Pyles v. Raisor, 94-5047

• Decision Date: 01 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-5047,94-5047
• Parties: Teresa A. PYLES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert S. RAISOR, Defendant-Appellant, Ray L. Sabbatine, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1211

60 F.3d 1211

Teresa A. PYLES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert S. RAISOR, Defendant-Appellant Ray L. Sabbatine, et al., Defendants.

No. 94-5047.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued March 24, 1995.

Decided Aug. 1, 1995.

Charles G. Williamson, Jr., Mt. Sterling, KY (argued and briefed), for plaintiff-appellee.

Dave Whalin (argued and briefed), Landrum & Shouse, Louisville, KY, Gordon Goad, Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, Frankfort, KY, for defendant-appellant.

Before: JONES and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; JOINER, District Judge. ^*

JOINER, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BATCHELDER, J., joined. JONES, J. (pp. 1216-17), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

JOINER, District Judge.

Defendant, Robert Raisor, an enforcement officer for Kentucky's Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, arrested plaintiff Teresa Pyles at a rock concert for supplying alcohol to a minor. Pyles responded with this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action, claiming that the arrest and the manner in which it was conducted violated her civil rights. The district court agreed in part, concluding that Pyles' arrest violated Kentucky law. The court entered judgment as a matter of law in Pyles' favor on the issue of liability, and the jury awarded Pyles $35,000 in damages. Inasmuch as Raisor had probable cause to arrest Pyles, we find no federal constitutional right implicated in this action, and reverse the judgment against him.

I.

The rock concert at which Pyles was arrested was held in Rupp Arena, where state, county and city law enforcement officers were engaged in a joint operation to control the unlawful procurement of alcohol for minors. Their operation was conducted pursuant to Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 530.070(1)(a) (Baldwin 1994), which governs unlawful transactions with minors and provides that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he knowingly "sells, gives, purchases or procures any alcoholic or malt beverage in any form to or for a minor." Section 530.070(1)(a) further states that it "does not apply to a parent or guardian of the minor." Under Kentucky law, the age of majority is 18, except with respect to alcohol and the care and treatment of children with disabilities, for which the age of majority is 21. Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 2.015 (Baldwin 1994). The officers were instructed to issue citations to adults who violated Sec. 530.070(1)(a) with respect to minors 18 years of age and older, but to arrest violators who procured alcohol for minors under the age of 18. To aid in the enforcement of Sec. 530.070(1)(a), all beer was sold at the concert in distinctively colored cups.

Pyles attended the concert with her husband, an adult friend, and two German exchange students. Immediately upon arriving, Pyles' husband and his friend bought two glasses of beer apiece, the limit at the concession stand. They testified that each planned on drinking three beers, and returned to the line to purchase two more glasses of beer. The three adults then walked to their seats, each carrying two glasses of beer. The exchange students accompanied them.

Raisor observed the group walking down the aisle and took a seat behind them. Raisor testified that he saw one of the exchange students, Annabell Haars, take a sip from a beer-colored glass with a straw in it. Raisor approached the group, asked for identification, and was told that Haars had none with her. Raisor saw a glass of beer sitting on the floor between Pyles and Haars, and observed Haars trying to scoot the beer with her foot closer to Pyles' seat. Raisor told Pyles and Haars to accompany him to the concourse, where another officer ascertained that Haars was 17 years old. According to Raisor, Pyles became loud and argumentative, telling him that Haars was an exchange student living in her house, and would be deported if arrested. Pyles did not tell Raisor that she was Haars' guardian. Raisor testified that Haars said that she had taken a few sips of the beer, and that the legal age for drinking beer in Germany was 16.

Haars did not testify at trial. Pyles testified, however, that the beer on the floor was one of the three purchased for their adult friend, and that he had left it behind when he exchanged seats with Haars. Pyles further testified that she was detained at the arena for thirty minutes, and that during this time Raisor shouted at her and used profane language. Pyles was then handcuffed and transported by a Lexington police officer to the detention center. Pyles testified that she endured a pat-down search at the detention center in the presence of male inmates, and that she was held three hours before she was permitted to leave.

The misdemeanor charge against Pyles ultimately was dismissed, but the reason for the dismissal is a matter of dispute. Pyles claims to have demonstrated that she was Haars' guardian, and that Sec. 530.070(1)(a) did not apply to her. Raisor and another officer testified that the judge dismissed the charge because Haars was old enough to drink beer in her native country, and because the judge did not want to interfere with the exchange program.

Following the dismissal of the misdemeanor charge, Pyles filed suit in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against Raisor, the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, the Lexington-Fayette County Detention Center, and employees and deputies of each. With respect to Raisor, Pyles alleged that her arrest was not supported by probable cause, and claimed without further elaboration that the arrest violated her federal constitutional "rights, privileges and immunities." Pyles' specific contentions became clearer at trial, where she also claimed that Raisor used excessive force during the arrest. The excessive force claim was rejected by the court on Raisor's motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the conclusion of Pyles' case, and Pyles has not cross-appealed this determination. As to the other defendants, Pyles challenged the manner in which she was searched and detained following her arrest, again claiming generally that the defendants violated her constitutional rights. The claims against all the other defendants were dismissed at the conclusion of Pyles' case due to her failure to demonstrate that the defendants' actions were taken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Pyles has not cross-appealed this determination.

Trial proceeded with respect to the one claim remaining in the case, Pyles' allegation that her arrest was unlawful. The parties filed cross-motions for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence, and the court denied Raisor's motion and granted Pyles' motion with respect to Raisor's liability. The court stated that it "had no problem with" Raisor's testimony that he had probable cause to believe that Pyles had given Haars the beer, and also found that Raisor saw Haars take a drink from a beer-colored cup. Nonetheless, the court found the arrest defective under Kentucky law, which permits an officer to make certain warrantless misdemeanor arrests only when the misdemeanor is committed in his presence. See Ky.Rev.Stat. Sec. 431.005(1)(d) (Baldwin 1994); Mash v. Commonwealth, 769 S.W.2d 42 (Ky.1989) (holding probable cause insufficient to support a warrantless misdemeanor arrest). The district court interpreted Mash to require that the arresting officer personally observe the arrestee commit each element of the offense. Because Raisor did not see Pyles hand one of the beers to Haars, the district court concluded that Raisor lacked the statutory authority to effect the arrest. The court further found that Pyles' mention of the fact that Haars was an exchange student living in her home obligated Raisor to determine whether Sec. 530.070(1)(a) applied by inquiring about Pyles' possible status as Haars' guardian. Finally, the court questioned the logic of Raisor's instructions to arrest only those adults who procured alcohol for minors under the age of 18, noting that Sec. 530.070(1)(a) does not draw a distinction in the ages of the minors to whom alcohol is provided. The court ultimately concluded that the arrest violated Kentucky law, and entered judgment as a matter of law against Raisor on the issue of liability.

II.

Raisor raises numerous issues ¹ on appeal, but we find it necessary to reach only one. This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a statute which provides that one who, under color of state law, deprives another of the "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," shall be liable for damages. "Unless a deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory right has occurred, Sec. 1983 provides no redress even if the plaintiff's common law rights have been violated and even if the remedies available under state law are inadequate." Lewellen v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 34 F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 903, 130 L.Ed.2d 787 (1995). Accordingly, in Conley v. Williams, No. 93-5524, 1994 WL 326001, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 16911 (6th Cir. July 5, 1994), this court held that a Sec. 1983 plaintiff's claim that he was unlawfully stopped and required to present his driver's license turned on federal constitutional law, and not on state law. "While the states are, of course, free to enact laws that are more protective of individual rights than the United States Constitution, a mere violation of such a state law will not establish a proper claim under Sec. 1983." Id. at * 6, 1994 WL 326001 at * 2.

In Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.1990), the Ninth Circuit addressed the very issue presented here, whether a Sec. 1983 plaintiff claiming wrongful arrest can prevail by demonstrating that the arresting officer violated a state law requirement that the misdemeanor be committed in the officer's presence. The court held that the state law requirement was not grounded in the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and that the...