Quartararo v. Fogg
Citation | 679 F. Supp. 212 |
Decision Date | 09 February 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 86 CV 2337 (ERK).,86 CV 2337 (ERK). |
Parties | Michael QUARTARARO, Petitioner, v. Walter FOGG, Superintendent, Coxsackie Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Barry Bassis, Phylis Skloot Bamberger, The Legal Aid Soc., Criminal Appeals Bureau, Federal Defender Services Unit, New York City, for petitioner.
Mark Cohen, Asst. Dist. Atty., Patrick Henry, Dist. Atty. of Suffolk County, Riverhead, N.Y., for respondents.
On April 20, 1979, John Pius, Jr. ("Pius"), a thirteen-year-old resident of Smithtown, New York, was murdered. Approximately seven months later, petitioner Michael Quartararo and his brother, Peter, were indicted and charged with Pius' murder.1 Petitioner and his brother were jointly tried, and following a six-week jury trial in the Suffolk County Court, both defendants were convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree, intentional murder in violation of Penal Law § 125.251 and murder resulting from a depraved indifference to human life in violation of Penal Law § 125.252. Petitioner, who was fourteen years old when the offense was committed, was sentenced to two concurrent terms of incarceration of nine years to life. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed petitioner's conviction. People v. Quartararo, 113 A.D.2d 845, 493 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2d Dep't 1985). Chief Judge Wachtler denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals on December 18, 1985. People v. Quartararo, 66 N.Y.2d 1042, 499 N.Y.S.2d 1040, 489 N.E.2d 1312 (1985).
Petitioner then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner asserts five grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) denial of his motion for severance; (3) the insufficiency of the evidence; (4) prejudicial pretrial publicity; and (5) prosecutorial misconduct.2 Because the record plainly demonstrates that petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and the petition must be granted for this reason, it is unnecessary to address the other issues raised by petitioner.3
The determination whether petitioner has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel is not made in the abstract, but "in light of all the circumstances" and "on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of the challenged conduct." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Similarly, the determination whether petitioner has made the requisite showing of prejudice is based on "the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury" because "some errors will have had a pervasive effect ... and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect" and because the resulting prejudice, if any, necessarily depends on the strength of the prosecution's case. Id. at 695-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69. Accordingly, in order to assess whether petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a comprehensive review of the entire trial as it unfolded is necessary.
The prosecution's opening statement was delivered by Assistant District Attorney Thomas Spota ("Spota"), without objection from either petitioner's or co-defendant's counsel. Spota outlined the case in the following manner (T. 23-26)4:
Spota then told the jury that Peter Quartararo had confessed and had implicated himself and petitioner (T. 32, 33). Spota also told the jury that petitioner's father did not believe petitioner's denial of the crime or his brother's recantation of his earlier confession (T. 34). Spota, continuing without objection, told the jury that lie detector tests were administered to both defendants at their father's request and that the results were then given to their father, who then asked Peter to "restate what he considered to be the truth in this case, so that there would be cooperation by these defendants" (T. 34). Spota also informed the jury that Peter told the police that "he would go back to his original version of what had occurred" if petitioner first told the police what happened (T. 35).
The only allusion to admissible evidence against petitioner was contained in the following few sentences of Spota's opening statement (T. 35):
You will hear testimony ... from friends and acquaintances of Peter and Michael Quartararo ... one or two of whom are very close friends of the Quartararos ... how Michael Quartararo, in particular, and Peter Quartararo, detailed to them how, in fact, yes, they had killed John Pius, and the manner in which it was done.
Spota's opening statement emphasized emotion rather than the evidence, and with good reason. There was no physical evidence linking petitioner to the murder and the testimony of the "friends and acquaintances" to which Spota alluded was vague, inconsistent and "presented credibility problems." People v. Brensic, 70 N.Y.2d 9, 22, 517 N.Y.S.2d 120, 509 N.E.2d 1226 (1987). The jury did not, however, learn this from petitioner's appointed counsel, William O'Leary ("O'Leary"), who waived his right to give an opening statement (T. 37). O'Leary would later explain that he does not give opening statements because the prosecution bears the burden of proof and the jury was so apprised during the process of jury selection (Evidentiary Hearing of September 2, 1987, at 92-93).
Nicholas Castellano ("Castellano"), who represented Peter Quartararo, did not adhere to this philosophy. Castellano began his opening by emphasizing the presumption of innocence (T. 38) and the prosecution's burden of proving the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (T. 38-39). He raised the issue of whether Peter's confession was voluntary (T. 40) and gave an account of how the Quartararos and Ryan were questioned over a period of hours (T. 44-56), informing the jury that Peter had recanted his confession after his mother arrived (T. 59). Castellano also alluded to statements made by petitioner at a railroad station a few months after the murder, suggesting that petitioner was drunk at the time the statements were made (T. 62-63). Castellano told the jury that neither Ryan nor Brensic had confessed to any involvement in Pius' murder (T. 56) and alluded to the fact that Ryan had not been indicted (T. 43).
Castellano also accused the police of failing to apprehend the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Quartararo v. Mantello, 88 CV 1013 (ERK).
...filed by petitioner's brother, Michael, was granted on the ground that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Quartararo v. Fogg, 679 F.Supp. 212 (E.D.N.Y.), affirmed, 849 F.2d 1467 (2d Cir.1988). Subsequently, petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The peti......
-
Sparman v. Edwards, 95-CV-4689 (JG).
..."An accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system." Quartararo v. Fogg, 679 F.Supp. 212, 239 (E.D.N.Y.) (Korman, J.) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1467 (2d......
-
Henry v. Scully, 91 CIV. 7632.
...Merely labelling counsel's errors `strategy' does not shield his trial performance from Sixth Amendment scrutiny." Quartararo v. Fogg, 679 F.Supp. 212, 247 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1467 (2d Cir.1988) (citations In this case, there is no possible strategy which would have justified allowi......
-
Quartararo v. Hanslmaier
...Korman granted Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Quartararo v. Fogg, 679 F.Supp. 212 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1467 (2d Cir.1988). Specifically, Judge Korman found that Petitioner's counsel was constitutionally deficie......