Qualls v. United states
| Decision Date | 15 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 09-cr-418(DLI),07-cr-14 (S-1)(DLI),06-cv-5852(DLI) |
| Parties | THOMAS QUALLS, pro se, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
On November 5, 2008, Petitioner, Thomas Qualls (“Petitioner”) was convicted, in absentia [1] after a month-long jury trial of one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, one count of mail fraud, twelve counts of wire fraud, and two counts of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, 18 U.S.C § 1341, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), respectively. See, Superseding Indictment, Dkt. Entry No. 49; Jury Verdict Dkt. Entry No. 153. On November 6, 2008, the jury further rendered a verdict in favor of the government as to the forfeiture of $922, 382.00 as proceeds of defendant's fraudulent acts. See, Jury Verdict, Dkt. Entry No. 155.
Petitioner had absconded to Canada (See, FN #1 below). In March 2009, authorities captured Petitioner in Montreal, Canada, and returned him to this district after extensive extradition proceedings. Petitioner had been indicted by grand jury of this district in a separate case for bail jumping. See, Indictment, Dkt. No. 09-CR-418, Entry No. 1. Proceedings on both cases were delayed, inter alia, due to psychiatric examinations of Petitioner conducted at Petitioner's request as well as assignment of counsel issues. See generally, Case Docket Nos. 07-cr-14(S-1)(DLI) and 09-cr-418(DLI). Petitioner ultimately pled guilty to bail jumping, and the Court consolidated that case with the original trial case (the “instant case”) for sentencing purposes On June 17, 2014, the Court sentenced Petitioner to 150 months of imprisonment on each count of conviction after trial to run concurrently with each other, and 60 months of imprisonment for the bail jumping charge, to run consecutively to the fraud sentences. Each term of imprisonment was to be followed by three years of supervised release with conditions, to be served concurrently with each other. See, Judgment, Dkt. Entry No. 248, at 3-4.
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that: (1) the district court violated Petitioner's rights under the Confrontation Clause by admitting at trial testimony pertaining to third-party business records, and (2) his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. See, United States v. Qualls, 613 Fed.Appx. 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2015). On May 28, 2015, the Second Circuit affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence in a summary order. See, generally, Id. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 13, 2015. Qualls v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 338 (2015).
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, [2] timely filed this motion challenging his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Section 2255”). See, generally, Dkt. Entry No. 253 (“Petition”); Dkt. Entry No. 257 (“Mem.”).[3] Petitioner contends that his sentence should be vacated because: (1) his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in (a) failing to recognize Petitioner's mental health issues; (b) failing to investigate Petitioner's mental health and raise the issue of his competence at trial and sentencing; and (c) not being proficient in the requirements for a sentencing departure under United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 5K2.13 and United States v. Valdez, 426 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2005); (2) his counsel operated under a conflict of interest; and (3) the Court exhibited bias towards Petitioner. Mem. at 3; See, also, Petitioner's Mot. for Summary Disposition (“Reply”), Dkt. Entry No. 261.[4]
In opposition, the government argues that defense counsel was not ineffective because there were insufficient indicia of incompetence to raise it as an issue before or during trial, and the Court's own observations, over the course of a month-long trial, supported a finding of competence to stand trial. Gov't Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Mot. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Opp'n”), Dkt. Entry No. 259, at 8-10. The government further argues that defense counsel, in fact, did seek a departure under § 5K2.13, and the Court's discretionary decision not to downwardly depart is not a basis upon which to challenge Petitioner's sentence. Id. at 10-11. The government additionally contends that Petitioner's argument that his counsel was somehow conflicted is belied by the fact that Petitioner requested the reappointment of his trial counsel following his return from Canada. Id. at 11-12. Finally, the government contends that Petitioner's claim of Court bias towards him is procedurally barred, and, in any event, meritless. Id. at 14-15.
For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is denied in its entirety.
BACKGROUND[5]
Petitioner's conviction stems from his role as a principal, president, and treasurer of International Foreign Currency, Inc. (“IFC”) and his participation in a fraudulent investment scheme involving foreign currency exchange markets. See, United States v. Qualls, 25 F.Supp.3d 248 at 251-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (). Following his indictment for mail and wire fraud, money laundering and obstruction of justice charges, and prior to closing arguments at his jury trial, Petitioner fled the jurisdiction. Petitioner was convicted in absentia and sentencing was held in abeyance pending his return.
After Petitioner fled, his trial counsel, Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma (“trial counsel”), moved to withdraw as counsel. Mot. to Withdraw & Aff. of Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Dkt. Entry No. 163. Trial counsel cited a “total breakdown of communication” and “irreconcilable differences” between him and his client as the grounds for his motion. Id. at ¶ 2. At a hearing held on December 17, 2008, trial counsel explained that he felt Petitioner had “used [him]” in communicating “a bald-faced, manipulative lie” to the Court that Petitioner would return to Court for the remaining portions of the trial. See, Dec. 17, 2008 Hr'g Tr. (“Dec. 17 Tr.”), Dkt. Entry No. 180, at 3:8-19. The government opposed the motion arguing that trial counsel's predicament “would be one that would be shared by any future counsel” and it would “be premature for him to be dismissed”. Id. at 10:2-13. However, since trial counsel claimed he could no longer zealously advocate for Petitioner, the Court granted the motion to withdraw. Id. at 13:17-18.
On July 31, 2012, following Petitioner's capture in Canada and extradition to this district, the Court appointed Martin Geduldig, Esq. to represent Petitioner during sentencing. Mem. At 6.; July 31, 2012 Minute Entry Re: Status Conference. After initial preparatory meetings, Mr. Geduldig requested a mental health evaluation, and the Court appointed Dr. Lawrence Siegel to perform the evaluation. Id. Dr. Siegel concluded that his psychological test of Petitioner was “of limited value due to Qualls's ‘unwillingness or inability . . . to disclose personal information.'” Ex. A to Opp'n, Gov't Br. on Appeal (“Gov't Br.”), Dkt. Entry No. 259-1, at 14-15. Nonetheless, Dr. Siegel “suspected that Qualls might be suffering from delusional disorder” and suggested additional psychological testing. Id. at 15; Mem. at 6.
On November 20, 2012, Petitioner filed a letter requesting the reappointment of Mr. Margulis-Ohnuma as his counsel. See, Ltr. dated Nov. 18, 2012 (“Nov. 18 Ltr.”), Dkt. Entry No. 207. As the basis for the motion, Petitioner cited “major disagreements” between him and Mr. Geduldig and noted “a previous and comfortable relationship between the defendant and Mr. Ohnuma.” Id. Petitioner felt that “[Mr. Margulis-Ohnuma's] reassignment could expedite the [sentencing] process, ” and he indicated that he had spoken with Mr. Margulis-Ohnuma, who had “agreed and expressed the desire to return to and be reassigned to represent the defendant for sentencing, if YOUR HONOR will allow.” Id. (emphasis original). On December 17, 2012, the Court relieved Mr. Geduldig and reappointed Mr. Margulis-Ohnuma.
On January 28, 2013, based on Dr. Siegel's evaluation and on the parties' consent, the Court directed the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to conduct a psychological evaluation of Petitioner. See, Order for Mental Evaluation, Dkt. Entry No. 211. Dr. William Ryan conducted a psychological evaluation for the BOP and found that Petitioner had a “delusional disorder based on his current delusions regarding his purported work in ‘asset recovery operations.'” Gov't Br. at 15. Dr. Ryan found that Petitioner “‘understands his current charges arose directly from activities within a business unrelated to his asset recovery activities, '” and, thus, concluded that Petitioner was competent to stand trial and participate in sentencing. Id.; Mem. at 6-7.
At sentencing, Petitioner, through counsel, moved for a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines Range (“SGR”) based on diminished mental capacity under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. In support of that motion, Petitioner submitted an evaluation by his own psychologist, Dr. Sanford Drob. See, Mem. at 7. Dr. Drob concluded that Petitioner suffered from delusional behavior and that he had been delusional for at least ten years prior to the evaluation. See, Id. at 7-8; Opp'n at 4. Based on “the evidence adduced at trial, the Court's own interactions with Defendant while in Court, the multiple psychological reports, and the parties' submissions and arguments, the Court [found] that a downward departure [was] not appropriate in this case.” Qualls, 25 F.Supp.3d at 258.
Petitioner now contends that his trial counsel should have recognized that his competence was at issue, investigated whether Petitioner was competent to stand trial, and...
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