Pye v. Aycock, 2610

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Citation: 480 S.E.2d 455,325 S.C. 426
• Decision Date: 13 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 2610,2610
• Parties: James R. PYE, II, Respondent, v. Ronald Elton AYCOCK, Appellant.

Page 455

480 S.E.2d 455 325 S.C. 426 James R. PYE, II, Respondent,
v.
Ronald Elton AYCOCK, Appellant. No. 2610. Court of Appeals of South Carolina. Submitted Dec. 3, 1996.
Decided Jan. 13, 1997.

Page 456

[325 S.C. 429] Edward K. Pritchard, Jr., Charleston, for appellant.

Gary L. Cartee, North Charleston, for respondent.

ANDERSON, Judge:

James R. Pye, II (Pye), filed this action against Ronald Elton Aycock (Aycock) seeking damages for injuries incurred when Aycock struck Pye in the face with a metal pipe. The [325 S.C. 430] trial court granted Pye's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. We affirm. ¹

FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Around 2:00 a.m. on April 20, 1991, Aycock, accompanied by Kevin Coogan, arrived

Page 457

home from his job at the Charleston Naval Base. At that time, he discovered numerous people standing in and around his front yard. Although the parties present starkly different versions of the facts, it is undisputed that Aycock deliberately struck Pye in the face with a metal pipe. ²

On November 16, 1992, Pye filed his complaint alleging, among other things, Aycock was negligent, reckless, willful, and wanton in his actions. Aycock, by and through counsel retained by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm), his homeowner's insurance carrier, answered with a qualified general denial. He also asserted the following affirmative defenses: sole negligence, contributory negligence, sudden emergency, self defense, and the unconstitutionality of the imposition of punitive damages.

On December 30, 1992, State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court and named both Pye and Aycock as defendants. State Farm sought a declaration as to whether Aycock was excluded from coverage and not entitled to a defense under the intentional acts exclusion of his policy. Aycock answered on February 2, 1993, asserting a general denial.

In the declaratory judgment action, the jury returned a verdict for State Farm and concluded Aycock was not entitled to coverage nor a defense under his homeowner's policy. Aycock moved for a new trial in the federal action. This motion was denied.

[325 S.C. 431] In the case at bar, Pye filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the issues of willfulness, wantonness, any affirmative defense, and liability on the grounds of collateral estoppel or res judicata in that the same facts were raised and resolved by jury verdict in the declaratory judgment action. The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of res judicata as to liability and ordered a trial on the issue of damages. Aycock appeals from this ruling.

ISSUES

I. Did the trial court err in finding Aycock was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from litigating the issue of liability in the state court action after the issue had been decided by a federal court jury in response to special interrogatories?

II. Did the trial court err in failing to find that special circumstances bar application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Columbia v. American Civil Liberties Union, --- S.C. ----, 475 S.E.2d 747 (1996). See Rule 56, SCRCP. In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. City of Columbia, supra. Summary judgment is proper where plain, palpable, and indisputable facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ. Byerly v. Connor, 307 S.C. 441, 415 S.E.2d 796 (1992). Summary judgment is not appropriate, however, where further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify application of the law. Baugus v. Wessinger, 303 S.C. 412, 401 S.E.2d 169 (1991). It should not be granted even where there is no dispute as to evidentiary facts if there is dispute as to the conclusion to be drawn from such facts. Id.

[325 S.C. 432] RES JUDICATA

Aycock argues the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata to bar him from litigating the issue of liability in the state court action. He contends the issue had not been litigated in the federal court action and that the state and federal claims are separate and distinct.

Page 458

LAW/ANALYSIS

To establish res judicata, three elements must be shown: (1) the identities of the parties is the same as a prior litigation; (2) the subject matter is the same as the prior litigation; and (3) there was a prior adjudication of the issue by a court of competent jurisdiction. Johnson v. Greenwood Mills, Inc., 317 S.C. 248, 452 S.E.2d 832 (1994). It is apodictic that the doctrine of res judicata has been elongated to include "privies." A pristine statement of the doctrine of res judicata is stated in Nunnery v. Brantley Constr. Co., 289 S.C. 205, 345 S.E.2d 740 (Ct.App.1986). In Nunnery, this Court explicated the doctrine with certitude:

Our Supreme Court in Bagwell v. Hinton, 205 S.C. 377, 400, 32 S.E.2d 147, 156 (1944), held that the following elements must be shown in order to establish the plea of res judicata:

(1) The parties must be the same or their privies; (2) the subject matter must be the same; and (3) while generally the precise point must be ruled, yet where the parties are the same or are in privity the judgment is an absolute bar not only of what was decided but of what might have been decided.

Nunnery, 289 S.C. at 209, 345 S.E.2d at 742-43. The doctrine of res judicata bars a litigant from raising any issues which were adjudicated in the former suit and any issues which might have been raised in the former suit. Hilton Head Ctr. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 294 S.C. 9, 362 S.E.2d 176 (1987). See also Johnson, supra (res judicata bars subsequent action by same parties on same issues). "Res judicata also bars subsequent actions by the same parties when the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of a prior action between those parties." Riedman Corp. v. [325 S.C. 433] Greenville Steel Structures, Inc., 308 S.C. 467, 469, 419 S.E.2d 217, 218 (1992).

Additionally, "[f]or a judgment to bar the maintenance of a subsequent action, there must be identity of the cause of action as well as identity of the subject matter." Nunnery, 289 S.C. at 209, 345 S.E.2d at 743. If it is doubtful whether a second action is for the same cause of action as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the identity of facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 51 S.E.2d 622 (1949). When applying principles of res judicata, a fundamental test used for comparing causes of action is to determine whether the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong are the same in each action. Nunnery, supra. " 'Under this test, there is but one cause of action where there is but one right in the plaintiff and one wrong on the part of the defendant involving that right.' " Id. at 210, 345 S.E.2d at 743 (quoting 46 AM.JUR.2D Judgments § 406 at 575 (1969)).

The "subject matter of the action," within the res judicata rule, is a matter or thing concerning which a wrong has been done, which is ordinarily property, contract, or other thing involved, or main primary right from the breach of which a remedial right arises. First Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 207 S.C. 15, 35 S.E.2d 47 (1945).

In a subsequent suit between the same parties on a different claim, the former judgment is conclusive as to those issues actually determined in the prior action. Surety Realty Corp. v. Asmer, 249 S.C. 114, 153 S.E.2d 125 (1967). A plea of res judicata applies to those matters actually adjudicated in the former action. Id.

DISCUSSION

In response to special interrogatories, the jury in the declaratory judgment action found:
                .
                1. Did Plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company prove, by a preponderance
                 of the evidence, that the incident on April 20, 1991, when James Pye was
                 injured, was not an occurrence, which is defined by the State Farm Fire and
                 Casualty policy as "an accident which results in bodily injury?"
                YES x 3 NO
                 ------------------- -----------------
                2. Did Plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company prove, by a preponderance
                 of the evidence, that Ronald Aycock both intentionally acted in striking
                 James Pye and also intended that the blow cause the type of loss or injury
                 which resulted to James Pye?
                YES x NO
                 ------------------- -------------------
                3. Did Plaintiff State Farm Fire and Casualty Company prove, by a preponderance
                 of the evidence, that James Pye's bodily injuries resulted from willful and
                 malicious acts of Ronald Aycock?
                YES x NO
                 ------------------- -------------------
                4. Did Defendant Ronald Aycock prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
                 his actions constituted self-defense?
                YES NO x
                 ------------------- -------------------
                5. Was Defendant Ronald Aycock so intoxicated as to be unable to know,

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