Pye v. Estate of Fox

• Decision Date: 24 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 26193.,26193.
• Parties: Russ and Lee PYE, Justin Enterprises, a South Carolina General Partnership, Appellants, v. ESTATE OF Dorothy T. FOX, John Richard Fox, III, A Personal Representative, Estate of John C. Fox, and G. Thomas Hill (Tommy Hill), Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

633 S.E.2d 505

Russ and Lee PYE, Justin Enterprises, a South Carolina General Partnership, Appellants, v. ESTATE OF Dorothy T. FOX, John Richard Fox, III, A Personal Representative, Estate of John C. Fox, and G. Thomas Hill (Tommy Hill), Respondents.

No. 26193.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard January 5, 2006.

Decided July 24, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Chalmers C. Johnson, of Chalmers Johnson Law Firm, of Charleston, for Appellants.

Coming B. Gibbs, Jr., of Gibbs & Holmes, of Charleston, for Respondents Estate of Dorothy T. Fox, John Richard Fox, III, as Personal Representative, and Estate of John C. Fox.

David W. Overstreet and David J. Harmon, both of Carlock Copeland Semler & Stair, LLP, of Charleston, for Respondent G. Thomas Hill.

Acting Justice ANDERSON:

Russ and Lee Pye, along with their partnership, Justin Enterprises (the Pyes), initiated this action against the Estate of Dorothy T. Fox, the Estate of John C. Fox, John Richard Fox, III (the Foxes), and attorney G. Thomas Hill, alleging (1) abuse of process, (2) civil conspiracy, and (3) a violation of the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act, S.C.Code Ann. section 15-36-10. The circuit court dismissed Hill from the action at the summary judgment stage, and directed a verdict in favor of the Foxes at the close of the Pyes' case. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Pyes own two adjacent parcels of land, known as Encampment Plantation and Encampment Plantation Drive, located on Highway 17 in Charleston County. The Foxes have an easement for ingress and egress over Encampment Plantation Drive which allows them access from their land to Highway 17. At least one additional parcel separates the Pyes' land from the Foxes'.

Dr. Southard owns property adjacent to the Pyes and has an easement over Encampment Plantation Drive. Soon after Southard purchased his tract he began requesting that the Pyes alter the travel lane over Encampment Plantation Drive. Due to the layout of the lane, Southard was forced to make a ninety-degree turn in order to access his property. Southard engaged in logging on the land, and the cumbersome ninety-degree turn inhibited access for the logging trucks.

Initially, the Pyes resisted Southard's request to realign the travel lane. According to Mrs. Pye's testimony at trial, Southard's proposal would have required the removal of one of several "Grand Trees" which were protected by a county ordinance. However, an Act of God intervened when lightening struck one of the Grand Trees. As a result, the Pyes realigned the lane on Encampment Plantation Drive to turn at a forty-five-degree angle and pass over where the fallen Grand Tree once stood. The Pyes planted shrubbery to cover the former path. Despite the Pyes' rearrangement of the travel lane, several lawsuits ensued.

On February 27, 2002, attorney Hill filed suit 02-CP-10-903, which was captioned Estate of John Carlton Fox v. Justin Enterprises, A South Carolina General Partnership, Russ Pye and Lee Pye (Suit 903). However, John Carlton Fox's estate was already closed. Therefore, Suit 903 was eventually dismissed. On May 16, 2002, civil action number 02-CP-10-2131 (Suit 2131) was filed. Suit 2131 alleged the same causes of action as Suit 903, but was captioned Estate of Dorothy T. Fox, John Richard Fox, III, as Personal Representative, John Richard Fox, III, and Developments Unlimited, LLC. The Foxes were dismissed as plaintiffs from Suit 2131 on December 19, 2002, but the action continued with Dr. Southard's company, Developments Unlimited, LLC, as the sole plaintiff.

Thus, the Foxes filed two lawsuits against the Pyes, but they were eventually dismissed from both suits. Hill represented the Foxes in each action. Based on these lawsuits, the Pyes initiated the case sub judice against the Foxes for abuse of process, civil conspiracy, and violation of S.C.Code Ann. section 15-36-10, the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act, and against Hill on the civil conspiracy and frivolous proceedings act claims.

Hill moved for summary judgment on the civil conspiracy cause of action. The circuit judge granted the motion reasoning the Pyes stated the same claim under the frivolous proceedings act.

Subsequently, Hill filed a motion for summary judgment on the frivolous proceedings act claim. The court scheduled the summary judgment motion in conjunction with the Pyes' Rule 59 motion to alter or amend. The Pyes agreed to withdraw the frivolous proceedings act claim based on In re Beard, 359 S.C. 351, 597 S.E.2d 835 (Ct.App.2004). The court of appeals, in In re Beard, held that the Frivolous Proceedings Sanctions Act was subject to the general ten-day limitation for post-trial motions. Thus, the Pyes' claim under the act was time barred.

The court then heard the Pyes' Rule 59(e) motion. The judge previously had granted summary judgment finding the civil conspiracy claim was adequately addressed by the frivolous proceedings cause of action. According to the Pyes, because the frivolous proceedings claim was not viable, the basis for the court's decision did not apply. The following colloquy occurred at the hearing:

The Court: What are you suggesting that he did outside of his duty as a lawyer? That's the problem. I didn't hear anything that he did, or didn't do, that wasn't really tied to what his responsibilities were to his client.

Ms. Hunt: Essentially, Your Honor, the evidence sets forth in my memoranda, that Mr. Hill had conversations with Mr. Fox prior to filing the lawsuit that Mr. Fox— Mr. Fox testified in his deposition that he actually took it upon himself to file the lawsuit and that he didn't inform him that the estate was closed. He acted outside that realm when he takes it upon himself to give people permission to enter upon the plaintiffs' property to measure trees—he ventured—he's outside that attorney-client relationship by —

. . . .

The Court: [D]o you have any proof that he gave them permission to go anywhere outside the easement?

Ms. Hunt: No, Your Honor.

The Court: Okay. Then as long as it is confined to the easement, then he had a duty to do what he did. Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Hunt: Thank you, Your Honor.

The Court: I deny the Motion to Reconsider.

The case was tried before a jury with two causes of action surviving against the Foxes—abuse of process and civil conspiracy. At the close of the Pyes' case, the Foxes moved for a directed verdict. The court found no evidence of an ulterior purpose or willful abuse of process in the proceedings the Foxes initiated. Therefore, the judge directed a verdict on the abuse of process claim. The Pyes do not appeal this ruling. Next, the circuit court addressed the civil conspiracy claim:

As to the conspiracy, I understand the dilemma here, Ms. Hunt, and I understand you're contemplating appealing that. I realize that situation. There is no evidence because Mr. Hill had been dismissed prior to this lawsuit. So there was no — you couldn't have really had any testimony concerning that. So, there's no evidence concerning a conspiracy on the part of Mr. Fox. He can't conspire with himself. That being the case, the Court would also grant the directed verdict as to the conspiracy action and, therefore, directs a verdict for the Defendant in this matter.

The Pyes present two issues on appeal: (1) whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to dismiss the civil conspiracy cause of action against Hill; and (2) whether the circuit court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the Foxes.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary Judgment

When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court applies the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pittman v. Grand Strand Entm't, Inc., 363 S.C. 531, 611 S.E.2d 922 (2005); B & B Liquors, Inc. v. O'Neil, 361 S.C. 267, 603 S.E.2d 629 (Ct.App.2004). In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Medical Univ. of South Carolina v. Arnaud, 360 S.C. 615, 602 S.E.2d 747 (2004); Rife v. Hitachi Constr. Mach. Co., Ltd., 363 S.C. 209, 609 S.E.2d 565 (Ct.App.2005). If triable issues exist, those issues must go to the jury. Mulherin-Howell v. Cobb, 362 S.C. 588, 608 S.E.2d 587 (Ct.App.2005).

Directed Verdict

In ruling on motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions. The trial court must deny the motions when the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt. Steinke v. South Carolina Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Reg., 336 S.C. 373, 386, 520 S.E.2d 142, 148 (1999). If the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should have been denied. Jinks v. Richland County, 355 S.C. 341, 345, 585 S.E.2d 281, 283 (2003); Adams v. G.J. Creel Sons, Inc., 320 S.C. 274, 277, 465 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1995). In deciding whether to grant or deny a directed verdict motion, the trial court is concerned only with the existence or nonexistence of evidence. Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poole, 351 S.C. 1, 15, 567 S.E.2d 881, 888 (Ct.App.2002).

This Court will reverse only where there is no evidence to support the trial court's ruling, or where the ruling was controlled by an error of law. Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Public Safety, 362 S.C. 377, 382-83, 608 S.E.2d 573, 576 (2005); Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 386, 520 S.E.2d 142, 148 (1999); Abu-Shawareb v. S.C. State Univ., 364 S.C. 358, 613 S.E.2d 757 (Ct....