Putnam v. City of Grand Rapids

• Decision Date: 04 November 1885
• Citation: 25 N.W. 330,58 Mich. 416
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PUTNAM and others v. CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS.

25 N.W. 330

58 Mich. 416

PUTNAM and others v. CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

November 4, 1885

Appeal from superior court of Grand Rapids.

Smiley & Earle, for complainants.

J.W Ransom and Blair, Kingsley & Kleinhaus, for appellants.

CAMPBELL J.

The complainants, who are tax-payers in Grand Rapids, filed their bill to prevent the execution of a contract whereby the city was to make an arrangement with the electric-light company to have 25 towers put up in various places, and electric lights furnished for five years, in the times and manner specified, at $26,000 a year, at the end of which period all the fixed property was to belong to the city, if desired. The resolutions which authorized this were returned unapproved by the mayor to the common council, and passed over his veto, which was put on the ground of impolicy in making what he considered an experiment. It is not claimed that there is anything illegal in the amount of the appropriation, if otherwise lawful. The chief ground of objection is the creation of an undertaking extending over more than one year. The injunction was granted. A preliminary objection was made by defendants, on the ground that complainants could not be allowed as private citizens to interfere with a matter of public concern. There are certainly many cases in which they could not legally represent the public, and could have no private footing as complainants. But in the present case they appear as owners of taxable property, each of whose burdens will probably exceed the sum required to give equity jurisdiction, if the contract stands.

This private grievance has been heretofore considered sufficient to authorize them to interfere on their own account, and while their grievance is not joint, it is a common one, for the redress of which, if grantable at all, there is no serious objection to their making common cause. Their allegations of the amount of their respective interests are not controverted, and bring them within the statute. Some part of the bill is taken up with complaints of the impropriety of the arrangement proposed, and various objections are pointed out. These considerations have nothing to do with the legal aspect of the case. The question before us is one of power and not of wisdom, and we are bound to decide it on strictly legal grounds. If the charter would be violated by the proposed contract, the illegality involves such a grievance as may be dealt with in a court of equity and the injunction must stand. If not, then the bill cannot be maintained.

Counsel for complainant did not on the argument dwell much upon such parts of the case as rest on assertions of the impropriety of the contract as unwarranted by the true policy of the city. It is alleged to be more expensive than other modes of lighting the city, and in other ways impolitic and not desirable. But we find no charges of dishonest or fraudulent conduct. There has been an idea in some places, as apparent from reported cases, that courts of equity can always stand between citizens and municipal authorities, to shield them from abuses and extravagant action. This is not one of the functions of courts. It is one of the incidents of popular government that the people must bear the consequences of the mistakes of their representatives. No court can save them from this experience. It is one of the means of teaching the necessity of choosing proper servants, and being vigilant to obtain reform from abuses. The discretion which is necessarily vested in public functionaries cannot be reviewed by any one else. If they go beyond the range of the discretion given them, and mischief happens or is likely to happen, a case arises for the interference of judicial authority to keep them within the lines bounding their agency. But their mistakes within those lines are beyond legal redress. Whether the present case authorizes it depends upon the effect of the city charter.

Although our legislation on municipal subjects has been unstable, yet every city charter is enacted and intended for permanence, and in view of both extended bounds and growing population. It usually leaves a wide range of discretion in the choice of ways and means of promoting public as well as private convenience. It does not require the community to be deprived of the comfort and convenience of new inventions and improvements, and it usually does not restrict it to any fixed ways. There have been many changes in methods of paving, lighting, building, and furnishing water supplies, and other needs of civilization. Many of these changes are experimental, and they are not all useful. But, such as they are, they are made because they commend themselves to public confidence, or are supposed to do so, and unless restricted by some legal provision a large choice is given to the corporation. The present controversy relates to a new method of lighting which has been allowed by the legislature to be managed by corporations, and to have rights of occupancy in streets and other places, to place its lights and the apparatus for furnishing them the means of illumination by the necessary wires and fixtures. How.St. � 4191. The law has placed it on as favorable a footing as gas or oil lighting, and permitted the companies to contract with cities for easements and for public lighting.

It is not claimed that the city of Grand Rapids cannot contract on some terms for electric lighting. The only claim tangibly presented by the bill is whether it can be done for more than one year, and whether it can be done without giving the management of the public lights to public officers. The provisions of the charter in regard to the latter branch of...