Quality Towing, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, No. 25103.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: BURNETT, Justice
• Citation: 340 S.C. 29,530 S.E.2d 369
• Parties: QUALITY TOWING, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF MYRTLE BEACH, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 03 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 25103.

340 S.C. 29
530 S.E.2d 369

QUALITY TOWING, INC., Appellant,
v.
CITY OF MYRTLE BEACH, Respondent

No. 25103.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard February 16, 2000.

Decided April 3, 2000.

340 S.C. 32

Robert C. Childs, III, of Mitchell, Bouton, Yokel & Childs, of Greenville, for appellant

James B. Van Osdell, and Charles B. Jordan, Jr., of Van Osdell, Lester, Howe & Jordan, P.A., of Myrtle Beach, for respondent.

BURNETT, Justice:

This case involves an alleged conflict between a city ordinance and a state statute. The trial court ruled the statute and ordinance did not conflict. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

Appellant is a towing service operating in the City of Myrtle Beach (the city). In early 1996, the city enacted an ordinance imposing certain conditions and maximum rates a wrecker service could charge for tows of unauthorized vehicles from private property ("involuntary tows") made pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-11-760 (1976). Myrtle Beach City Code § 23-133 (1996). Appellant challenged the validity of the ordinance, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the city. This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did the trial court err in limiting the scope of appellant's attack on the ordinance?

II. Did the trial court err in finding appellant lacked standing to challenge subsections (a) and (b) of the ordinance?

III. Does the ordinance conflict with state law?

IV. Did the trial court err in finding subsection (d) severable?

V. Did the trial court err in dismissing appellant's inverse condemnation cause of action?

VI. Did the trial court err in dismissing appellant's § 1983 claim?

340 S.C. 33

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP; Baughman v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 410 S.E.2d 537 (1991). In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, as will preclude summary judgment, the evidence and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm'n, 332 S.C. 54, 504 S.E.2d 117 (1998).

DISCUSSION

I. Did the trial court err in limiting the scope of appellant's attack on the ordinance?

In its order granting the city's motion for summary judgment, the trial court expressly declined to address any issues other than the validity of the rate schedule contained in § 23-133(a) of the city ordinance. The court stated: "This is Quality's sole ground in its Complaint alleging a conflict between the ordinance and state law. The Complaint, in fact, specifically narrowed Quality's objection to the ordinance to the one issue of the rate schedule." Appellant argues the trial court erred in limiting its scope of attack on the ordinance to the issue of the rate schedule. We agree.

Pleadings are to be liberally construed "to do substantial justice to all parties." Rule 8(f), SCRCP; Hughes v. Water World Water Slide, Inc., 314 S.C. 211, 442 S.E.2d 584 (1994). Appellant's complaint, while focusing primarily on the rate schedule, gave notice that appellant wished to challenge "the maximum amount that can be charged for the towing of vehicles from private property and the manner in which vehicles may be towed from private property." (emphasis added). Moreover, appellant argued the invalidity of other portions of the ordinance in its memorandum in opposition to the city's motion for summary judgment and at the motion hearing. We conclude appellant challenged the validity of the ordinance as a whole, and not just the rate schedule in subsection (d).

340 S.C. 34

II. Did the trial court err in finding appellant lacked standing to challenge subsections (a) and (b) of the ordinance?

Appellant argues the trial court erred in ruling it lacked standing to challenge the validity of subsections (a) and (b) of the ordinance. Subsection (a) requires property owners to place certain signs in their parking lots before they can lawfully have a vehicle towed. Subsection (b) makes the property owner guilty of a misdemeanor if it has a vehicle towed without complying with the signage requirements in subsection (a) or if the vehicle is shown to have been legally parked. Thus, these subsections apply directly to property owners, not to towing services. Nevertheless, we conclude appellant has standing to challenge the entire ordinance.

A private party "may not invoke judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action unless he has sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, prejudice therefrom." Florence Morning News v. Building Comm'n, 265 S.C. 389, 398, 218 S.E.2d 881, 884-85 (1975). "[S]uch imminent prejudice must be of a personal nature to the party laying claim to standing and not merely of general interest common to all members of the public." Citizens for Lee County, Inc. v. Lee County, 308 S.C. 23, 29, 416 S.E.2d 641, 645 (1992).

Appellant has standing to challenge subsections (a) and (b) of the ordinance because of the impact the restrictions potentially have on its own income. "[V]endors and those in like positions have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). In Craig, the United States Supreme Court permitted a 3.2% beer vendor to challenge the constitutionality of a statute permitting the sale of 3.2% beer to females over the age of eighteen, but prohibiting its sale to males under the age of twenty-one. Because enforcement of the statute directly affected the vendor, she was permitted to assert the equal protection rights of males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.

340 S.C. 35

Although Craig is not binding upon this Court, we find its reasoning persuasive. Like the beer vendor in Craig, appellant is the potential party economically affected by the ordinance, and therefore the one with the most motivation to challenge the ordinance. Moreover, the harm to appellant is "of a personal nature ... and not merely of general interest common to all members of the public." Citizens for Lee County, 308 S.C. at 29, 416 S.E.2d at 645

Having...