Quarless v. Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center

• Decision Date: 27 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 99 CIV.4414 (RMB).,99 CIV.4414 (RMB).
• Citation: 228 F.Supp.2d 377
• Parties: Duncan QUARLESS, Plaintiff, v. BRONX-LEBANON HOSPITAL CENTER and Sheldon Ortsman, Vice-President of Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

228 F.Supp.2d 377

Duncan QUARLESS, Plaintiff, v. BRONX-LEBANON HOSPITAL CENTER and Sheldon Ortsman, Vice-President of Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center, Defendants.

No. 99 CIV.4414 (RMB).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 27, 2002.

ORDER

BERMAN, District Judge.

Duncan Quarless ("Quarless" or "Plaintiff") filed this action against Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center ("Bronx-Lebanon"), his former employer, and Sheldon Ortsman, Director of Human Resources at Bronx-Lebanon, who supervised Mr. Quarless during his tenure at the hospital (collectively "Defendants"). In his amended complaint, filed July 30, 1999 ("Am. Compl."), Mr. Quarless alleged, among other things, race discrimination, disparate pay and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq. (1994) ("Title VII"), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et. seq. ("NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. Admin. Code § 8-101 et. seq. ("NYCHRL").

On August 15, 2000, this Court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's failure to promote and retaliation claims under Title VII on statute of limitations grounds. See Order dated August 15, 2000 at 7-10. It also dismissed the Plaintiff's hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims, as well as the Plaintiff's state law failure to promote claim. Id. at 10-13. The Court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Plaintiff's federal, state and city disparate pay claims, id. at 6-7, 12 ("Plaintiff has alleged a prima facie case of disparate pay under Title VII and ... under the State Human Rights Law and NYC Human Rights Law"), as well as the Plaintiff's state and municipal law retaliation claims. Id. at 12-13 ("Plaintiff sets forth a prima facie case of state and local Human Rights Law retaliation.").

On December 26, 2001, the Defendants moved for summary judgment ("Def.Mem.") under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing, among other things: (1) that Mr. Quarless failed to produce any evidence to support his disparate pay or retaliation claims; and (2) that the Plaintiff's claims under both federal and state statutes were not timely filed. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants' motion is granted.

I. Background

In February 1992, Bronx-Lebanon hired the Plaintiff as the Director of Labor Relations in its Human Resources Department. See Employee Requisition, Plaintiff's Ex. 27. The Plaintiff's duties at Bronx-Lebanon included responsibility for labor-management relations with various employee unions and employee relations with nonunion staff, including "grievance handling, arbitration preparation, supervisory development and development of preventive labor/employee relations approaches and policies." See id.

The Plaintiff's starting salary in his position as Director of Human Resources was $72,000 per year. See Am. Compl. at ¶ 11. In July 1993, Bronx-Lebanon gave the Plaintiff a 2% pay raise, bringing his annual salary to approximately $74,000. See id. at ¶ 13. The Plaintiff felt that this raise was inadequate, and he complained to his immediate supervisor, Dr. Ralph Staulcup, the Vice President of Human Resources ("Staulcup"), on December 1, 1993. See id. at ¶ 14. Bronx-Lebanon then adjusted the Plaintiff's salary upward by 1.4% on December 20, 1993, thereby increasing the Plaintiff's annual salary to approximately $75,000. See id. at ¶ 15.

Sometime in 1994, several black managerial and non-union employees approached the Plaintiff in his capacity as the Director of Labor Relations to complain about a disparity in pay between them and their white counterparts. See id. at ¶ 16. The Plaintiff investigated these complaints and determined that the black employees had a valid claim. See id. at ¶ 18. The Plaintiff informed Staulcup of the results of his investigation and Staulcup promised that he would look into the matter. See id. at ¶ 18-19. Apparently neither Staulcup nor anyone else at Bronx-Lebanon took action in response to the Plaintiff's report. See id. at ¶ 19.

In 1995 and 1996, there were two large-scale reductions-in-force at Bronx-Lebanon. See id. at ¶ 20. The Plaintiff believed that most of the employees who had complained to him regarding pay inequities had been included on the layoff list, and he complained to Staulcup that the reductions-in-force unfairly targeted minority employees. See id. at ¶ 20-21. Staulcup apparently did little in response to the Plaintiff's complaints and the reductions-in-force were implemented. See id. at ¶ 21. As a result of these reductions-inforce, Bronx-Lebanon was subjected to United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") complaints and lawsuits. See id. at ¶ 22.

During the course of one of the lawsuits arising from the reductions-in-force, Brown v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 97 Civ. 2270, 1997 WL 736700 (S.D.N.Y.1997), the Plaintiff was interviewed by Ms. Ricki Roer, the attorney representing Bronx-Lebanon. See id. at ¶ 23. The Plaintiff informed Ms. Roer of his investigations regarding pay disparities at Bronx-Lebanon, and he further stated that he believed that there was both statistical and anecdotal evidence to support the claims of plaintiff John Brown. See id. at ¶ 24. The Plaintiff also informed Ms. Roer that he believed that he had suffered from disparate pay during his tenure at Bronx-Lebanon. See id. at ¶ 25. The Plaintiff believes that Ms. Roer related the contents of this interview to, among others, Defendant Ortsman, the "VIP of Operation and Human Resources" and the Plaintiff's immediate supervisor at the time, and Mr. Ernest Callazo ("Callazo"), Bronx-Lebanon's outside counsel for labor relations matters. See id. at ¶ 25.

In March 1997, after Staulcup left the employ of Bronx-Lebanon, the Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ortsman informed the Plaintiff that he was to be promoted to the position of Assistant Vice-President of Human Resources with a minimum salary of $100,000. See id. at ¶ 26. At the time, the Plaintiff states that it was agreed that the Plaintiff would receive an immediate salary increase to $93,000 per year. See id. at ¶ 27. In late September 1997, following the Plaintiff's meeting with Ms. Roer in regard to Brown's lawsuit, the Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Ortsman to inquire about the status of his promotion and pay increase. See id. at ¶ 29. Defendant Ortsman responded, in a letter dated October 1, 1997,¹ that the Plaintiff "should not presume ... that I have made the decision to create [an Associate Director of Human Resources] position, that I have decided to appoint you to the position, and that you will be receiving a 10% promotional increase retroactive to some prior date." See Def. Mem., Ex. M.

During 1998, the Plaintiff complained about his treatment by Defendant Ortsman, stating that his "authority was undermined, he was shunned, and he was kept away from meetings he usually attended." See Am. Compl. at ¶ 31. In June 1998, Callazo advised the Plaintiff (apparently verbally) that he should seek employment elsewhere. See id.; Plaintiff's Affidavit, Ex. 26, at ¶ 24. The Plaintiff resigned from Bronx-Lebanon on September 25, 1998, see Am. Compl. at ¶ 32, and he eventually accepted a lesser position with lower pay at another institution. See Plaintiff's Affidavit, Ex. 26, at ¶ 20(g).

On February 1, 1999, the Plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint alleging discrimination and constructive discharge. See Def. Mem., Ex. O. In his EEOC complaint, the Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that he "experience[d] a hostile work environment in this department initiated by his immediate supervisor, Mr. Ortsman," that his "authority was undermined, he was shunned and kept away from meetings he usually attended," and, also, that "he was forced to relinquish his position and accept another position with less money." See id. at ¶¶ 21, 22, 23. Upon Plaintiff's request, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on April 2, 1999.

II. Standard Of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue of fact is `material' for these purposes if it `might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law,' [and] [a]n issue of fact is `genuine' if `the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Konikoff v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 234 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Therefore, "[i]f, as to the issue on which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party, summary judgment is improper." Gummo v. Village of Depew, 75 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.1996).

The moving party has the initial burden of identifying "those portions of the [record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must then "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "Statements that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir.1999); see also Cifarelli v. Village of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1996) ("mere conclusory allegations, speculation or...