Pyles v. State

• Decision Date: 17 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 609,609
• Citation: 334 A.2d 160,25 Md.App. 263
• Parties: Russell Eugene PYLES v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 263

25 Md.App. 263

334 A.2d 160

Russell Eugene PYLES v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 609.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 17, 1975.

Charles D. Smith, Upper Marlboro, with whom were Taylor & Smith, Upper Marlboro, on the brief, for appellant.

Donald R. Stutman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty., for Prince George's County and Charles P. Strong, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., for Prince George's County on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON, DAVIDSON and MOORE, JJ.

THOMPSON, Judge.

Russell Eugene Pyles appeals from an order of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Chief Judge Ralph W. Powers presiding, finding him in contempt for his failure to comply with a court order directing that he undergo an examination at Patuxent Institution.

The record shows that on September 2, 1970, appellant received a ten year sentence for manslaughter to begin as of July 14, 1970. On September 3, 1970, the trial judge directed that he be referred to Patuxent Institution for examination to determine his status as a defective delinquent. When it was discovered that the order did not contain a requirement that Pyles cooperate, a second order was signed on April 9, 1974 directing that he be examined at Patuxent and that he submit to any mental, medical or physical tests required by the staff of Patuxent Institution for said purposes. A copy of this order was served upon Pyles on April 18, 1974. Thereafter on the 24th of May the trial court signed an order directing that Pyles show cause at a hearing to be held on July 11, 1974, why he should not be held in contempt for violation of the April 9 order. At the hearing, Dr. H. M. Boslow testified that Pyles had submitted to a physical examination but had refused to submit to psychiatric or psychological examinations. Dr. Boslow added that he and the staff had been unable to determine appellant's status because of said refusals. Particular problems were encountered with reference to appellant's intellectual deficiency and emotional unbalance because of the absence of past examinations. Defense counsel stated that the appellant had requested that he advise the court that he had no intentions of submitting to any psychological testing at Patuxent Institution. The trial judge found Pyles in contempt and directed that he:

'. . . be detained by the Division of Correction under this order and not under any other commitment, until such time as he is willing to comply with the Order of this Court dated April 9, 1974, to submit to the examinations enumerated therein; and

'IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that when defendant agrees in writing to comply with the Order of this Court dated April 9, 1974 the Commissioner of Corrections, shall forthwith transfer defendant to Patuxent Institution.'

I WILLFULNESS OF THE CONTEMPT

Appellant first contends that since the two elements that could not be ascertained by Dr. Boslow were his intellectual deficiency and emotional unbalance, his refusal to cooperate could be the result of these factors rather than a contemptuous refusal. The appellant cites no authority to support his argument. Presumably he relies on some of the language of McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245, 92 S.Ct. 2083, 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972), particularly:

'For if confinement is to rest on a theory of civil contempt, then due process requires a hearing to determine whether petitioner has in fact behaved in a manner that amounts to contempt. At such a hearing it could be ascertained whether petitioner's conduct is willful, or whether it is a manifestation of mental illness, for which he cannot fairly be held responsible. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962).' Id. at 251, 92 S.Ct. at 2087.

We do not interpret this language as laying down a rule of law that the record must affirmatively show that the appellant's conduct was not the product of mental or emotional instability, but rather as indicating a possible defense to a charge of contempt. Courts have from time immemorial held that every person was presumed sane in the absence of contrary evidence. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). We have followed the universal rule, Tanner v. State, 9 Md.App. 462, 467-468, 265 A.2d 573 (1970), cert. denied, 259 Md. 736, and see no reason to depart therefrom. See Meyers v. State, 23 Md.App. 275, 326 A.2d 773 (1974). There is nothing in this record which would tend to show the appellant's contemptuous conduct was the product of intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance. It appears rather or be a studied intention to avoid a possible application of Md.Code, Art. 31B.

II SELF-INCRIMINATION

Appellant argues that the trial judge's order directing him to cooperate was invalid under Savage v. State, 19 Md.App. 1, 308 A.2d 701 (1973) and Meyers v. State, supra. The orders in those cases specifically provided that information elicited could not be used in any criminal case or prosecution against the accused. We do not think the omission of such a caveat is fatal.

When a witness is called to testify in any proceeding he is permitted to claim his privilege against self-incrimination and to refuse to answer any appropriate question. That does not mean, however, that he can avoid testifying as to any facts which might not incriminate him. Shifflett v. State, 245 Md. 169, 173, 225 A.2d 440 (1967); Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 447-448, 204 A.2d 500 (1964); 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2268 (McNaughton Rev.1961). In the instant case we are unable to see how an I.Q. examination, for example, could in anywise incriminate Pyles or anyone else. It is possible that in securing the psychiatric history appellant might be asked about some crime, not barred by the statute of limitations, and of which he was not previously convicted, but he cannot be permitted to claim his privilege against self-incrimination and thus avoid giving any history of his prior life. In an appropriate case we may well sustain his right to refuse to answer a specific question. Of course, an accused in a criminal case can refuse to testify. Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 22; Marshall v. State, 182 Md. 379, 35 A.2d 115 (1943), but in the instant situation Pyles is more akin to a witness than an accused.

As we indicated in Savage v. State, supra, we agree with United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 723 (4th Cir. (1968) that 'a defendant's right not to incriminate himself is not violated per se by requiring him, in an appropriate case, to submit to a mental examination.' We do not think that the difference between an insanity examination and an examination to determine defective delinquency is significant. In both instances the court is trying to protect society and an individual who may be suffering from a mental illness of some type. We reiterate what we said in Savage v. State, supra:

'It follows, said the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in Sas v. Maryland, D.C., 295 F.Supp. 389, 411 (1969), affirmed, sub nom., Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (...