Qiu v. Huang
| Docket Number | Record No. 0459-22-4 |
| Decision Date | 18 April 2023 |
| Citation | 77 Va.App. 304,885 S.E.2d 503 |
| Parties | Shiye QIU v. Chaoyu HUANG, Anna Ouspenskaya and Arlene Starace |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Jacqueline A. Kramer (Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr. ; Westlake Legal Group, on briefs), for appellant.
Bernard J. DiMuro, Alexandria; James R. Hart, Fairfax; Max F. Maccoby (Jonathan R. Mook, Alexandria; Robert F. Horan, III, Fairfax; DiMuroGinsberg, PC; Hart & Horan, P.C.; Washington Global Law Group PLLC, on brief), for appellees.
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges AtLee and Friedman
OPINION BY CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER
Shiye Qiu appeals a decision of the circuit court dismissing his various claims against the appellees, Chaoyu Huang, Anna Ouspenskaya, and Arlene Starace. He argues that the court erred by sustaining their joint demurrer and dismissing his claims of tortious interference with parental rights and civil conspiracy against the three women, as well as his claim of fraud against Starace. He further contends that the court erred by staying the proceedings, including discovery, prior to ruling on the demurrer. We hold that the circuit court did not err, and we affirm the challenged rulings.
Qiu (the father) and Sharon Yip (the mother) were married in 1995, and their daughter, M.Q., was born in 2005. The parties separated when M.Q. was eight years old. A few months later, the mother began divorce and custody proceedings and also sought pendente lite relief.
Two years later, in 2016, while the divorce and custody proceedings were ongoing, the father filed the pro se tort complaint that is the subject of this appeal. In that complaint, he alleged that two of the mother's acquaintances and one of her attorneys were tortiously involved in the custody dispute. For purposes of this appeal, the three relevant defendants were Chaoyu Huang, the mother's friend; Anna Ouspenskaya, M.Q.’s piano teacher and someone with whom the mother had a "deep friendship and intimate relationship"; and Arlene Starace, the mother's attorney during the first part of the divorce and custody proceedings (collectively the defendants). The complaint also named Arnold Small, Ph.D., a therapist who treated both M.Q. and the father.3 The father did not seek service of the complaint at that time.
In February 2017, the circuit court entered the final divorce decree and awarded joint legal custody of M.Q. to the parents, with primary physical custody to the mother. Shortly afterward, the father retained counsel in the tort suit and obtained service of the complaint on the defendants, who challenged it with demurrers. The circuit court granted the father leave to amend various parts of the complaint on multiple occasions. In June 2019, he filed his fifth amended complaint, which was more than fifty pages long and contained nine counts. Counts one to four, eight, and nine are at issue in this appeal.
Counts one, two, and three, respectively, alleged that Huang, Ouspenskaya, and Starace tortiously interfered with the father's parental and custodial rights intentionally and without his consent. With regard to Huang and Ouspenskaya, the complaint alleged that they encouraged the mother to leave the father, helping her formulate and implement a departure plan that included taking M.Q. with her. The father further alleged that Ouspenskaya encouraged M.Q. to view her as a "substitute" parental figure. With regard to Starace, the complaint alleged that she, too, intentionally interfered in the father's parental and custodial relationship with M.Q. in various ways.
Additional facts pleaded made clear that none of the three women physically took M.Q. from the father or the mother. Instead, they merely encouraged and aided the mother in leaving the father and in obtaining a divorce and award of shared custody. The complaint also averred that the women "played a role in physically, mentally and emotionally alienating M.Q." from her father without his consent, "severely damaging the [parent-child] relationship."
These first three counts asserted further that, from 2014 to 2017, as result of the behavior of the three defendants, the father was unable to speak with M.Q. by phone and was permitted to see her only once a week for dinner under the mother's supervision. Additionally, the father alleged that for approximately one year from 2017 to 2018, he was unable to have any contact with M.Q.4 Finally, the father suggested that his contact from that date forward was limited to one dinner per week and alternating Saturdays. He sought compensatory damages of $2 million and punitive damages of $1 million from each defendant.
Count four of the complaint alleged that Starace committed fraud by falsely representing the nature of the mother's relationship with Ouspenskaya, which he alleged was romantic. The count further asserted that Starace falsely represented that the father abused M.Q. and falsely alleged cruelty as a ground for divorce. The allegation included that these representations harmed his parental and custodial rights, and he requested damages in the same amounts as for the tortious interference claims.
Finally, counts eight and nine alleged that Huang, Ouspenskaya, and Starace were involved in two different civil conspiracies. Count eight contended that the three women conspired to commit tortious interference with his parental rights and fraud.5 Count nine averred that Huang and Ouspenskaya engaged in a different but similar civil conspiracy. The father sought the same damages for each conspiracy count that he did for the tort and fraud counts.
At a scheduling conference in September 2019, trial was set for the following July. On February 14, 2020, while discovery was proceeding, the defendants filed a joint motion to stay the proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of Virginia of an appeal in a separate, unrelated case, Padula-Wilson v. Landry , 298 Va. 565, 841 S.E.2d 864 (2020). They represented that Padula-Wilson also involved a claim of tortious interference with parental rights. The defendants argued that the Supreme Court's opinion was likely to be dispositive of the issues raised in the father's complaint or at least to "set forth the parameters" under which his primary claims would be resolved. They also provided the court with copies of the briefs filed in Padula-Wilson and noted that oral argument in that case was "likely to occur in the next few months." On February 28, 2020, the court granted the requested stay, which included discovery.
Three months after the motion was filed, on May 14, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Padula-Wilson . Based on that decision, the defendants made a motion to lift the stay, withdraw their answers, and file a renewed joint demurrer to the father's complaint. By order of July 16, 2020, the court granted the requests.
On July 31, 2020, following a hearing, the court sustained the demurrer in all relevant respects, dismissing the tortious interference, fraud, and conspiracy claims against the three defendants, as well as other counts against Dr. Small. The court granted the father leave to amend one of the counts against Dr. Small. After additional proceedings, the father and Dr. Small reached a settlement, and the court dismissed the action with prejudice. The father then noted this appeal of the previously dismissed claims against Huang, Ouspenskaya, and Starace.
The father challenges the circuit court's decision granting the defendants’ joint demurrer. He also contends that the court erred by granting their motion to stay the proceedings.
The father suggests that the complaint properly stated claims against the defendants for tortious interference with parental rights, fraud, and civil conspiracy. As a result, he contends that the circuit court erred by sustaining their joint demurrer to counts one through four, eight, and nine.
We evaluate the father's contentions under the standards applicable to all demurrers. The appellate court reviews a decision to sustain or overrule a demurrer de novo because that decision "involves issues of law." Coutlakis v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 293 Va. 212, 216, 796 S.E.2d 556 (2017). A demurrer "tests the legal sufficiency of facts alleged in pleadings, not the strength of proof." Abi-Najm v. Concord Condo., LLC , 280 Va. 350, 357, 699 S.E.2d 483 (2010) (quoting Augusta Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mason , 274 Va. 199, 204, 645 S.E.2d 290 (2007) ). Consequently, a demurrer "can be sustained if the pleading, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fails to state a valid cause of action." Hooked Grp., LLC v. City of Chesapeake , 298 Va. 663, 667, 842 S.E.2d 413 (2020) (quoting Welding, Inc. v. Bland Cnty. Serv. Auth. , 261 Va. 218, 226, 541 S.E.2d 909 (2001) ). In evaluating a demurrer, the appellate court "consider[s] as admitted the facts expressly alleged and those which fairly can be viewed as impliedly alleged or reasonably inferred." Id. (quoting Welding, Inc. , 261 Va. at 226, 541 S.E.2d 909 ).
As relevant to the first three assignments of error, the demurrer involved three potential legal theories for recovery: tortious interference with parental rights, fraud, and civil conspiracy.
The Supreme Court of Virginia first recognized tortious interference with parental rights as a legitimate common-law cause of action in Wyatt v. McDermott , 283 Va. 685, 691, 699, 725 S.E.2d 555 (2012).6 The Court refined the scope of the tort in Coward v. Wellmont Health Sys. , 295 Va. 351, 361-66, 812 S.E.2d 766 (2018), and Padula-Wilson v. Landry , 298 Va. 565, 576-78, 841 S.E.2d 864 (2020).
Wyatt and Coward involved adoption proceedings, and to date, adoption provides the only context in which the Supreme Court has recognized that the tort is available in Virginia. In Coward , 295 Va. at 354-57, 812 S.E.2d 766, the...
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