Quality Care of Nashville v. Waller

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HENRY F. TODD; BROCK
• Citation: Quality Care of Nashville v. Waller, 584 S.W.2d 779 (Tenn. 1979)
• Decision Date: 30 July 1979
• Parties: QUALITY CARE OF NASHVILLE and the Travelers Ins. Company, Defendants-Appellants, v. Lina Mai WALLER, Plaintiff-Appellee.

Page 779

584 S.W.2d 779

QUALITY CARE OF NASHVILLE and the Travelers Ins. Company Defendants-Appellants, v. Lina Mai WALLER, Plaintiff-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 30, 1979.

Michael J. Philbin, Nashville, for defendants-appellants.

Kathryn Behm Celauro, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

HENRY F. TODD, Special Justice.

The defendants, Quality Care of Nashville and Travelers Insurance Companies have appealed from a judgment of the Trial Judge awarding to the plaintiff, an employee of Quality Care, benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law.

On appeal, no issue is made as to the amount of the award. The only question raised by appellants is the applicability of the Workmen's Compensation Law to the injury of plaintiff under the special circumstances of the case.

The facts are not controverted. Plaintiff is a nurse's aide and is employed from time to time by Quality Care which furnishes nursing personnel to various health-care institutions. For this purpose, Quality Care maintains a registry or list of available personnel. As need requires and request is made, Quality Care assigns employees from its available list to work in such institutions. Such individuals are paid by Quality Care which in turn receives payment from the institution for the services of the individual.

Plaintiff was so registered with Quality Care on December 31, 1976, when she was notified by Quality Care to report to the Sunnyview Nursing Home for work. Plaintiff had worked for Quality Care before, but had not previously worked at Sunnyview. Quality Care instructed plaintiff as to the location of Sunnyview which was on premises which extended from 17th to 18th Avenues South at Horton Street. Said premises are surrounded by a wall with openings on 17th Avenue and 18th Avenue; however, Quality Care instructed plaintiff to approach the building by way of the 18th Avenue opening in the wall because the 17th Avenue opening was an exit. Plaintiff was also instructed to enter the building through a particular door.

Quality Care assumed no responsibility for plaintiff's transportation, and she was not paid for time spent en route to her assigned place of work (Sunnyview).

Weather conditions were such that snowy and icy conditions prevailed generally throughout the area.

Plaintiff drove her own automobile to the vicinity of Sunnyview, where she parked her car in the "lower lot" which was outside the wall. She proceeded on foot through the 18th Avenue entrance and across a parking lot on the premises toward the designated building entrance.

While walking across the parking lot toward the building entrance, plaintiff slipped on ice and fell, breaking her wrist. This injury is the subject of the present suit.

Plaintiff admits that her injury occurred before she reported for work and that she received nothing from Quality Care as a result of her activities on the day in question, i. e., going to the premises of Sunnyview where she fell.

In Woods v. Warren, Tenn.1977, 548 S.W.2d 651, this Court affirmed a judgment denying compensation under the following circumstances:

"Claimant was employed as a maid in the Warren House Apartments where she also resided. * Her normal Modus operandi was that she would walk from her apartment to the manager's office or apartment, 'clock-in', and pick up a master key, her cleaning supplies, and a list of apartments to be cleaned. Her apartment was at the opposite end of the complex from the manager's office and apartment, which were located adjacent to each other. Normally she walked to her work, but, on occasions, she drove her automobile. No particular route was prescribed.

On the day of the accident she drove her automobile to work because it had been snowing and snow and ice covered the sidewalks. She parked near the office, in a space of her own selection, where she was permitted, but not required, to park. She emerged from her automobile, took a few steps along the icy sidewalk and fell, severely injuring her knee. All this occurred at approximately 8:00 o'clock, a. m. The sidewalk is owned by, and located upon, the premises of the apartment complex.

After discussing numerous authorities, this Court held:

". . . in order to avoid the application of the general rule of nonliability for an injury sustained en route to or from work, the employee must show that:

a. at the time of the injury he was using a route required or furnished by the employer; (Travelers Indem. Co. v. Charvis, 221 Tenn. 593, 428 S.W.2d 797) Charvis, supra, and such route was on the premises of the employer, Little ; (Little v. Johnson City Foundry etc., 158 Tenn. 102, 11 S.W.2d 690) Camel Mfg. Co.; (Smith v. Camel Mfg. Co., 192 Tenn. 670, 241 S.W.2d 771) Aluminum Co. of North America, supra, (Aluminum Co. of America v. Baker, Tenn., 542 S.W.2d 819) and

b. the use of the required route subjects the employee to a definite special hazard. Camel Mfg. Co.; Charvis ; Aluminum Co. of North America, supra, or

c. that the risks of travel are directly incident to the employment itself. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. (Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Court, 162 Tenn. 477, 36 S.W.2d 907); Douglas, supra (Douglas v. Lewis Bros. Bakeries, Tenn., 477 S.W.2d 202)

(4) All of this is qualified by the fact that the 'premises' are that part of the property where the employee actually works or which he is required to use for ingress and egress. Bennett, (Bennett v. Vanderbilt University, 198 Tenn. 1, 277 S.W.2d 386) and McKinney, supra, (McKinney v. Hardwich Clothes, 217 Tenn. 457, 398 S.W.2d 265)

(5) When we apply these rules to the instant case wherein the employee was unquestionably on the premises of her employer, we must reluctantly hold that there was no coverage under the act. She was not pursuing a required route, but was on a way of her own selection.

Assuming Arguendo that the employee was, in effect, on a required route, coverage would not attach in view of the fact that her injury was not attributable to a definite Special hazard. It is to be borne in mind that the phrase 'rising out of employment' refers to 'the origin of the injury', while 'in the course of employment' refers to 'time, place and circumstances' of the injury. Knox v. Batson, 217 Tenn. 620, 399 S.W.2d 765 (1966).

It takes a combination of these criteria to establish coverage under the act. Sec. 50-902, T.C.A. Therefore, the fact that the injury arises in the course of employment, standing alone, is insufficient. It must also rise out of the employment.

We cannot in good conscience hold that general snowy and icy conditions were definite special hazards of employment in this case. We must hold that these conditions were common to the general public and not peculiar to the nature of the employment or to the conditions under which that employment was required to be performed."

Applying the rule just quoted, it may be said that plaintiff was (a) "using a route required or furnished by the employer." When injured, plaintiff was walking across the premises of Sunnyview from the designated street entrance (on 18th Avenue) to the designated door in the building. Defendants insist that the door to the building was not "designated", but the uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff on this subject is as follows:

"She said, 'Go in down the steps after you get inside the wall *. There is a nurses station right there in front of the door, and ask' " (BE p. 40) *

A picture in the record (Exhibit 10) shows the area in which plaintiff fell, including the door to the building which is below the level of the parking lot and steps leading down from the parking lot to the door.

Plaintiff admits that she had her choice of routes across the parking lot to the door of the building, but this is not deemed important, because directions to approach through a particular parking lot entrance to reach a particular doorway would presuppose that the employee would use the most direct route from the entrance to the door.

The relationship of Sunnyview to Quality Care was such that, for purposes of this appeal, the premises of Sunnyview must be considered the premises of the employer.

The next requirement (b) of Woods v. Warren, above, is that the required route subjects the employee to a definite, special hazard. Here, some difficulty is encountered, for it is uncontroverted that the snow and ice was general and widespread. Plaintiff testified of its presence at her home and en route. It is not shown that the route across the parking lot was any more hazardous than any other...