Quarles v. Quarles
| Decision Date | 12 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 9009.,No. 9078.,No. 9071.,9009.,9071.,9078. |
| Citation | 353 A.2d 285 |
| Parties | C. Ellis QUARLES, Jr., Appellant, v. Sarah B. QUARLES, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Guy M. Bayes, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Harold F. Golding, Washington, D.C., for appellee.
Before KERN, NEBEKER and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges.
We review here three orders entered by the Superior Court following the trial of a divorce action. Appellant-husband contends (1) that the orders directing him to pay child support of $500 monthly and raising the attorney fees payable to the appellee from $1,500 to $2,500 constituted abuses of the trial court's discretion; and (2) that the trial court improperly granted appellee's request for an order requiring him to transfer all of his rights and interest to the family homesite in Wheaton, Maryland, and to convey a one-half interest in a tract located in Louisa County, Virginia, both held by the parties as tenants by the entirety during their second marriage.1 We affirm.
Appellant, C. Ellis Quarles, left the family's Wheaton home in 1969. He moved to the District of Columbia and in August 1973, filed an action for absolute divorce on the ground of voluntary separation. Following the trial, the trial court, on April 4, 1974, granted appellant an absolute divorce and sole ownership of one-half of the Virginia property. By the same order appellee, Sarah B. Quarles, was granted custody of the parties' two minor children,2 attorney fees of $1,500,3 and sole ownership of the Wheaton property and a one-half interest in the Virginia tract. Appellant's attempted appeal of the order was dismissed because of his failure to file the notice within the time prescribed by the rules of this court.4
The court made no immediate provision for child support but held the matter in abeyance pending a referral to an Auditor-Master for findings concerning appellant's ability to pay an award. Following four days of hearings before a Deputy Auditor-Master, a comprehensive report was filed in which the Auditor reviewed the evidence and concluded that the appellant had a fluctuating net business income in the "minimum range" of $18,000 to $25,000 annually. The trial court adopted the report and, on August 23, 1974, entered an order directing that appellant pay an award of $500 monthly for the support of the parties' two minor children. Upon motions filed by the appellee, the court entered two additional orders on September 27, 1974, one raising the award of attorney fees to $2,500 to compensate appellee for her expenses before the Auditor, the other requiring appellant to execute the instruments necessary to effect the disposition of the parties' jointly held property decreed by the court in its order of April 4. Appellant's timely appeals of the three orders were consolidated for purposes of this review.
Appellant premises his attack on the awards primarily on his contention that the finding regarding his income made by the Auditor and adopted by the trial court is not supported by the record and that, as a consequence, the figures set for child support and appellee's attorney fees exceeded the court's discretion.
Appellant is a businessman of long experience who, for a number of years, has operated an employment agency and a real estate enterprise engaged in the purchase, renovation and rental of housing properties. Although he characterized himself as a man of meager circumstances, a claim not uncommon in actions of this kind, the evidence produced by the parties tended to show that his financial condition was considerably less precarious than his own description suggested. Specifically, the evidence indicated, and the Auditor so found, that he had real estate holdings outside the District of a net value in excess of $50,000;5 that he had an indeterminate interest in four properties located within the District of a total assessed value of approximately $23,000;6 and that the income flowing through his business accounts had averaged $3,000 monthly in the period from January 1971, to May 1974.7
It is beyond the province of our review to substitute our own interpretation of the evidence for that reached by the primary finder of fact. Our review here is instead limited to a determination of whether, in light of the entire record, the Auditor's findings as approved by the trial court are so incongruent with the evidence as to be "plainly wrong or without evidence to support" them.8 We find no such variance. To the contrary, we agree with the trial court that the report filed by the Auditor represented the product of a diligent attempt to disentangle appellant's confused business interests, and arrive at the best estimate of his annual income the record allowed. The findings are supported by the evidence.
Having determined that the Auditor's estimate of appellant's income was not improperly adopted by the trial court and noting that the appellee, who was charged with the care of the parties' two minor children, was found at the time of trial to have a net annual income of only $6,500,9 we conclude that the award of $500 monthly for child support was not so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the award of attorney fees. By its order of April 4, 1974, the trial court set the award at $1,500 but specifically stated within the text of that decree that it was entering the award without prejudice to a future claim by the appellee for the legal expenses she might incur in subsequent proceedings. The raise from $1,500 to $2,500 was considerable but in view of the length of the Auditor's hearings and of the preparation required of appellee's counsel to participate effectively in the dissection of appellant's business affairs, it was not so large as to compel upset on appeal.
Finally, we find no error in the trial court's order of September 27, 1974, directing appellant to execute deeds to the appellee for the parties' jointly held property. It was a reasonable solution and properly within the exercise of the trial court's in personam...
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...to enforce an unstayed order, although the order has been appealed. Floyd v. Leftwich, 456 A.2d 1241, 1243 (D.C. 1983); Quarles v. Quarles, 353 A.2d 285, 288 (D.C.1976); see also Taylor v. First Am. Title Co., 477 A.2d 227, 230 (D.C.1984) (holding that trial court may strike pleadings of te......
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...may have been impliedly retained by the court in the original decree. Cf. Zapata v. Zapata, 499 A.2d 905 (D.C. 1985); Quarles v. Quarles, 353 A.2d 285 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S.Ct. 321, 50 L.Ed.2d 290 (1976); Travis v. Benson, 360 A.2d 506 (D.C. 1976).16 Once determined, prop......
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