Quattlebaum v. Barry

• Decision Date: 21 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92-CV-504.,92-CV-504.
• Citation: 671 A.2d 881
• Parties: Carrie QUATTLEBAUM, et al., Appellants, v. Marion BARRY, et al., Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

671 A.2d 881

Carrie QUATTLEBAUM, et al., Appellants, v. Marion BARRY,^* et al., Appellees.

No. 92-CV-504.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued En Banc April 25, 1995.

Decided December 21, 1995.

Anthony Herman, Washington, DC, with whom Joshua D. Sarnoff, Tucson, AZ, Eric Lasker, and Florence Wagman Roisman, Washington, DC, were on the brief, for appellants.

Edward Schwab, Assistance Corporation Counsel, with whom John Payton, Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellees.

Kathryn W. Lovill, Walter A. Smith, Jr. and A. Lee Bentley, III, Washington, DC, filed a brief on behalf of the Children's Defense Fund, as amicus curiae.

Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and FERREN, TERRY, STEADMAN, SCHWELB, FARRELL, and KING, Associate Judges.

ON REHEARING EN BANC

PER CURIAM:^**

In 1991, the Council of the District of Columbia, confronted with a serious revenue shortfall, enacted legislation, subsequently signed by the Mayor, which reduced the benefit entitlements of AFDC recipients¹ to October 1, 1989 levels and eliminated the annual COLA² which recipients had previously received. See Budget Conformity Amendment Act of 1991, D.C. Law 9-27 (August 17, 1991). Appellants, AFDC recipients who were adversely affected by these benefit reductions, brought a class action in the Superior Court against the Mayor and other District officials (collectively the District), seeking injunctive and other relief. Appellants contended that the Council had unlawfully reduced their benefits, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2017(b) (1988), by improperly taking into consideration AFDC recipients' entitlement to receive food stamps. They also claimed that the Council had failed to reassess the current minimum needs of AFDC recipients, in violation of D.C.Code § 3-205.44.³ Finally, appellants asserted that the individual notices advising AFDC recipients of the reductions were not in compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and, on April 13, 1993, the trial judge issued a comprehensive opinion in which he granted the District's motion. Quattlebaum v. Dixon, 120 Daily Wash. L.Rptr. 1925 (Super.Ct.D.C.1992) (Quattlebaum I). The AFDC recipients appealed and, on October 20, 1994, in Quattlebaum II, supra note 1, a division of this court reversed the judgment, holding that the Council had improperly considered the AFDC recipients' entitlement to food stamps and that the notices to the recipients were insufficient.⁴ On March 27, 1995, this court, sitting en banc, vacated the division opinion and granted the District's petition for rehearing en banc. We now affirm the trial court's principal rulings and sustain the validity of the benefit reductions.⁵

I. THE FOOD STAMP ACT CLAIM

A. The Facts.

The facts of record are largely undisputed. They are described in detail both in the trial judge's memorandum opinion, Quattlebaum I, 120 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1928-31, and in the opinion of the division. Quattlebaum II, 648 A.2d at 952-54. We recite only those facts, and address only those issues, which we view as necessary to decide this appeal.

In March 1991, during a fiscal crisis which has not abated in the interim, former Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly presented to the Council her budget proposal for Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992. She recommended that the Council suspend the previously automatic annual COLA for AFDC recipients, and that individual entitlements be rolled back by 4.5% to 1989 levels.

On April 25, 1991, the Council's Committee on Human Services issued a Report⁶ recommending that the Mayor's budget proposals be adopted. The Committee reported that "funding simply does not exist to fund adequately each and every program which the District has provided for in the past."⁷

Under federal law, the value of food stamp allotments which state agencies are authorized to issue increases as an eligible recipient's income decreases. See 7 U.S.C. § 2017(a) (1991). Recognizing that the law operates in this manner, the Committee noted that the loss of AFDC benefits would be partially offset by an increase in the food stamp allotment for which some affected recipients would be eligible. Report, at 6. The Report contained the following table:

                FY FY AFDC Food Stamp
                Household 90 91 Decrease Increase
                    1         $ 258    $ 270       $ 12            $ 4
                    2           321      336         15              5
                    3           409      428         19              6
                    4           499      522         23              7
                

Id. The Report further described a meeting of the Committee at which

Councilmember Wilhelmina Rolark noted that these types of reductions were devastating, because they "hit the most vulnerable of our population, the poor." She further noted that she understood that we are in a budget crisis, and inquired as to whether this bill was one of those budget conformity pieces of legislation. Chairman H.R. Crawford responded in the affirmative. Mr. Crawford further indicated that this bill was requested by the Executive and that some of the difference in the public assistance reductions would be off-set in the allocation of flood stamps. . . . Mr. Crawford further reminded the Committee that he had to work within the funds that "were allocated to the human services budget, that we did not allow the workers of the District of Columbia a COLA, or pay an increase in the last 2 years." He noted that everyone must participate in the terrible budgetary crisis we are facing in the District. Councilmember Rolark indicated that she understood and commended the chairman for having worked hard to off-set the reductions.

Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

B. The Trial Judge's Decision.

The provision of the Food Stamp Act on which appellants rely states that

the value of the allotment provided any eligible household shall not be considered income or resources for any purpose under any Federal, State, or local laws, including... welfare, and public assistance programs, and no participating State or political subdivision thereof shall decrease any assistance otherwise provided an individual or individuals because of the receipt of an allotment under this chapter.

7 U.S.C. § 2017(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Appellants claimed at trial, and now contend in this court, that the references to food stamp eligibility in the Committee's Report demonstrated that AFDC benefits were rolled back "because of" recipients' eligibility for food stamps, in violation of § 2017(b).

The trial judge rejected this contention. He wrote that a state may undoubtedly reduce AFDC benefit levels because of financial exigencies, and that the Food Stamp Act "does not prohibit the defendants from lowering their guaranteed income level in order to protect their solvency." Quattlebaum I, 120 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1929 (quoting Foster v. Center Township, 527 F.Supp. 377, 379 (N.D.Ind.), aff'd. mem. 673 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir.1981)). He perceived it to be "clear from the record ... that the principal factor precipitating defendants' reduction of AFDC benefits and suspension of the COLA's was the District's fiscal crisis." Id. The judge noted that the Council attempted to alleviate this crisis by making "across the board" budget cuts and adjustments, and that the Act was originally passed as emergency legislation "in order to alleviate budget problems as quickly as possible." Id.

Turning to the legislative history on which the AFDC recipients largely based their case, the judge wrote as follows:

Plaintiffs insist that Chairman Crawford's remarks concerning food stamps at the Council meeting on April 25, 1991, combined with the table in the Committee report, demonstrate the requisite causation. This hardly suffices to support plaintiffs' conclusion. These references merely called attention to the fact that increased food stamp allotments would offset approximately one-third of the AFDC decrease. In times of budgetary constraints an elected legislative body can scarcely be expected to forego pointing out that disagreeable medicine is not quite so bad as may first appear. Plaintiffs' broad interpretation of the statutory expression "because of" would put a virtual gag on legislators faced with the unpopular task of reducing AFDC benefit levels. The legislative history demonstrates unequivocally that the "cause" of the reductions was the District's severe fiscal crisis, not the consideration of food stamp allotments. Consequently, the Court concludes that the reduction did not violate the second prohibition of 7 U.S.C. § 2017(b).

Id.

C. Legal Discussion.

It appears to be undisputed that the question whether the District was entitled to summary judgment is one of law. Accordingly, we must review the trial judge's decision de novo. See, e.g., Colbert v. Georgetown University, 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1994) (en banc).

In conducting our review, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. In the present case, however, all parties sought disposition of the case by summary judgment, and no claim was made by anyone, either in the Superior Court or on appeal, that there are genuine issues of material fact requiring development at trial. Moreover, the resolution of the Food Stamp Act issue turns upon the intent of the Council in enacting the challenged legislation. No party has suggested that a trial could shed further light upon that intent, and we agree with the parties that the issue before us is one of law.

It is important to recognize, at the outset, the nature of the claim which the AFDC recipients are asserting under the Food Stamp Act, and the kind of relief which they are seeking. Appellants have asked the court to order the elected branches of the government to spend more money on the AFDC program because, they claim, the Council made the decision to reduce benefits for a legally impermissible reason. Moreover, appel...