Pyles v. United Air Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 93-4920,93-4920
• Parties: 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2818, 131 Lab.Cas. P 11,529 Paul J. PYLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1046

79 F.3d 1046

151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2818, 131 Lab.Cas. P 11,529

Paul J. PYLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-4920.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 20, 1996.

F. Lee Bailey, Bailey, Fishman, Freeman & Ferrin, West Palm Beach, FL, for appellant.

Peter W. Zinober, Zinober & McCrea, P.A., Tampa, FL, Charles A. Powell, IV and Robert A. Siegel, O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, California, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, COX, Circuit Judge, and DYER, Senior Circuit Judge.

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:

Appellant Paul J. Pyles, a former Pan American Airlines pilot, appeals the district court's dismissal of his case against United Airlines. The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that appellant's claims are preempted by both the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1988), and the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA"), Pub.L. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (repealed by Pub.L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 745, 1379, 1383 (1994), and replaced by provisions of 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 40101-49105 (West 1995)). We affirm.

I.

On October 23, 1990, United and Pan Am entered into an agreement in principle whereby Pan Am would sell to United, in a two-phase transaction, the following: first, two of its Boeing 747 aircraft and some ground facilities, and second, some of its European routes and equipment used to service those routes. A final agreement for the transaction (the "Phase Two Agreement") was signed on November 14, 1990. To address concerns over potential job losses at Pan Am as a consequence of the route and aircraft sale, the Phase Two Agreement provided that:

[United] shall exercise its best efforts to take a reasonable number of qualified and current B747 flight crew members from [Pan Am's] seniority list following the Interim Closing or the Closing, as the case may be. [United] will utilize its normal hiring procedures and standards, and will consider employing only flight crew members who are currently flying the European operation, determined by [United] to be pilot-qualified, and pass [United's] flight medical examination.

Phase Two Agreement § 5.9(g) (emphasis added).

The Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA") maintained a local at both United (the "UAL-ALPA") and Pan Am (the "PAA-ALPA"), and represented pilots of each airline in collective-bargaining negotiations. The agreement called for UAL-ALPA and PAA-ALPA to negotiate and then provide United, by December 1, 1990, with an agreed number of Pan Am crews to be transferred to United. Phase Two Agreement § 5.9(g)(ii). ¹ Failure to do so would result in United's being free from any obligation to hire any Pan Am crews. Unable to reach an agreement, the union locals were subsequently sent to arbitration pursuant to a resolution passed by the Executive Committee of ALPA International. ² On February 8, 1991, the arbitrator rendered his decision, reduced to a written award on March 27, which concluded that forty-two Pan Am 747 flight crew members should be transferred to United.

While these events transpired, United entered into negotiations with ALPA. On February 4, 1991, they entered an agreement (the "letter of agreement") that established a framework for the impending crew transfers. The letter of agreement discussed the general manner in which integration of the Pan Am crews into United operations would proceed, the benefits and compensation the transferred crews would be entitled to receive, and the selection criteria for transfer. In addition, the agreement admonished that transferring crews would have to "pass a United pilot physical examination" and "otherwise satisfy all of United's normal pilot hiring criteria." Letter of Agreement, Attachment A.

Appellant's seniority was such that he qualified to be among the group slated for transfer to United. He therefore submitted to United's physical examination on April 1, 1991. Pyles claims he was told that he failed this physical examination because radial keratotomy surgery had been performed on his eyes in 1986. On that basis, he alleges that United refused to hire him and officially denied him employment on April 8. Having been denied a job, Pyles brought this action in the district court.

Pyles had three state-law claims pending in the district court when the order dismissing the case was entered on July 21, 1993. ³ His first claim was for breach of the route purchase agreements between Pan American and United. The second alleged breach of the letter of agreement between United and UAL-ALPA. Pyles claimed to be a third-party beneficiary to these agreements. Pyles' final claim alleged that United tortiously interfered with the business relationship between Pyles and Pan Am.

II.

We consider first appellant's first and third counts. Section 11.5 of the Phase Two Agreement, entitled "No Third Party Beneficiary," states that

[n]othing herein expressed or implied is intended to or shall be construed to confer upon or give to any person or corporation other than the parties hereto and their successors or permitted assigns any rights or remedies under or by reason of this agreement.

Phase Two Agreement § 11.5. Because he is not a party to the agreement and because the agreement specifically precludes third-party beneficiaries, appellant has failed to state a claim in his first count. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

Appellant's third count, for tortious interference, likewise fails to state a claim. The complaint lacks a sufficient factual predicate to substantiate how United tortiously interfered with Pyles' business relationship with Pan Am. Under Florida law, Pyles must prove the following in order to recover for tortious interference with a business relationship:

1. the existence of a business relationship under which Pyles has legal rights;

2. knowledge by United of such relationship;

3. an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship by United; and

4. damage to Pyles.

See Babbit Elecs., Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1161, 1177 (11th Cir.1994) (per curiam). Pyles has failed to state a claim because he has pled nothing which would satisfy the third and fourth elements. Pyles does not allege any affirmative act on the part of United that interfered with his relationship with Pan Am. When United denied him employment, it in no way affected Pyles' relationship with Pan Am; Pyles returned to work at Pan Am with his former status and benefits intact. The record is devoid of any allegations to the contrary. Given those facts, it is also impossible for Pyles to show that he has suffered any damage. Construing the pleaded facts and inferences arising therefrom as true, we find that Pyles can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.1995); Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987, 113 S.Ct. 1586, 123 L.Ed.2d 153 (1993). We therefore dismiss count three for failure to state a claim. ⁴ See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

III.

Most of the provisions of the RLA apply to labor relations in the airline industry. See 45 U.S.C. § 181. The RLA has established a framework for the resolution of disputes between air carriers and their employees that "grow[ ] out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 45 U.S.C. § 184. The distinguishing feature of such a dispute, termed a "minor dispute," is that "the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing [collective-bargaining] agreement." Consolidated Rail Corp. v Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 305, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 2482, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989). Congress intended that these "minor disputes" be resolved through the grievance procedures of the RLA rather than in federal court. See Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94, 99 S.Ct. 399, 402, 58 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). Therefore, it has long been the rule that when the resolution of a state-law claim, such as the breach of contract claim here, requires an interpretation of the CBA, the claim is preempted and must be submitted to arbitration before a system board of adjustment. See Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 324, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972).

The Supreme Court recently revisited its standard for preemption of claims by the RLA in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). In so doing, the Court adopted the preemption standard applied in cases under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2249; see Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). The LMRA standard narrows the otherwise broad preemptive scope of the RLA by precluding preemption of state-law claims that enforce rights independent of a CBA. See Hawaiian Airlines, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2246-48. The fact that reference to a CBA may be required, particularly where factual issues are involved, is insufficient of itself to preempt an independent state-law claim; only where interpretation of a CBA is required will the claim be preempted. See id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2251. In Hawaiian Airlines, the Court applied the narrow standard and concluded that the RLA did not preempt a state tort cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of protections embodied in a state whistleblower protection act. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2251.

Applying the standard set forth in Hawaiian Airlines, we find appellant's second claim, alleging breach of the letter of agreement between United and UAL-ALPA, preempted by the Railway Labor Act. ⁵ The letter, in its first paragraph, indicates that it is "entered into in accordance with the provisions of...