Quality Trailer Products v. CSL EQUIP., No. 25435.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 562 S.E.2d 615,349 S.C. 216
• Parties: QUALITY TRAILER PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent, v. CSL EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. and I Corp., Defendants, of which I Corp. is Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 25435.
• Decision Date: 01 April 2002

349 S.C. 216
562 S.E.2d 615

QUALITY TRAILER PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent,
v.
CSL EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC. and I Corp., Defendants, of which I Corp. is Appellant

No. 25435.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard February 20, 2002.

Decided April 1, 2002.

Rehearing Denied May 16, 2002.

349 S.C. 217

Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., S. Elizabeth Brosnan, and Alexander H. Twedt, of Richardson, Plowden, Carpenter & Robinson, P.A., of Columbia, for appellant

W. Mark White and W. Chaplin Spencer, Jr., of Spencer & Spencer, P.A., of Rock Hill, for respondent.

James B. Richardson, Jr., of Richardson & Birdsong, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae, Pro se.

349 S.C. 218

PER CURIAM

Appellant I Corp. appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") and its motion for new trial following a jury verdict for Respondent Quality Trailer Products, Inc. ("QTP"). We dismiss the appeal as untimely.

FACTS

QTP brought suit against CSL Equipment Company, Inc. ("CSL") and I Corp. QTP asserted causes of action against I Corp. for breach of the South Carolina Bulk Transfers Act ("The Act"),¹ promissory estoppel, and successor liability. The trial court granted I Corp.'s motion for directed verdict on QTP's claim arising under the Act, and submitted the other two theories to the jury. In its general verdict, the jury found I Corp. liable to QTP. In addition, the trial court awarded QTP prejudgment interest.

Following the jury verdict, I Corp. made timely post trial motions for JNOV, and for a new trial (collectively, "first motion"). By order dated December 20, 1999, and filed December 21, 1999, the trial court denied the first motion.

On December 30, 1999, I Corp. filed a motion captioned as a motion to "Alter, Amend or Reconsider Judgment and Findings Denying Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial" ("second motion"). The caption of the second motion indicated it was made pursuant to "S.C.R.Civ.P. 52, 59, and 60." In fact, the second motion was almost a duplicate of the first motion. The only changes I Corp. made were to caption the second motion differently, and to change the relief sought to coincide with the second motion's caption. The trial court recognized that the second motion was, in substance, identical to the first motion, and by order dated February 16, 2000, and filed February 21, 2000, denied the second motion. I Corp. filed its notice of appeal on March 17, 2000.

349 S.C. 219

ISSUE

Did I Corp.'s second motion toll the time period for filing an appeal?

ANALYSIS

Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR, provides that a notice of appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas

shall be served on all respondents within thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice of entry of the order or judgment. When a timely motion for judgment n.o.v. (Rule 50, SCRCP), motion to alter or amend the judgment (Rules 52 and 59, SCRCP), or a motion for a new trial (Rule 59, SCRCP) has been made, the time for appeal for all parties shall be stayed and shall run from receipt of written notice of entry of the order granting or denying such motion.

In Coward Hund Const. Co., Inc. v. Ball Corp., 336 S.C. 1, 518 S.E.2d 56 (Ct.App.1999), the Court of Appeals held that a successive Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion, following the denial of a similar motion, did not toll the time for filing appeal, where the court's ruling on the first such motion did not change its ruling at trial. The Court of Appeals noted that Coward Hund did not challenge any new ruling in its second...