Pyles v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 05 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-10809,97-10809 |
| Citation | 136 F.3d 986 |
| Parties | 48 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1369 Johnny Dean PYLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gary L. JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Rita Jeanne Radostitz, Elizabeth A. Cohen, Austin, TX, for Pyles.
Douglas A. Danzeiser, Margaret Portman Griffey, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-appellant Johnny Dean Pyles, a Texas death row inmate convicted of capital murder, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
While on routine patrol at 12:50 a.m. on June 20, 1982, Officer Charles Mitchell, a deputy sheriff with the Dallas County Sheriff's Department, noticed a beige Jeep in the parking lot of a small convenience store in the city of Sunnyvale. The store was closed. Mitchell used his patrol car's spotlight to examine the vehicle and the store as he slowly drove past. Mitchell did not see anyone, but a couple in an automobile flashed their high beams as he drove away, and Mitchell stopped. After a conversation with the couple, Mitchell called for backup and indicated that a white male suspected of criminal activity was in the area of the convenience store. Mitchell then parked behind the Jeep with his high beams and spotlight on the vehicle. Mitchell exited his patrol car and, using a flashlight, inspected all four sides of the convenience store building in search of the suspect. Mitchell did not see anyone and concluded that the store was secure.
Officers Ray Kovar and Dwaine Crain, responding to Mitchell's request for backup, approached the scene with their emergency lights and siren on, but turned them off when they got within one half to three quarters of a mile of the store. Mitchell heard the backup unit's siren before the officers turned them off. Kovar and Crain arrived at the scene at approximately 1:00 a.m. After the three officers again secured the building, they began a search of the area.
Mitchell saw Kovar walk around the east side of the building, with a flashlight in his left hand and his pistol in his right hand. Crain took a shotgun and went to the west side of the building to search there. Mitchell and Crain both heard Kovar tell someone, "Halt, get up." Then a series of gunshots were fired. Mitchell ran to help Kovar and found him lying face down. Kovar had suffered a bullet wound to the chest from which he later died.
Crain heard Mitchell shout that Kovar was down and called in a report to that effect on his radio to his dispatcher before joining Mitchell. Crain noticed that Kovar's flashlight was turned on. Two police officers unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate Kovar, and several others searched the scene of the shooting but were unable to locate a suspect.
Richard Hart, a reserve deputy sheriff who was called out to assist in the search for the person who killed Officer Kovar, set up surveillance in an unmarked car almost two miles from the scene of the shooting. Around 4:00 a.m., Hart saw a white male, later identified as Johnny Dean Pyles, walking toward him on Collins Road. He immediately radioed a description of Pyles to the dispatcher and then left the car, pointing his flashlight and pistol at Pyles and ordering him to halt. At first, Pyles turned around and took several steps back the way he came. Hart again ordered Pyles to stop, saying, "One more step and that's it." Pyles turned around and raised his hands. He told Hart that he was not armed. Hart ordered Pyles to lie face down on the road. He noticed that Pyles's right hand was swollen, and that he was bloody and covered with mud. Hart handcuffed Pyles and placed him in the back seat of the car lying face down. Hart recited Pyles's Miranda warnings on the way to the Sunnyvale Substation, and Pyles indicated that he understood his rights.
The magistrate again read Pyles his rights and advised him that he was being charged with capital murder, a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death. The magistrate asked Pyles if he was in pain and if he wanted to go to the hospital. Pyles did not ask for medical attention and did not complain of being in pain. After a paramedic bandaged and elevated Pyles's arm, the magistrate asked Pyles if he was up to talking to the police. 1 Pyles responded affirmatively and the magistrate left for a brief period.
The magistrate returned as Pyles was preparing to sign a statement admitting that he had shot Officer Kovar. The magistrate informed Pyles that he did not have to sign the statement, and, according to the magistrate, Pyles replied, Pyles then signed the statement with his left hand.
Afterward, Sergeant Larry Williams of the Dallas County Sheriff's Office interrogated Pyles. A second statement was prepared based on the conversation between Pyles and Williams, and Pyles signed that statement.
At Pyles's capital murder trial, the medical examiner testified that the cause of Officer Kovar's death was a gunshot wound to his chest. A .38 caliber bullet was removed from Kovar's body. An officer from the Physical Evidence Section of the Sheriff's Office testified about the scene of the shooting. He explained that a .357 magnum pistol was found where Officer Kovar fell. The weapon contained six spent casings. A .38 caliber pistol, found twenty-seven feet from Kovar, contained four spent casings and one empty chamber. Both weapons had been completely emptied by firing.
Pyles testified on his own behalf, explaining that he was not aware at the time of the shooting that Kovar was a police officer. Pyles claimed that he acted in self-defense, firing because he saw a flashlight and a gun pointed at him and heard a voice telling him to halt.
On October 14, 1982, Pyles was convicted of capital murder after a seven-week jury trial. On October 15, 1982, after a separate punishment hearing, the jury answered the three special issues presented to them pursuant to the version of article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time of Pyles's trial in the affirmative. The state district court later sentenced Pyles to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Pyles's conviction and sentence on June 1, 1988.
Pyles filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in state district court on December 5, 1990. On July 15, 1991, the district court entered an order adopting the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the state's response and recommending that the application be denied. On July 19, 1991, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals accepted the district court's recommendation and denied Pyles's application.
On July 22, 1991, Pyles filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. An evidentiary hearing was held before a magistrate judge on January 24 and 25, 1996. On January 16, 1997, the magistrate judge entered findings and a recommendation that the petition be denied. After a de novo review, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and denied Pyles's petition on June 16, 1997. This appeal follows. 2
Pyles contends that the district court erred in denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus because (1) his conviction was based in part upon extrinsic evidence obtained as a result of a juror's unauthorized visit to the crime scene, (2) the state knowingly presented false testimony at his trial, and (3) the state withheld exculpatory evidence. We address each of these issues in turn.
Pyles contends that his conviction was tainted by juror misconduct because one of the jurors in his case, Geraldine Sarratt, made an unauthorized visit to the crime scene. In support of his claim, Pyles offers two affidavits from Sarratt. 3 Both affidavits state that, during the guilt/innocence phase of Pyles's trial, Sarratt made an unauthorized visit to the scene of the shooting. According to the second affidavit, she made the visit during daylight hours. The affidavits also state that, based on the evidence presented at trial, which included photographs of the crime scene taken during day and night, Sarratt "was not convinced that Johnny was guilty of capital murder."
Each affidavit contains a description of the manner in which Sarratt perceived the actual crime scene, viewed in person, to differ from the photographs of the crime scene presented at trial. The first affidavit states Because I had questions in my mind, I went to the scene of the crime. The lot was much smaller than I pictured from the trial. Although photos were in evidence with officers testifying about the scene, pictures never tell the whole story. The visit to the scene of the crime helped me decide that if there had been a police car and officers in the lot, that anyone hiding in the lot would have known a police officer was present.
The second affidavit states:
During the trial, while I was sitting on the jury of Mr. Pyles' capital murder trial and prior to his conviction, I went to the exact scene of the crime. I went to the scene because the photographs and diagrams presented at trial were inadequate for me to understand the dimensions of the area. Most, if not all, of the photographs introduced during the trial were taken of the building and the lot at night. I went to the scene during the day light hours. At that time, I was able to clearly see the dimensions of the area where the crime occurred. The dimensions of the scene in person were very different than the photographs and diagrams shown to the jury during trial.
Specifically, the lot was much smaller than the photographs and diagrams indicated at trial. Viewing the...
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