Qualley v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 59524
Decision Date | 18 January 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 59524,59524 |
Citation | 261 N.W.2d 466 |
Parties | George T. QUALLEY, Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CREDIT CORP., Appellee. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Law Offices of George T. Qualley, Omaha, Neb., for appellant.
L. W. Rosebrook, of Ahlers, Cooney, Dorweiler, Haynie & Smith, Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard before MOORE, C. J., and MASON, REES, REYNOLDSON and McCORMICK, JJ.
In this appeal by plaintiff George T. Qualley from an adverse final judgment and from an order of the trial court overruling plaintiff's motion to enlarge or to amend the trial court's findings and conclusions this court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal is challenged by defendant. It stems from an action at law tried to the court. The challenge is predicated on defendant's contention plaintiff's notice of appeal was not timely filed as required by rule 335, Rules of Civil Procedure (now rule 5, Rules of Appellate Procedure) which is set out later.
The record discloses that on September 23, 1974, George T. Qualley, a lawyer in Sioux City, instituted this action in the Polk District Court. Plaintiff alleged in his petition and the various amendments thereto that his automobile and certain personal property therein were willfully seized by defendant with malicious design and purpose of injuring plaintiff. He alleged damages to his reputation and embarrassment in explaining to his friends, neighbors, associates and clients that his car was repossessed because he was 17 days in arrears in his car payment. In various other counts he made other allegations. In each prayer for relief he sought either compensatory or exemplary damages or both. His theory of relief was mainly based on defendant's alleged noncompliance with various sections of Chapter 554, Iowa's enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code.
After more than a year filled with various amendments to petitions and answers, discovery procedures and motions, trial was had January 27, 1976. February 23 the trial court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law and ruling thereon. March 18 the trial court entered final judgment. March 29, 32 days after the court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, plaintiff filed a motion to enlarge or amend the court's findings under rule 179(b), R.C.P., which states:
April 20 plaintiff's motion was overruled. May 19 he filed his notice of appeal from the final judgment and from the trial court's overruling of his motion to enlarge or amend the court's findings and conclusions.
The trial court overruled plaintiff's motion because it found the motion was not timely. The court's ruling was in pertinent part as follows:
Defendant's attack on this court's jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal is based on defendant's interpretation of rules 179(b), 247 and 335, R.C.P. Rule 335 provides as follows:
"(a) Appeals to the supreme court must be taken within, and not after, thirty days from the entry of the order, judgment or decree, unless a motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is filed as provided in rule 247, or a motion as provided in rule 179'b', and then within thirty days after the entry of the ruling on such motion; * * * ."
The challenge to this court's jurisdiction raises the following questions:
1. Is the timeliness of a motion to enlarge or amend a trial court's findings and conclusions to be determined by the date its findings and conclusions are filed or from the date of entry of its judgment?
2. Does an untimely motion to enlarge or amend the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law toll the running of the thirty-day period for filing an appeal under rule 335, R.C.P.?
I. " * * * Want of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be taken advantage of at any stage of the proceedings. It cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel or consent.
" Walles v. Intern. Bro. of Electrical Wkrs., 252 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Iowa 1977).
If it is determined that this court does not have jurisdiction, plaintiff's appeal must be dismissed even though defendant herein has not moved to dismiss the appeal under rule 348, R.C.P. This was made clear in Harden v. Illinois Central R. Co., 254 Iowa 426, 429, 118 N.W.2d 76, 78, where the court stated:
II. Plaintiff neither requested nor was granted any extensions of time for filing his motion to enlarge or amend. The trial court did not set any dates other than those prescribed by statute for the filing of such motion. Thus, our discussion of the timeliness of the motion is not concerned with those parts of our Rules of Civil Procedure which allow courts to grant extensions of time for such motions.
As the parties herein correctly point out, the timeliness of a motion to enlarge or amend under rule 179(b) is determined by the same date as is that of a motion for a new trial under rule 244 ( ). This conclusion is dictated by that section of rule 179(b) wherein it is stated, "On motion joined with or filed within the time allowed for a motion for a new trial," and by that section of rule 247 which provides a motion for a new trial (or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a bill of exceptions) must be filed "within ten days after the verdict, report or decision."
Because the timeliness of both motions is determined by rule 247, it is necessary to determine the meaning of the phrase, "verdict, report or decision." Once this is determined the ten-day period within which such motions must be filed is easily calculated.
Plaintiff maintains the phrase refers to the date of entry of the trial court's judgment. He first contends this court in the case Egy v. Winterset Motor Co., 231 Iowa 680, 2 N.W.2d 93 (filed February 10, 1942), interpreted the phrase and found the time period within which a motion for a new trial must be made began with formal entry of judgment and not from a more informal ruling which had preceded the formal entry.
Plaintiff's interpretation of Egy is correct but we find the case actually supports defendant's contention the phrase at issue refers to the date on which the trial court filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law and rulings thereon. The following excerpts from the case, 231 Iowa at 683-687, 2 N.W.2d at 94-95, 96-97, provide the basis for our finding:
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