Qinghua Zhang v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka
| Decision Date | 28 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-4073-SAC |
| Parties | QINGHUA ZHANG, and STEVEN CRAIG HEILAND, Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF TOPEKA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
The plaintiffs, Qinghua Zhang ("Zhang") and Steven Craig Heiland ("Heiland"), are former employees of Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka ("FHLB"). They bring claims of race-based discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") and state common-law retaliatory termination in violation of public policy. FHLB moves for summary judgment (ECF# 90), and the parties have fully briefed the motion.
Both plaintiffs worked for FHLB for over a decade. An Asian-American male, Zhang began working on January 16, 2007. When he was terminated on March 5, 2019, he held the position of Director of Quantitative Analysis. A white male, Heiland began working on May 6, 1999. When he was terminated on April 29, 2019, he held the position of Director of Market Risk Operations.
The employment problems at issue seem to have escalated from the following. When Peg Schultz ("Schultz"), a Caucasian woman on working on Zhang's team, retired in September of 2018, she stated in her exit interview with Human Resources ("HR") that she believed Zhang had discriminated against women and harbored a discriminatory attitude toward them. In response, HR interviewed a Caucasian woman working in the same department but not on Zhang's team. HR then verbally counseled Zhang in November of 2018. After this disciplinary action, the tension between the plaintiffs and FHLB's management and HR escalated.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding the motion, the court's role is "is not . . . to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. The court may grant summary judgment for lack of a genuine issue when the evidence is insufficient "for a jury to return a verdict," when "the evidence is merely colorable," or when the evidence "is not significantly probative." Id. It follows then that a genuine issue for trial exists when "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way." Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden is met "by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Adler, 144 F.3d at 671. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and set forthspecific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational fact finder could find for the nonmovant." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Such facts "must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein." Id.
The court applies this standard drawing all inferences arising from the record in the nonmovant's favor. Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003). The court does not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; these are jury functions. Id. at 1216. The Tenth Circuit has counseled the following for summary judgment proceedings in employment discrimination cases:
[I]n the context of employment discrimination, "[i]t is not the purpose of a motion for summary judgment to force the judge to conduct a 'mini trial' to determine the defendant's true state of mind." Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 453 (10th Cir. 1995). Many of the highly fact-sensitive determinations involved in these cases "are best left for trial and are within the province of the jury." Id.; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (). Consequently, "in this Circuit . . . an employment discrimination suit will always go to the jury so long as the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to disbelieve the employer's [explanation for the alleged misconduct]." Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998) (Tacha, J., concurring in part); see Randle, 69 F.3d at 452 ().
Lounds v. Lincare, Inc., 812 F.3d 1208, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2015).
CLAIMS
In the pretrial order, Zhang states his legal claim of Title VII race discrimination as FHLB taking "materially adverse job actions against him because of his race." ECF# 89, p. 7. For his factual contentions, Zhang asserts Michael Surface ("Surface"), supervisor for both him and Heiland, received repeated complaints in2018 about Schultz treating Asian-minority employees in the Market Risk Analysis ("MRA") Department poorly. Surface counseled Schultz about her behavior but took no further disciplinary action against her. Nor did FHLB investigate these allegations of race discrimination against Schultz. It is also contended the plaintiffs complained to Surface that Cathy Parcaro was promoted over an Asian employee who had been promised a promotion. This discriminatory action was reported to HR, but it was not investigated and did not result in any disciplinary action. It is further contended that when Schultz complained of Zhang discriminating against women, HR failed to speak to him, to investigate prior complaints against Schultz, and to interview other witnesses before disciplining him.
The pretrial order reflects that Zhang contends he complained to Surface and HR of their race discrimination in the handling and investigation of Schultz's allegations against him and in Surface's threatening conduct toward Asians and tolerance of Schultz's actions toward Asians. Finally, Zhang contends he complained when Cathy Parcaro was recognized for work that had been accomplished by Zhang's Asian team, but HR did not fairly investigate his complaints or take disciplinary action. While including all these incidents as discrimination, the pretrial order is not clear on what Zhang is asserting to be an adverse employment action for this claim. Based on the parties' summary judgment briefing on this claim, the court understands Zhang's termination to be the only adverse employment action. The court, therefore, understands these factual contentions to be evidence in support of his claim of racially discriminatory employment termination.
Zhang summarizes his Title VII retaliation claim as FHLB taking materially adverse actions against him in retaliation for opposing discrimination against Asian minority employees. Zhang contends FHLB terminated his "employment in retaliation for his complaints of race discrimination." ECF# 89, p. 5.
Zhang summarizes his state-law claim of retaliatory discharge for whistle-blowing activities as FHLB terminated him in retaliation for reporting that FHLB had violated its Anti-Fraud Policy, the Safety and Soundness Act, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Zhang contends he reported to Surface in December of 2018 "a modeling issue that would generate false reports" and to Enterprise Risk Management ("ERM") Department "suspicious model validation reports." ECF# 89, p. 4. Zhang also contends that in January of 2019 he reported to Surface "a serious modeling issue in the stress-testing process," and that in March of 2019 he reported to Surface and Schlossman "serious concerns about the PolyPath income simulation validation process." Id. He contends FHLB did not address his concerns about false reporting but terminated him in retaliation.
Heiland summarizes in the pretrial order his Title VII claim of retaliation as FHLB taking materially adverse actions against him in retaliation for witnessing and opposing upper management's discrimination of Asian employees. He also contends in the pretrial order that in November and December of 2018 Zhang listed him as a witness to the discriminatory conduct of Schultz and Surface. Heiland also contends that upon Zhang's termination on March 5, 2019, he told Surface that he opposed the termination as discriminatory and retaliatory. "On April 12, 2019, the day after Zhang identified Heiland as witness and opponent of the action, FHLBank placed Heiland onadministrative leave, and Heiland notified FHLBank's HR and Legal Department that he opposed the discrimination and retaliation Zhang had been subjected to and he supported the whistleblower claims concerning false reports." ECF# 89, p. 5.
Heiland summarizes his state-law claim of retaliatory discharge for whistle-blowing activities as his termination for reporting that FHLB had violated its Anti-Fraud Policy, the Safety and Soundness Act, and Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the pretrial order, the contentions state that the "plaintiffs" reported the January 2019 modeling issue and the March 2019 serious concerns about the PolyPath income simulation validation process. The contentions also include that Heiland reported to Surface "a serious false report about pricing mortgage investments." Id. at p. 4. He too contends FHLB did not address his concerns about false reporting but terminated him in retaliation.
Both plaintiffs also contend FHLB offered them severance agreements that...
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