Pyne v. Meese

Decision Date22 August 1985
Citation172 Cal.App.3d 392,218 Cal.Rptr. 87
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesBritt PYNE and Harold Pollard, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. George MEESE, Director of California Department of Motor Vehicles, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 23926.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., and Seward L. Andrews and James M. Schiavenza, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendants and respondents, George Meese, Director of Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, State of Cal., John Hurd, and Joann Black.

Price, Price, Davis, Brown & Halsey and F. Dennis Halsey, Chico, for defendants and respondents County of Siskiyou and Sheriff Laurence "Bud" Taylor.

Weintraub, Genshlea, Hardy, Erich & Brown and Larry L. Hill, Redding, for defendants and respondents City of Etna and David Bradford.

EVANS, Acting Presiding Justice.

Plaintiffs brought an action under 42 United States Code section 1983 against defendants, various local and state agencies and their representatives. The trial court granted defendants' separate motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting the motions and in awarding attorney fees and costs. We will affirm the judgments.

FACTS 1

In July 1982, plaintiffs received notice from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) that registration fees in the amounts of $100 and $45 were due on their horse trailer and Volkswagen, respectively. Plaintiff Pollard indicated to the DMV he intended to pay the fees, but requested a hearing pursuant to title 13, California Administrative Code, section 310.04, as he questioned the legality of federal reserve notes and did not wish to use them to pay the fees. Plaintiffs maintain unconventional beliefs regarding certain issues and believe the use of federal reserve notes violates the United States Constitution.

A hearing was held in August 1982. Plaintiffs' sole purpose in attending the hearing was to discuss the constitutional validity of using federal reserve notes to pay the registration fees. They did not inform the hearing officer the vehicles were not being operated upon public highways. 2 Following the hearing, plaintiffs were notified the fees were due and owing.

[172 Cal.App.3d 399] Some time before the hearing, plaintiffs had attempted to pay the registration fees on a jeep they owned with Public Office Money Certificates (hereafter POMCs). 3 They were informed POMCs were not acceptable as a form of payment.

On the day of the hearing concerning the fees on the trailer and the Volkswagen, plaintiffs met with DMV agents Hurd and Black at Archie's Pizza Parlor in Etna. Defendant Bradford, Chief of the Etna Police Department, was also present. Hurd informed plaintiff Pollard the fees were due on the jeep and if he did not pay in acceptable currency, the vehicle would be impounded. Bradford informed Pollard he (Bradford) was there to keep the peace. Plaintiff Pollard told Hurd the vehicle was not going to be impounded and that furthermore, a seizure warrant as defined by the United States Constitution was necessary. During this confrontation, Pollard gestured to a sign regarding Proposition 15 (gun control) which was in issue at the time and stated, " 'When you come to take our guns, it won't be this easy.' " He explained he had no reason to believe Hurd would attempt to take his guns, but was generally fearful of police action.

Defendant Black, a DMV investigative agent, contacted Pollard in November 1982, and asked if he intended to pay the fees on the trailer and Volkswagen. He replied he would not tender the fees unless he could pay with gold or silver at the daily rate. Because the fees remained unpaid, a "seize and sell" order was issued by the DMV registrar. Such orders are issued by the Sacramento office after a hearing has been held and the fees have been determined to be owing and are not received within a certain time. DMV agents of the special investigations branch, charged with enforcing the seize and sell orders, act solely on the face of the orders; they are presumed to be valid. Once an order is issued, it is the duty of a special investigations agent to carry it out. Under DMV policy, the agent may go onto private property to seize a vehicle even if it has not been

operating on the public highways, so long as a seize and sell order has been issued

On February 3, 1983, Black and Hurd, armed with the seizure order, went to the Siskiyou County Sheriff's Office and requested law enforcement assistance in carrying out the order. Black believed plaintiffs might resort to violence, because of the gun reference made when she and Hurd collected the fees on the jeep. Black showed the seizure order to Captain Jourdan of the sheriff's department, who assigned Deputy Samples to accompany them.

[172 Cal.App.3d 400] Samples discussed the request with Bradford, whose desk is near Samples' in city hall, and Bradford volunteered to accompany Samples. Bradford was assisted by Fector, a nonuniformed employee of the Etna Police Department. Samples, Bradford, Fector, Black, and Hurd proceeded to plaintiffs' residence. When they arrived, the gate was open and the vehicles were to the right of the driveway. Plaintiffs were not at home but arrived shortly thereafter. Hurd refused to show plaintiff Pollard the seizure order and a confrontation ensued. Pollard attempted to block the Volkswagen by moving his tractor behind it, but was thwarted by Bradford who stood in the tractor's path. Plaintiffs informed Black and Hurd the vehicles had not been moved since 1982 and were inoperable. Pollard also informed Black he had been told by an employee of the Yreka branch of the DMV that he need not register a vehicle which was not being operated on public highways. Black went ahead with the impound procedure because she had a valid seizure order. Bradford threatened Pollard by quoting section 148 of the Penal Code, resisting an officer, to him. Upon the advice of their attorney, plaintiffs paid the fees in legal tender.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint for deprivation of civil rights under 42 United States Code section 1983, 4 alleging the defendants' conduct had deprived them of their constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures, invaded their privacy, and deprived them of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. The gist of plaintiffs' complaint appears to be that they did not in fact owe any registration fees because the vehicles were not being operated upon public highways, thus any action taken pursuant to or in connection with the seizure order was illegal. The trial court granted each of the separate motions for summary judgment filed by Meese and the DMV, Hurd and Black, Bradford and the City of Etna, and the County of Siskiyou and its Sheriff, Bud Taylor.

I

For purposes of convenience, we shall address the three categories of defendants (state, county, and city) separately.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, GEORGE MEESE (DIRECTOR OF DMV), AND DMV AGENTS HURD AND BLACK

We begin by summarily dismissing the objection to the summary judgment in favor of Meese. Meese was not the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles at the time of the underlying incident. He did not assume that position until March 14, 1983. Plaintiffs appear to concede the issue, as they raise no argument regarding Meese's actions, save a statement in their factual summary indicating they were misled as to who in fact was the director of the DMV at the time of the incident. Quite clearly, Meese cannot be in any way liable if he was not the director of the DMV at the time of the confrontation and was not otherwise involved. Plaintiffs do not allege Meese held some other position with the DMV prior to being named director.

Next, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding the State of California (State) and its agency, the DMV, are not amenable to suit under 42 United States Code section 1983 (hereafter section 1983) in an action brought in state court. They argue federal case law is in conflict over whether a state is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983 and that those cases holding a state may not be sued under section 1983 in an action brought in federal court rely upon the Eleventh Amendment, which is inapplicable to a cause of action brought in state court.

In Quern v. Jordan (1979) 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358, the Supreme Court firmly held that states were not amenable to suit under section 1983 because of the immunity conferred upon them by the Eleventh Amendment. (440 U.S. at pp. 342-345, 99 S.Ct. at pp. 1145-1147, 59 L.Ed.2d at pp. 367-369.) Both Quern and its predecessor, Edelman v. Jordan (1974) 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662, involved an action brought against a state or its officials in federal court. Plaintiffs argue Quern is inapposite, as they have chosen to proceed in state court, 5 thus alleviating any potential Eleventh Amendment problems. They do not rely on any direct decisional holding but rather primarily upon a footnote in Maine v. Thiboutot (1980) 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555. The plaintiffs in Thiboutot sued the State of Maine and its commissioner of Human Services in state court under section 1983. The issue before the court was whether section 1983 encompassed actions based upon purely statutory violations of federal law and if so, whether attorney fees under 42 United States Code section 1988 could be awarded to the prevailing party. (Id., at p. 3, 100 S.Ct. at p. 2503, 65 L.Ed.2d at p. 558.) In its discussion regarding the availability of attorney fees, the court dropped a footnote discussing the power reserved to Congress by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to set aside Eleventh Amendment immunity in certain cases and stated, "No Eleventh Amendment question is present, of...

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