Quarantello v. Leroy

• Citation: 977 So.2d 648
• Decision Date: 15 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 5D06-2340.,5D06-2340.
• Parties: Margaret M. QUARANTELLO, etc., Appellant, v. David T. LEROY, Terry Leroy, etc., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

977 So.2d 648

Margaret M. QUARANTELLO, etc., Appellant, v. David T. LEROY, Terry Leroy, etc., et al., Appellees.

No. 5D06-2340.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

February 15, 2008.

Rehearing Denied March 31, 2008.

Brian T. Wilson, of Dellecker Wilson King McKenna & Ruffier, A Limited Liability Partnership, Orlando, and Stephan W. Carter, Maitland, for Appellant.

Angela C. Flowers, of Kubicki Draper, Ocala, for Appellees.

SAWAYA, J.

We are called upon to interpret the meaning of section 316.613(3), Florida Statutes (1999), which states that "[t]he failure to provide and use a child passenger restraint shall not be considered comparative negligence, nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence." This particular provision is part of a broader statutory scheme intended to protect children five years of age or younger from injury in automobile accidents by requiring that they be secured in a proper child passenger restraint. § 316.613, Fla. Stat. (1999). The issue we must resolve, which appears to be a matter of first impression, is whether section 316.613(3) prohibits introduction of any evidence of failure to provide and use a proper child passenger restraint in a negligence action brought by an injured child against a caretaker who allegedly failed to secure the child in such a device prior to the automobile accident that caused the injuries. We conclude that it does not and reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of the caretaker.

Margaret Quarantello, as court-appointed guardian of Alexander Swope, brought a personal injury action against Terry Leroy, Alexander's maternal grandmother, to recover damages for injuries the child sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 15, 1999. At the time of the accident, Alexander was eleven months old, and he was under the care of Mrs. Leroy. Mrs. Leroy placed Alexander into a child booster seat in the backseat of her car in preparation for a drive. Mrs. Leroy and Alexander were both passengers in the vehicle, which was driven by Mrs. Leroy's husband, David Leroy. When the Leroys' vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Frederick Lindsey, Alexander was thrown from the booster seat and sustained severe injuries, including quadriplegia.

Mrs. Quarantello filed an amended complaint alleging in Count IV that Mrs. Leroy was negligent because she breached a common law duty to use reasonable care in caring for the child — the complaint did not allege breach of a duty of care created by section 316.613, Florida Statutes (1999).¹ In order to meet her burden of proof, Mrs. Quarantello intended to introduce evidence that Mrs. Leroy failed to use a proper child passenger restraint to ensure that Alexander was transported safely. Specifically, Mrs. Quarantello contended that the booster seat in which Alexander was placed was designed for older children and that the appropriate restraint device would have been an infant safety seat. This allegation is in direct reference to section 316.613(1), Florida Statutes (1999), which provides that "[f]or children aged through 3 years, such restraint device must be a separate carrier or a vehicle manufacturer's integrated child seat." She claimed Alexander's mother had provided Mrs. Leroy with an appropriate infant seat and that Mrs. Leroy failed to use it.

Mrs. Leroy filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that section 316.613(3), Florida Statutes, prohibits introduction of any evidence that she failed to provide or use an appropriate child passenger restraint. In essence, she contended that the statute provides her with immunity from any negligence suit where evidence of failure to provide or use an appropriate child passenger restraint is attempted to be introduced. She further argued that Mrs. Quarantello's action was predicated solely on the admission of this prohibited evidence and that summary judgment should therefore be entered in her favor. The trial court agreed and entered the judgment we now review. Mrs. Quarantello appeals, contending that section 316.613(3), Florida Statutes, only bars evidence of comparative negligence and similar evidence of negligence that can be used to reduce an injured child's recovery.

Because the issue we address presents a question of law, the standard for reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment is de novo. See Major League Baseball v. Morsani 790 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.2001) ("The standard of review governing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment posing a pure question of law is de novo."); see also GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781 (Fla.2007) ("Generally speaking, statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review." (citing BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003))).

The courts have compiled a catalogue of rules of statutory construction to provide guidance when determining the meaning of a statute. Of these, we first apply the preeminent rule that legislative intent is the most important factor that informs our analysis. See Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004) ("It is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis."). Because legislative intent is determined primarily from the text of the statute, we begin our analysis of section 316.613(3), as we do in any case of statutory interpretation, with the "actual language" used by the Legislature. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 198 (Fla.2007); Borden v. E.-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.2006). If it is clear and unambiguous, we proceed no further and apply the provisions as written. See Foley v. State, 50 So.2d 179, 184 (Fla.1951).

We do not believe that section 316.613(3) is an exemplar of good legislative draftsmanship. The statute is poorly worded and ambiguous — it is unclear from the text whether the statute prohibits admission of any and all evidence of failure to use a child passenger restraint or whether it simply prohibits evidence of comparative negligence and similar evidence of negligence that may be used to reduce an injured child's recovery. The first phrase of section 316.613(3) states that "[t]he failure to provide and use a child passenger restraint shall not be considered comparative negligence," and the very next phrase provides, "nor shall such failure be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action with regard to negligence." The conclusion reached by the trial court and advanced by Mrs. Leroy as the correct interpretation literally begs the question: why would the Legislature bother to include the first phrase prohibiting evidence of comparative negligence if it intended to exclude all evidence in all negligence cases in the second phrase? If the trial court and Mrs. Leroy are correct, there would have been no need for the Legislature to have included the first phrase because there would be no cause of action in which a defendant could allege comparative negligence.

In arriving at its conclusion, the trial court apparently considered the first phrase meaningless or in isolation from the second. We are, however, loathe to render statutory language irrelevant in any context, and we discern no valid reason to do so here. Statutory interpretation is a "holistic endeavor," United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988), and when engaged in the task of discerning the meaning of a statute, we "`will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute....'" Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650, 94 S.Ct. 2431, 41 L.Ed.2d 374 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.(19 How.) 183, 194, 15 L.Ed. 595 (1856)). Adverting to our catalogue of rules of statutory construction,

[w]e are required to give effect to "every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute, if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage." American Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 366 (Fla.2005) (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla.2003)). Moreover, "a basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless." Id. (quoting State v. Goode, 830 So.2d 817, 824 (Fla.2002)). "[R]elated statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and ... `[w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.'" Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 829 So.2d 891, 898 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992)).

Heart of Adoptions, 963 So.2d at 198-99; see also Snively Groves v. Mayo, 135 Fla. 300, 184 So. 839, 841 (1938); Goode v. State, 50 Fla. 45, 39 So. 461, 463 (1905) ("It is the general rule, in construing statutes, that construction is favored which gives effect to every clause and every part of the statute, thus producing a consistent and harmonious whole. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language used should be rejected, if an interpretation can be found which will give it effect.'" (quoting 26 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law 618 (2d ed.))).

Reading section 316.613(3) in its entirety, we conclude that the latter phrase, "evidence ... with regard to negligence," gives effect and meaning to the former phrase, "comparative negligence." Interpreting the statute in this manner indicates that the Legislature intended to prohibit evidence of comparative negligence and evidence of negligence that may be similarly used to reduce an injured child's...