Pye v. Nu Aire Inc.

• Citation: 112 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 865,641 F.3d 1011
• Decision Date: 17 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–2243.,10–2243.
• Parties: Lionel PYE, Appellant,v.NU AIRE, INC., also known as NuAire International, Inc., Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

641 F.3d 1011

112 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 865

94 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,210

Lionel PYE, Appellant,

v.NU AIRE, INC., also known as NuAire International, Inc., Appellee.

No. 10–2243.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 17, 2011.Filed: June 17, 2011.

Stephen Wright Cooper, argued, Stacey Renee Everson, on the brief, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.Ansis V. Viksnins, argued, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN and BYE, Circuit Judges, and FLEISSIG, ¹District Judge.

FLEISSIG, District Judge.

Lionel Pye appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, NuAire, Inc. (“NuAire”), on his claims of race discrimination, hostile work environment, and termination as a result of retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e–17, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. § 363A.15 (“MHRA”).² We affirm with respect to the discrimination and hostile work environment claims, and reverse and remand with respect to the retaliation claims.³

I.

As we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we describe the facts in the light most favorable to Pye. See Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt Supply, Inc., 626 F.3d 410, 413 (8th Cir.2010). On July 21, 2007, NuAire hired Pye, a 25–year–old African American, as a metal finisher, in a temporary, entry-level position. On October 22, 2007, NuAire hired Pye in that position as a regular employee. On that same day, Pye asked NuAire's payroll administrator, Cheryl Holladay, to fill out a two-page employment verification form that he needed to submit to the county to qualify for housing assistance. Holladay told him to return in one week after he had received a paycheck as a regular employee. Pye agreed, and left the form with her.

Pye returned to Holladay's office on October 30, 2007, but she told him to come back later as she had not yet gotten around to completing the employment verification form. Pye again explained his situation, but Holladay said that she did not really care about his situation and referred to the form as “dumb.” Pye left, but immediately returned to ask what time he should come back. While he was standing in the doorway, before Holladay realized he had returned, he saw Holladay sitting at her desk looking at papers and heard her say “nigger goon.” Holladay then saw Pye and hurriedly filled in parts of the form, faxed it to the county, and gave Pye a copy.

When Pye left Holladay's office, he noticed that part of the form had not been completed. Seeing his supervisor, Ken McKnight, Pye told him that Holladay had been rude to him and had not completed the form. McKnight went to speak to Holladay and when he came out of her office, he told Pye to take the form back to Holladay and she would help him. Pye went back into Holladay's office and she apologized to him for the way she had treated him. She then added information to the form and faxed it to the county again. A few days later, Pye represented on a new-employee questionnaire that he was happy at his job and had no complaints.

On or about November 12, 2007, Pye learned from the county that it had only received the top page of the form. Pye returned to Holladay the same day to discuss the matter and she was rude to him again. On November 14, 2007, Pye left a written complaint in McKnight's office, stating that Holladay had referred to him as a “nigger goon,” and had not properly filled out the employment verification form in a timely manner, causing him not to get housing assistance from the county. McKnight immediately referred the matter to NuAire's Director of Human Resources, Vickie Johnson.

Johnson, who was Holladay's friend, reviewed the complaint with Holladay on the day she received it. Holladay admitted calling the form “dumb,” but denied Pye's other allegations. The following day, Johnson wrote a note regarding the investigation to James Peters, a Vice President at NuAire. Johnson stated her belief that any interviews and the investigation should be conducted by someone else, or at least overseen by someone else, as she did not want to be accused of covering for Holladay because Johnson was Holladay's supervisor. Johnson also stated that she was “very upset at the allegations that this person [Pye] has made, and with the number of people we come in contact with in our jobs—without the benefit of witnesses—we are very vulnerable for these types of allegations.”

Johnson, nonetheless, proceeded with the investigation, and met with Pye and McKnight on November 15, 2007. The parties dispute just what was said at the meeting. Accepting Pye's rendition of what transpired, Johnson began by telling him that she did not believe his allegation that Holladay had referred to him as a “nigger goon,” and stated that she had known Holladay for many years, and that Holladay was not a racist. Pye explained the situation to Johnson and McKnight, including that he had lost the housing assistance. Johnson asked him, with disdain, what he wanted to make the problem go away. Pye responded that he wanted to be helped or compensated for what had occurred. Johnson continued to ask him what he wanted to make the problem go away. Pye turned to McKnight and said he had been requesting to move into different jobs in the company, at which point Johnson asked him if he wanted a position with more money, more benefits, or perhaps with a company car. Pye asked what was usually done in this type of situation, and stated that he wanted the matter handled in the usual manner. He also responded that a company car would be nice. Pye also asked Johnson whether, if she could not deal with the matter properly because of her friendship with Holladay, she could give his complaint to someone higher up in the company.

After the meeting, Johnson sent Peters an email stating that Pye “was shaking us down”—that he wanted a promotion, money, and a company car “for his trouble.” She also wrote that Pye had said that “he doesn't want to take it to the next step because a multi-million dollar company like NuAire would go out of business.” NuAire's witnesses testified that they believed that with this language, Pye was referencing the filing of a lawsuit. Johnson suggested to Peters that a lawyer be consulted to see if NuAire could fire Pye for making threats. Peters responded that he did not need to consult a lawyer, and directed McKnight to fire Pye when Pye next returned to work on Monday, November 19, 2007. The only information Peters had at the time he made the decision to terminate Pye pertained to Pye's allegations of discrimination, and to the investigation; he had no information regarding Pye's performance on the job.

McKnight fired Pye on November 19, 2007, telling him that his services were no longer needed and to call Human Resources if he wanted more information. Upon inquiry by Pye the next day, Johnson told him that he was terminated for attempting to obtain a promotion and/or money and a company car through coercion or intimidation.

In his complaint, Pye also alleged that before his termination, he requested training which was denied, while white employees with less skill and experience were given promotions and training. In Count I of his complaint Pye asserted claims for retaliatory termination and hostile work environment. In Count II, he asserted claims of racial harassment and discrimination, and hostile work environment. Specifically, Pye asserted in Count II that he was treated differently than white employees, that the harassing conduct toward him and the failure of supervisors to respond to the situation appropriately created a hostile work environment, and that NuAire “maintained a system of employment which adversely affected African American employees.” ⁴

II.

In the order granting summary judgment, the district court declined to address NuAire's argument that Pye's Title VII claims should be dismissed for his failure to file a charge with the EEOC, determining that judicial economy would be served by dealing with the claims on the merits.

On the merits, the district court first rejected Pye's claim that he was discharged on the basis of race. Finding no link between Holladay's conduct and Pye's termination, the district court analyzed the claim under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and held that Pye failed to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, because he did not show that similarly situated white employees were treated differently.

The district court held that Pye's hostile work environment claim failed because a reasonable person would not consider Holladay's comments so extreme as to create an abusive work environment.

With regard to the claim of retaliatory discharge, the district court found it unnecessary to consider whether Pye could establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, because the claim failed at the pretext stage. The court held that NuAire articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Pye—his coercive attempt to gain employment and monetary benefits—and Pye did not produce evidence showing that NuAire did not honestly believe that his actions were coercive. Moreover, stated the court, no evidence suggested that retaliation was the true cause of NuAire's decision to terminate Pye.

III.

We review de novo the district court's decision to grant summary judgment, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Winspear v. Cmty. Dev., Inc., 574 F.3d 604, 605 (8th Cir.2009). “We will affirm the grant of summary judgment if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ... and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Marksmeier v. Davie, 622 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56).

Disputes that are not “genuine,” or that are about facts that are not “material...