Pytlewski v. U.S., 96 C 6928.
| Decision Date | 26 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96 C 6928.,96 C 6928. |
| Citation | 991 F.Supp. 1043 |
| Parties | Richard PYTLEWSKI, Sr., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Roger D. Rickmon, George M. Ferreti, Herschbach, Tracy, Johnson, Bertani & Wilson, Joliet, IL, for Plaintiff.
Samuel D. Brooks, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Richard Pytlewski ("Pytlewski") has filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States of America ("the government") for injuries that he sustained in a slip and fall at the Lockport, Illinois Postal Store. The government has filed a motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the court grants the government's motion.
At approximately 4:30 p.m. on September 21, 1995, Pytlewski entered the Lockport, Illinois Postal Store. At that time, there was a "medium drizzle" outside. Before entering the store, Pytlewski walked across six feet of wet concrete sidewalk to the front door of the Lockport Postal Store. Pytlewski did not have an umbrella with him at the time.
As Pytlewski entered the Postal Store, he stepped on a rubber mat which was located just inside the door of the store and was lying flat on the floor. The mat was wet from people walking on it as they entered and exited the store; however, the mat was not "water logged." The floor of the Lockport Postal Store was also wet, which Pytlewski surmised was caused by people walking into the Postal Store. Pytlewski stepped off the mat, took three steps, and then fell to the floor.
Pytlewski was taken to St. Joseph Medical Center in Joliet, Illinois, where he was diagnosed with a fractured left ankle. The next day, September 22, 1995, he had surgery on his left ankle. He was released from St. Joseph Medical Center on September 27, 1995.
There is no evidence that any of the Lockport Postal Store employees ever mopped the entrance to the Lockport Postal Store on September 21, 1995. In fact, four Lockport Postal Store employees each testified at a deposition that he or she had not mopped the entrance area of the Lockport Postal Store on September 21, 1995 and/or that he or she did not remember anyone else doing so. In addition, one of the employees testified that the Lockport Postal Store has a wet floor sign on a mop bucket, which another employee testified was never placed in the lobby area on September 21, 1995.
United States Postal Service Maintenance Series Handbook MS-10 ("the MS-10 handbook") and United States Postal Service Housekeeping Postal Facilities Handbook MS-47 ("the MS-47 handbook"), which are published by the United States Postal Service both contain guidelines or procedures to be followed by United States postal employees when dealing with wet floors. There is no evidence that any Lockport Postal Store employee had ever received a copy of, had read, or had been told about the MS-10 or MS-47 handbook. Four Lockport Postal Store employees whose duties include housekeeping functions each testified at a deposition that he or she had never received any written materials concerning floor safety or general lobby maintenance.
On October 23, 1996, Pytlewski filed suit against the United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Pytlewski's complaint alleges that
[o]n September 21, 1995, Defendant's employees were negligent in that (a) they failed to remove, in a timely manner, water which was present on the floor and on a rubber mat which was situated inside the entrance to the post office building; (b) failed to use reasonable care in the maintenance of the floor and rubber mat; and (c) allowed the floor and rubber mat to remain in a slippery, hazardous, and unsafe condition.
(Compl. ¶ 8.) This court has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1346 and the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80.
A motion for summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material facts exists for trial when, in viewing the record and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir.1995).
The burden is on the moving party to show that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party presents a prima facie showing that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir.1989).
Under the FTCA, the government's liability is determined in accordance with the law of the place where the injury occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Buscaglia v. United States, 25 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir.1994). As Pytlewski's accident occurred in Illinois, Illinois law governs.
Pytlewski's action against the government is for negligence. In Illinois, to succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3) the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Rhodes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 172 Ill.2d 213, 216 Ill.Dec. 703, 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1267 (1996) (citing Vesey v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 145 Ill.2d 404, 164 Ill. Dec. 622, 583 N.E.2d 538 (1991)). Whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. (citing Gouge v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 144 Ill.2d 535, 163 Ill.Dec. 842, 582 N.E.2d 108, 111 (1991)). In deciding whether a duty exists under the facts of the case, the court must determine "whether the parties stood in such a relationship to each other that the law imposes an obligation on one to act for the protection of the other." Id. (citing Gouge, 163 Ill.Dec. 842, 582 N.E.2d at 111). If the plaintiff fails to establish the existence of a duty, summary judgment for the defendant is proper. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry., 165 Ill.2d 107, 208 Ill.Dec. 662, 649 N.E.2d 1323, 1326 (1995).
In this case, the only reasonable inference from the record is that Pytlewski slipped on a natural accumulation of water that was on the Lockport Postal Store.2 The issue before the court is whether Pytlewski has established that the government had a duty to remove the water or to warn of its existence. The government argues that it did not owe such a duty to Pytlewski because, pursuant to Illinois' natural accumulations rule, a landowner does not have a duty to remove the tracks or residue left by customers who have walked through natural accumulations of water. Pytlewski argues that notwithstanding the natural accumulations rule, the government owed him a duty to remove the water or to warn of its existence because it voluntarily assumed the duty to do so by adopting the MS-47 and MS-10 handbooks.
The government argues that, pursuant to the natural accumulations rule, it did not owe Pytlewski a duty to remove the water from the floor or to warn of its existence. In Illinois, it is well settled that a landowner does not have a duty to remove the tracks or residue left by customers who have walked through natural accumulations of water, slush, or snow. E.g., Stypinski v. First Chicago Bldg. Corp., 214 Ill.App.3d 714, 158 Ill.Dec. 604, 574 N.E.2d 717, 718 (1991); Wilson v. Gorski's Food Fair, 196 Ill.App.3d 612, 143 Ill.Dec. 477, 554 N.E.2d 412, 414 (1990); Lohan v. Walgreens Co., 140 Ill. App.3d 171, 94 Ill.Dec. 680, 488 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (1986); Torres v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. 93 C 3376, 1994 WL 23076, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Jan.21, 1994) (); Johansen v. United States, No. 92 C 5296, 1993 WL 338185, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug.31, 1993) (). There may be liability, however, if the plaintiff establishes that his injuries resulted from an unnatural accumulation of ice, snow, or water or from a natural condition which was aggravated by the landowner. E.g., Stypinski, 158 Ill.Dec. 604, 574 N.E.2d at 718; Wilson, 143 Ill.Dec. 477, 554 N.E.2d at 414; Handy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 182 Ill. App.3d 969, 131 Ill.Dec. 471, 538 N.E.2d 846, 848 (1989); Bernard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 166 Ill.App.3d 533, 116 Ill.Dec. 945, 519 N.E.2d 1160, 1161-62 (1988). Where there is no liability for falls resulting from natural accumulations of water, there is no duty to warn of such conditions. E.g., Handy, 131 Ill.Dec. 471, 538 N.E.2d at 847; Newcomm v. Jul, 133 Ill.App.2d 918, 273 N.E.2d 699, 701 (1971); Johansen, 1993 WL 338185, at *3.
In Lohan, Bernard, and Handy, cases involving facts analogous to the case at bar, the Illinois appellate court affirmed summary judgments granted in favor of the defendants pursuant to the natural accumulations rule. In Lohan, the plaintiff had entered a common entranceway to the defendants' store on a rainy day. As she entered, she noticed two rubber mats on each side of the front door. Both the mats and the concrete walk that led up to the mats were wet. The plaintiff entered the door and...
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