ins. Company, 437 Mich. 205, 208, 468 N.W.2d 511 (Cavanagh C.J., lead opinion), 437 Mich. at 215-216, 468 N.W.2d 511 (Riley, J.), 437 Mich. at 216, 468 N.W.2d 511 (Griffin, J.); 437 Mich. 205, 468 N.W.2d 511 (1991). ³

In resolving this dispute, we must interpret statutes within the no-fault act. As the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, this Court gives effect to the Legislature's intent. Turner v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 448 Mich. 22, 27, 528 N.W.2d 681 (1995). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts must apply the statute as written. Id. This Court gives the statute's language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Id. The no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it. Id. at 28, 528 N.W.2d 681. An issue of statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich. 75, 80, 467 N.W.2d 21 (1991).

B. Statute

The Michigan no-fault insurance act requires a no-fault automobile insurer to provide first-party injury protection for certain injuries related to a motor vehicle:

Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter. [M.C.L. § 500.3105(1); M.S.A. § 24.13105(1).]

The injury in the instant case involved a parked motor vehicle. The no-fault act expressly addresses a claim that an injury occurred while the motor vehicle was parked:

(1) Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless any of the following occur:

(a) The vehicle was parked in such a way as to cause an unreasonable risk of bodily injury which occurred.

(b) ... [T]he injury was a direct result of physical contact with equipment permanently mounted on the vehicle, while the equipment was being operated or used, or property being lifted onto or lowered from the vehicle in the loading or unloading process.

(c) ... [T ]he injury was sustained by a person while occupying, entering into, or alighting from the vehicle. [M.C.L. § 500.3106; M.S.A. § 24.13106 (emphasis added).] [ ⁴]

Where the motor vehicle is parked, the determination whether the injury is covered by the no-fault insurer generally is governed by the provisions of subsection 3106(1) alone. See Winter v. Automobile Club of Michigan, 433 Mich. 446, 457, 446 N.W.2d 132 (1989). ⁵ There is no need for an additional determination whether the injury is covered under subsection 3105(1). Id. at 458, n. 10, 446 N.W.2d 132. ⁶

The underlying policy of the parked motor vehicle exclusion of subsection 3106(1) is to ensure that an injury that is covered by the no-fault act involves use of the parked motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. Miller v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 411 Mich. 633, 639-640, 309 N.W.2d 544 (1981). This Court explained the purpose of the parking exclusion in Miller, supra at 639-640, 309 N.W.2d 544:

Injuries involving parked vehicles do not normally involve the vehicle as a motor vehicle. Injuries involving parked vehicles typically involve the vehicle in much the same way as any other stationary object (such as a tree, sign post or boulder) would be involved.

* * * * * *

The stated exceptions to the parking exclusion clarify and reinforce this construction of the exclusion. Each exception pertains to injuries related to the character of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle___characteristics which make it unlike other stationary roadside objects that can be involved in vehicle accidents. [Emphasis in original.]

Plaintiff claims that the exception in subsection 3106(1)(c) applies because she was injured while entering her vehicle. This Court elaborated in Miller, supra at 640, 309 N.W.2d 544, on the underlying purpose of subsection 3106(1)(c) as an exception to the parked vehicle exclusion:

[Sub]section 3106(c) [now subsection 3106(1)(c) ] provides an exception for injuries sustained while occupying, entering or alighting from a vehicle, and represents a judgment that the nexus between the activity resulting in injury and the...