Pyatt v. Pyatt

• Decision Date: 06 February 1890
• Citation: 18 A. 1048,46 N.J.E. 285
• Parties: PYATT et al. v. PYATT.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

18 A. 1048

46 N.J.E. 285

PYATT et al.

v. PYATT.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Feb. 6, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from prerogative court; MCGILL, Ordinary. See 15 Atl. Rep. 421.

Mr. Rice and A. H. Strong, for appellants. Mr. Adrian, for respondent.

DIXON, J. In April, 1887, the appellant Mary N. Pyatt was cited to account before the orphans' court of Middlesex county as guardian of her daughter Mary E. Pyatt, and forthwith filed her account, charging herself with $435.78 received in December, 1878, and various small sums of interest, amounting to $101.54, received subsequently, and praying allowance for $2,093.23, of which $1,872 was for board and maintenance of the ward from January 1, 1875, to December 31, 1886, at $3 per week. On exceptions filed by the ward, testimony was taken, the guardian being the only witness examined, and thereupon the orphans' court allowed the account as presented. On appeal to the prerogative court, the ordinary disallowed all the credits claimed, and the guardian has now brought his decree to this court for review.

The facts proven are as follows: Samuel L. Pyatt died intestate, January 11, 1868, seised of his homestead farm, and possessed of some personalty, leaving his widow, the appellant, and four young children, of whom the respondent is the oldest. Letters of administration were granted to the widow and her father, and the widow and children continued to reside upon the homestead farm as one family, no dower being set off to her. On August 18, 1874, the widow was appointed guardian of each of her children, and in December, 1874, she came into possession of her wards' distributive shares in their father's personal estate. The share of the respondent was $435.78. The guardian used the funds of her children in supporting them as members of her household, and, when these were exhausted, borrowed from her father, who was also surety on her guardianship bonds. She kept no account of her expenditures, and does not attempt to specify those made on behalf of each individual child. She swears, however, that the charge of three dollars per week for the board and maintenance of the respondent is fair and reasonable, and that all the moneys received by her as guardian had been actually expended by her in maintaining her daughter. These statements are uncontradicted, and there is no ground for doubting their truth.

The ordinary rejected the allowance claimed for the support of the ward during her minority, which ended October 5, 1876, because he drew from the circumstances an inference that the guardian was supporting the ward as a member of her family, without expecting compensation therefor. But we deem that inference unwarranted. The actual use of the very moneys in her hands as guardian, to purchase the necessaries of life for the children, shows unmistakably that she was not intending to support them at her own expense. Indeed, she seems not to have had any other resources for their maintenance. As a general rule, a widow is not bound to support her minor children out of her own property, if they have means of their own, (2 Kent, Coram. 190,) and she is entitled to a complete indemnity out of their estate for the money expended by her on their maintenance, within proper limits, (Bruin v. Knott, 1 Phil. Ch. 571; In re Bostwick, 4 Johns. Ch. 104.) It necessarily follows that when she has cast upon her, as their guardian, the duty of maintaining them, and has actually used their money for that purpose, she must be considered to have meant to charge their estate with their support, and all reasonable expenditures therefore should be allowed to her. The fact that the present guardian kept no accounts is excused by the evident impracticability of exactly distributing among the several members of her family the current expenses of the household. If she were seeking to charge the ward with specific payments made on her behalf, an itemized account might properly be insisted on, but, the charge being in its nature one of estimation merely, it is enough if the court can see that the estimate is within just bounds. This is plain. The charge for maintenance during the ward's minority should be allowed.

The cost of maintenance after majority was disallowed by the ordinary on the ground that the orphans' court had no jurisdiction over matters occurring between the parties after the ward became of age. he agreed with the orphans' court in believing that an understanding existed between the mother and daughter that the daughter's money in her mother's hands was to be used in supporting the family, including the daughter, and that the money was so used, but he decided that the account must close at the termination of the guardianship, and the balance be ascertained and decreed as of that date. We do not concur in this view of the law. The orphans' court is a court of general jurisdiction over the subjects committed to its cognizance. Den v. Hammel, 18 N. J. Law, 73. It partakes of the powers of a chancery and prerogative jurisdiction, being instituted to remedy and supply the defects in the powers of the prerogative court with regard to the accountability of executors, administrators, and guardians; and such construction should be given to the statutes establishing and regulating its authority as, consistently with the obvious intentions of the legislature, will advance and extend their remedial provisions. Wood v. Tallman, 1 N. J. Law, 153; Seaman v. Duryea, 11 N. Y. 324. Our present statute (Revision, p. 753, § 2)...