Quatannens v. Tyrrell

• Decision Date: 17 September 2004
• Docket Number: Record No. 032562.
• Citation: Quatannens v. Tyrrell, 268 Va. 360, 601 S.E.2d 616 (2004)
• Parties: Stephen D. QUATANNENS, et al. v. Robert E. TYRRELL, Jr., et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

601 S.E.2d 616

268 Va. 360

Stephen D. QUATANNENS, et al. v.Robert E. TYRRELL, Jr., et al.

Record No. 032562.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

September 17, 2004.

Stephen Quatannens, Alexandria, for appellants.

Eugene M. Paige(David C. Frederick; Kevin Byrnes, Alexandria; Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans, Washington, DC; Wade & Byrnes, Alexandria, on brief), for appellees.

Present: All the Justices.

OPINION BY Justice DONALD W. LEMONS.

In this appeal, we consider the evidentiary requirement to sustain a claim of adverse possession in a dispute over a narrow strip of land between adjoining landowners.

I.Facts and Proceedings Below

Stephen D. Quatannens and Eileen A. Quatannens("the Quatannens") reside at 217S. Alfred Street in Alexandria, Virginia.Robert E. Tyrrell, Jr. and his wife, Jeanne M. Hauch, ("the Tyrrells") reside at 219S. Alfred Street, Alexandria, Virginia.In dispute is the ownership of a strip of land 100 feet long and ranging from approximately eight to 20 inches wide, running the length of the adjoining parcels of property.The strip of land contains a small portion of a room of the Quatannens' house, part of a brick walkway, part of a paved parking area, and one side of a brick arch over the walkway at the front of the Quatannens' house, all of which have existed since at least 1976.The remainder of the strip appears to contain some vegetation.

The Quatannens purchased their property in October, 1995.Eileen Quatannens testified that the Quatannens had not intended to possess any property that they did not own and were unaware of any boundary issues until the fall of 2001 when the Tyrrells asserted their claim.Although the Quatannens had been given a plat of the property at the time of purchase, they testified that they had not reviewed it.The Quatannens filed a bill of complaint for injunctive relief and to quiet title in the Circuit Court.

At a bench trial, two previous owners of 217 S. Alfred Street testified that they presumed that the strip belonged to them and carried out such activities as gardening, storage, handball, and walking on the disputed land.A prior owner of 219 S. Alfred Street, the Tyrrells' property, testified in a deposition that he believed that his property ended at the wall of the home at 219S. Alfred Street and that the property at 217S. Alfred Street encompassed the strip of land in dispute.

Jeanne Hauch was the sole witness for the Tyrrells.She testified that she and her husband had "bought the plat"at 219S. Alfred Street.She admitted that she had not asserted any claims toward the disputed property before October 2001.

The trial court found that the Quatannens "had not established that their possession was `hostile,' as the possession had been by mistake for the majority of the period" and stated that it further found for the Tyrrells "for the reasons stated [in the Tyrrells'] closing argument," which were that "i) the acts of Plaintiffs in using the disputed land had been insufficient to establish possession, ii) that there had not been actual notice to the Defendants and their predecessors, and iii) that adverse possession could not be by mistake."The trial court denied the Quatannens' motion to reconsider.

II.Analysis

On appeal, the Quatannens contend that the trial court erred in denying their claim of adverse possession on three grounds:

a) that "the trial court erred in not finding for plaintiffs as to adverse possession due to lack of actual notice to defendants and their predecessors;"

b) that "the trial court erred in finding that the acts of plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest were not sufficient to establish possession;" and,

c) that "the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiffs could not adversely possess because they did not have a hostile intent to take the land in dispute from another."

The trial court's opinion and the arguments of the Tyrrells appear to conflate all the elements of adverse possession into hostile intent.The facts of the case are largely undisputed.In determining the proper application of the law of adverse possession to the facts of this case, we review the trial court's decisionde novo.Turner v. Caplan,268 Va. 122, 125, 596 S.E.2d 525, 527(2004)(questions of law subject to de novo review);Barter Found. v. Widener,267 Va. 80, 90, 592 S.E.2d 56, 60(2003)(regarding mixed questions of law and fact, a trial court's application of law is subject to de novo review);see alsoCarmody v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,234 Va. 198, 201, 361 S.E.2d 128, 130(1987).

A.Prior Cases

The doctrine of adverse possession in Virginia has a long history.Many cases are fact-specific and their resolution may turn on only one or two of the elements of adverse possession.

In Taylor v. Burnsides,42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 165, 190(1844), the Court held that "the elements of an adversary possession ... consist of an exclusive, actual, continued possession, under a colourable claim of title."The Court emphasized that possession must be exclusive and viewed it as a necessity that "when the rightful owner is in actual possession, that he should be disseised or ousted, and continually thereafter kept out by the hostile claimant."When the rightful owner is not in actual possession and the land appears vacant, the Court opined, "[S]till it is indispensable that [possession] should be not the less exclusive in its commencement and continuance.Though the adverse claimant cannot in such case turn out, he must shut out the rightful owner."Id. at 190.

This Court in Taylor also emphasized the "actual" nature of the possession.The opinion states that, actual possession is "absolute dominion and enjoyment of the property."Id.We noted that actual possession might be accomplished "by residence, cultivation, improvement, or other open, notorious and habitual acts of ownership."Id. at 192.In Turpin v. Saunders,73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 27(1879), an appeal of an action of ejectment, the plaintiffs to the ejectment claimed adverse possession of the subject land.The defendants claimed that their predecessor in interest had leased the land in question to a tenant.The plaintiffs claimed that the same tenant had a prior lease for the same land from the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest.The lease between the defendants' predecessor and the tenant was reduced to writing while the lease between the plaintiffs' predecessor and the tenant was not written and had not been widely publicized.In fact, the tenant had concealed the prior lease from the defendants' predecessor.Id. at 31-33.We held that the tenant's lease with the plaintiff's predecessor could not be used to establish adverse possession because "possession must be not only with claim of title, but it must be visible and notorious, and not secret and clandestine ... the occupation must be of that nature and notoriety that the owner may be presumed to know the adverse possession."Id. at 34.As we said in Turpin,

the plaintiff's claim of possession is lacking in one of the most essential elements to render it adversary in its character.Simpkins, although in the actual occupation of the premises, did not claim title in himself or in Saunders.On the contrary, he accepted a lease from Cecil, and claimed to hold under him.

Id. at 35.

In Christian v. Bulbeck,120 Va. 74, 90 S.E. 661(1916), we undertook to clarify the law on the subject of adverse possession by mistake.After extensive review of earlier Virginia cases and cases from other jurisdictions, we concluded that:

[T]he correct rule, and the rule in Virginia, [is that] where the proof is that the location of the line in question was caused in the first instance by a mistake as to the true boundary, the other facts and circumstances in the case must negative by a preponderance of evidence the inference which will otherwise arise that there was no definite and fixed intention on the part of the possessor to occupy, use and claim as his own[,] the land up to a particular and definite line on the ground.That is to say, on the whole proof a case must be presented in which the preponderance of evidence as to the character of the possession, how held, how evidenced on the ground, how regarded by the adjoining land owner, etc., etc., supplies the proof that the definite and positive intention on the part of the possessor to occupy, use and claim as his own the land up to a particular and definite line on the ground existed, coupled with the requisite possession, for the statutory period, in order to ripen title under the statute.Whether the positive and definite intention to claim as one's own the land up to a particular and definite line on the ground existed, is the practical test in such cases.

Id. at 110-111, 90 S.E. at 672.We further explained:

The collateral question whether the possessor would have claimed title, claimed the land as his own, had he believed the land involved did not belong to him, but to another, that is, had he not been mistaken as to the true boundary line called for in his chain of title, is not the proximate but an antecedent question, which is irrelevant and serves only to confuse ideas.

Id. at 111, 90 S.E. at 672.Citing an earlier case with approval, we then stated that "[i]n Virginia, proof of an expressed intention to claim title is not necessary."Id. at 107, 90 S.E. at 671(citingHaney v. Breeden,100 Va. 781, 783-84, 42 S.E. 916, 917(1902)).

In LaDue v. Currell,201 Va. 200, 110 S.E.2d 217(1959), we examined the types of acts sufficient to establish adverse possession.In a dispute between neighboring landowners in Centreville, Virginia, the Court explained that "[t]he usual kind of actual possession relied upon is occupancy, use or residence upon the premises for the statutory period of time, evidenced by cultivation, enclosure, or erection of improvements, or other plainly visible, continuous and notorious manifestation or exclusive possession in keeping with the...