Pyle v. Ferrell

• Decision Date: 24 January 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34429,34429
• Citation: 12 Ill.2d 547,147 N.E.2d 341
• Parties: John PYLE, Appellant, v. Bessie FERRELL et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 341

147 N.E.2d 341

12 Ill.2d 547

John PYLE, Appellant, v. Bessie FERRELL et al., Appellees.

No. 34429.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 24, 1958.

John C. Mitchell, Golconda, and William E. Aulgur, East Alton, for appellant.

No brief for appellees.

DAILY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Hardin County which dismissed for want of equity a complaint whereby the appellant, John Pyle, sought to quiet title to the mineral estate in 80 acres of land and to remove as clouds upon his title a tax deed conveying such estate and certain leases made by the holder of the tax deed.

William Pyle, the father of appellant, acquired title to the land in question by deeds executed in 1886 and 1903. Proof was made that he paid all taxes assessed for the years 1903 through 1911, and both his son and neighbors testified he was in possession and farmed the land until his death in 1931. By the terms of William Pyle's will, which was duly probated, the mineral estate in the 80 acres was severed from the surface estate and title to the former became completely vested in appellant when his mother's life tenancy was terminated by death in 1932. He thus became seized of a separate estate in the minerals with all the rights of an owner of land, and subject to all the laws of possession, conveyance and taxation. Miller v. Ridgley, 2 Ill.2d 223, 117 N.E.2d 759; Deverick v. Bline, 404 Ill. 302, 89 N.E.2d 43; 26 I.L.P., Mining, Oil & Gas, § 11. Such estate could not be lost by mere nonuser or abandonment of the mineral interest, (Uphoff v. Trustees of Tufts College, 351 Ill. 146, 184 N.E. 213, 93 A.L.R. 1224; 26 I.L.P., Mining, Oil & Gas, § 49,) but could be lost by adverse possession, (Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 301 Ill. 362, 133 N.E. 772; Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96, 146 A.L.R. 871,) and is also considered to be 'land,' within the meaning of section 7 of the Limitations Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 83, par. 7,) which may be lost to one who gains title by the payment of taxes for seven years under color of title. Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 176 Ill. 275, 52 N.E. 144.

Appellant was a resident of California when his parents died, having moved there in 1917, and he testified that he first learned of his mineral estate at the time of his monther's death in 1932. He continued his residence in California until 1946, in which year he moved to Galatia, Illinois, described as being 40 miles from the county seat where the tax and property records concerning his mineral estate were kept, and 35 miles from the land itself. By appellant's own admission, he did not at any time between 1932 and 1954 either visit the land or concern himself with the use of his mineral estate. Neither did he pay taxes at any time or attempt to learn of their status. In 1954 appellant's interest in his mineral estate was aroused by a geologist who approached him for a lease and who gave him the information that the estate had been sold to Haggie Ferrell for delinquent taxes. Thereafter appellant filed this proceeding to quiet title and although his complaint offers to do equity, there is no showing that he ever made a tender of the back taxes to Ferrell, or negotiated with him. With regard to taxes on the mineral estate, which were assessed separately from those of the surface estate, appellant testified he had never received notice of assessments and denied having received any notice relating to the tax sale proceedings.

Various tax records introduced in evidence, including a notice of sale, a certificate of purchase, an affidavit for deed, and a tax deed, establish that appellant's mineral estate was sold in 1936 for delinquent taxes of 1935. The purchaser, Haggie Ferrell, received a tax deed in 1938 when the estate was not redeemed. Ferrell paid the taxes assessed for 1936 and 1937 and, after receiving his tax deed, paid the taxes for and including all years up to 1955. In total, therefore, he paid taxes for 20 consecutive years with 18 of the payments being under the color of title afforded by his tax deed. Whether Ferrell took the possession of the mineral estate necessary to perfect a title under section 7 of the Limitations Act, (see: Robertson v. Bachmann, 352 Ill. 291, 185 N.E. 618; Wylie v. Fisher, 337 Ill. 488, 169 N.E. 237; Travers v. McElvain, 200 Ill. 377, 65 N.E. 623; Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 176 Ill. 275, 52 N.E. 144,) remains doubtful from the evidence in the record. However, in the view we take, a decision on that issue is unnecessary to this opinion. During 1951 Ferrell caused the title to the mineral estate to be placed in joint tenancy with his wife and title was so held when this action was commenced in 1954. Ferrell died before the cause was heard, thus it is his widow, Bessie Ferrell, who is the principal appellee in this court. The complaint alleges that Otis Lamar, Aluminum Corporation of America and the Shell Oil Company are third parties claiming some interest in the mineral estate by virtue of leases executed by Ferrell. The Shell Company filed an answer admitting its claim as the assignee of a recorded oil-and-gas lease executed by Ferrell on March 13, 1953, but did not participate further in the case; Lamar and the Aluminum Corporation filed no answers and were defaulted.

Appellant's complaint for equitable relief was predicated on the theory that the tax deed to the mineral estate was void for various incidents of nonconformance with the statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid tax deed. Appellee Ferrell denied the invalidity of the deed and, in addition, affirmatively defended on the ground of laches, and upon title allegedly perfected under section 7 of the Limitations Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 83, par. 7,) by virtue of seven years payment of taxes, with color of title to vacant lands. The chancellor, without passing upon the other issues, dismissed the complaint for want of equity on the ground that appellant had been guilty of laches. Although appellant has argued to the contrary, it is our opinion the decree must be sustained on that ground.

Laches, or the doctrine of stale demand, as it is sometimes termed, is a defense peculiar to equity which is bottomed on the reluctance to aid one who has knowingly slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time, (19 Am.Jur., Equity, sec. 489,) and its existence depends on whether, under all circumstances of a particular case, a plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to institute proceedings before he did. McCartney v. McCartney, 8 Ill.2d 494, 134 N.E.2d 789. Although laches is defined by one authority as such delay in enforcing one's rights as will work to the disadvantage of another, (30 C.J.S. Equity § 112,) it is, unlike limitations, not a mere matter of time but principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced, an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relation of the property and parties, and where there is such a change as to make it inequitable to grant relief, it will be refused. McKey v. McKean, 384 Ill. 112, 51 N.E.2d 189. Laches is, therefore, such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with a lapse of time of more or less duration and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate to bar relief in equity. Curtis v. Curtis, 398 Ill. 442, 75 N.E.2d 881; Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill. 273, 90 N.E.2d 785, 20 A.L.R.2d 1273; Carlson v. Carlson, 409 Ill. 167, 98 N.E.2d 779. When an owner brings an action in equity to recover land as against the holder of the tax title, the doctrine of laches will apply if the conditions for its application are present. 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 985; cf. Oakley v. Hurlbut, 100 Ill. 204.

What facts will combine to constitute laches is to be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case; however, it is pointed out in 19 Am.Jur., Equity, sec. 498, that a suit is held to be barred on the ground of laches or stale demand 'where and only where' the following facts are disclosed: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had notice or knowledge of defendant's conduct and the opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit, and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is held not to be barred. The facts present in this case meet these requirements and demonstrate conclusively that it would be most inequitable to grant relief to appellant, considering the long delay in bringing suit, the nature of the property interest, and all that he permitted to take place with reference to his mineral estate from the time he became seized of such interest until the time he commenced this suit.

Courts treating upon the doctrine of laches have long recognized that more than ordinary promptness is required of a claimant if the property involved is of a speculative or fluctuating character, (Simpson v. Manson, 345 Ill. 543, 178 N.E 250; Carlock v. Carlock, 249 Ill. 330, 94 N.E. 507,) and, because oil and mining property is of such a specially precarious nature and is exposed to the utmost fluctuations in value, have held there is no class of property in which laches is more relentlessly enforced. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 23 L.Ed. 328; Sturm v. Wiess, 8 Cir., 273 F. 457; Medallion Oil Co. v. Hinckley, 9 Cir., 92 F.2d 155. Here we are dealing solely with a mineral estate which had been severed from the surface, and the facts show appellant became aware of his interest, and of its nature, in 1932. Haggie Ferrell, from whom appellee Ferrell derived her...