Puz v. McDonald

• Decision Date: 12 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 2,CA-CIV,2
• Citation: Puz v. McDonald, 680 P.2d 213, 140 Ariz. 77 (Ariz. App. 1984)
• Parties: James R. PUZ and Mary E. Puz, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Richard Joseph McDONALD, Defendant/Appellant. 4892. . Rehearing Granted
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 213

680 P.2d 213

140 Ariz. 77

James R. PUZ and Mary E. Puz, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Richard Joseph McDONALD, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CIV 4892.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 2.

Rehearing Granted Jan. 12, 1984.

Decided April 13, 1984.

Thomas E. Johnson and Ned Vigil by Thomas E. Johnson, Tucson, for plaintiffs/appellees.

William J. Risner by Kenneth K. Graham, Tucson, for defendant/appellant.

OPINION

HATHAWAY, Judge.

On February 24, 1981, Richard McDonald and Michael Howard, armed and wearing bullet-proof vests, attempted to rob a pharmacy owned by appellees. Their attempt was aborted when McDonald turned away from Mrs. Puz, who was then able to grab her own gun and shoot him in the back. McDonald and Howard were apprehended by police as they attempted to flee, and were subsequently indicted on several counts of armed robbery, armed kidnapping and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Pursuant to plea agreements, McDonald was sentenced to 7.5 years' imprisonment, and Howard was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

In June 1981, appellees brought this action in tort against McDonald, his wife, and Howard, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for assault and battery. Following a trial to the court, judgment was entered against the defendants, jointly and severally, awarding appellees $61,000 compensatory damages and $200,000 punitive damages. Only Richard McDonald has appealed.

Before the trial court and on appeal, McDonald has not contested liability nor has he challenged the amount of compensatory damages which the court awarded to appellees. His sole complaint relates to the court's award of punitive damages, which he challenges on two grounds. First, appellant argues that the court erred in awarding punitive damages where criminal sanctions had already been imposed. Second, assuming that punitive damages could be awarded, he argues that the court erred in granting a judgment for such damages allegedly in excess of appellant's wealth. Finally, although not raised as a separate argument, appellant contends that since he has been sentenced to prison, has lost his wife and has suffered permanent injury as a result of the robbery, he has suffered enough and should not be additionally subjected to a judgment for punitive damages.

With regard to his first point, appellant notes correctly that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for reckless or intentional wrongdoing and not to compensate the plaintiff for his loss. Acheson v. Shafter, 107 Ariz. 576, 490 P.2d 832 (1971). Although appellant acknowledges that the majority of jurisdictions permit the award of punitive damages notwithstanding that the defendant has been subject to criminal punishment, see Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 870 (1980), he challenges the validity of the distinction drawn in such cases between public and individual vindication, since the interests involved are identical--to deter the defendant as well as others from committing similar acts.

Appellant's argument fails on two grounds. First, although we have found no judicial precedent on point, we believe that the legislature has expressed its intent that punitive damages not be precluded by prior criminal sanctions in A.R.S. § 13-102(C), which provides:

"This title does not bar, suspend or otherwise affect any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, regardless of whether the conduct involved in the proceeding constitutes an offense defined in this title."

Second, a blanket rule prohibiting punitive damages under these circumstances would defeat the purpose of deterrence in cases where, although the defendant's conduct is clearly wilful and outrageous, and the plaintiff has suffered compensable damage, the criminal sanction is slight. We believe that the public interest in deterring wanton, reckless or...