Quayle v. Catholic Health Initiatives Colo.
| Docket Number | 21-1382 |
| Decision Date | 29 June 2023 |
| Parties | SEJAL QUAYLE, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES COLORADO, a Colorado nonprofit corporation, d/b/a Centura Health-Mercy Regional Medical Center; CENTURA HEALTH PHYSICIAN GROUP; WILL MCCONNELL, an individual, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-02175-PAB-KLM) (D. Colo.)
Before TYMKOVICH, EID, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
Dr Sejal Quayle sued her employer (Mercy Hospital), alleging violations of Title VII. The district court granted Mercy's motion for summary judgment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Quayle worked as a urologist for Mercy Hospital from 2008 until her termination in 2018. The first formal complaint against Quayle was filed in 2011.
The complaint alleged that, while frustrated with a technician during an operation, Quayle shouted that she was "going to f***ing kill someone right now," and "going to bitch slap [the technician]." App'x Vol. I at 99. Following this outburst, Quayle met with a Mercy administrator and agreed to behave more professionally.
However in response to further complaints, in 2013, Mercy administration placed Quayle on a "Physician Performance Redirection and Improvement Plan" ("PRIP"). The complaints included Quayle's use of inappropriate comments and language in front of patients, her disrespectful and verbally abusive behavior towards hospital staff, and her creation of a hostile work environment. Following these complaints, Quayle was given formal notice of the behavioral standards to which she was expected to adhere. In 2015, Mercy administration placed Quayle on a second PRIP because of continued complaints from staff that Quayle "abused and demeaned them," "used profanity," "created an intimidating atmosphere in the urology clinic," and "yelled patients' protected health information down public hallways ...." Id. at 100. The second PRIP required Quayle to "treat staff with respect, set a professional tone in the clinic, refrain from yelling and using profanity, [and] comply with the Code of Medical Staff Profession [sic] Conduct and other behavior standards," noting that this would be Quayle's "final written warning." Id.
Additional issues followed during Quayle's time at Mercy. In 2017, Quayle placed a catheter in a patient, CG. During the procedure, when CG was "writhing in pain and . . . crying out," Quayle told CG that "you should have taken responsibility for your own health, and that's why you're in this situation." Id. at 101. After the procedure, CG and his wife requested that Quayle return and answer a few questions, but Quayle refused to reenter the room. Standing just outside CG's room, Quayle called CG an "asshole" and yelled "I don't have time for this f***ing patient." Id. Following this encounter, staff members again filed complaints about Quayle's behavior. Mercy administrators met with Quayle to discuss her encounter with CG; staff later reported that Quayle had contacted them to ask about "who turned her in." Id. at 102. In August 2017, administrators notified Quayle that she was suspended while they investigated the CG incident and interviewed Quayle's clinic staff. Later that month, administrators issued Quayle a third PRIP, stating that Quayle had to take responsibility for her actions, which had "deviated from Mercy norms of professional behavior" and conflicted with Mercy's core values. Id. at 103. Quayle disagreed with the PRIP and refused to sign it. Instead, she authored her own PRIP, denying any violation of Mercy's policies and maintaining that her behavior comported with Mercy's norms of professional conduct. Quayle returned to work that same month. In November 2017, Mercy administration once again met with Quayle, providing her with a revised PRIP that did not require her to admit wrongdoing. However, Quayle again refused to sign the PRIP. Mercy administration made continued attempts to find a "path forward" for Quayle at Mercy, id. at 103, suggesting she consult an "executive coach to improve her communication skills," id. at 104. Nevertheless, Quayle maintained that her behavior adhered to Mercy's professional norms and would not admit otherwise. Mercy leadership began "exploring other avenues" because Quayle refused to take responsibility for her actions. Id. at 108. In April 2018, Quayle and Mercy administration attended a mediation but failed to reach a resolution. Quayle was subsequently terminated.
Quayle brought claims for wrongful termination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, as well as state law tortious interference claims. She later conceded that the tortious interference claims should be dismissed. Mercy moved for summary judgment on Quayle's remaining claims. The district court granted summary judgment for Mercy on the wrongful termination and retaliation claims. Quayle appealed.
"This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court and examining the record to determine if any genuine issue of material fact was in dispute; if not, we determine if the substantive law was correctly applied." United States ex rel. Sorenson v. Wadsworth Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 48 F.4th 1146, 1159 (10th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). "In so doing, we view the factual record and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to . . . the nonmoving party." Id. (cleaned up).
Turning first to Quayle's wrongful determination claim, Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Turning first to Quayle's discrimination claim, she has not alleged direct evidence of sex discrimination by Mercy Hospital. "Title VII plaintiffs who can't show direct evidence of discrimination may nevertheless prove discrimination through circumstantial evidence." Fassbender v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 890 F.3d 875, 884 (10th Cir. 2018). We apply the McDonnell-Douglas framework "to evaluate whether circumstantial evidence of discrimination presents a triable issue." Id.; see generally McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, Quayle must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Bird v. W.Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1200 (10th Cir. 2016). To do so, Quayle must show that she is a member of a protected class; she was terminated; she was otherwise qualified for the position; and the position was not eliminated. Fassbender, 890 F.3d at 884. While Quayle's burden of making this showing is "not onerous," she must still show "actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under Title VII." Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228 (2015). Should she succeed, "the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." E.E.O.C. v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007). If Mercy meets "this burden, then the analysis moves to the third step of the McDonnell-Douglas framework, under which summary judgment is warranted unless [Quayle] can show there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reasons are pretextual." Fassbender, 890 F.3d at 884.
The burden on Quayle is not onerous-but it is still a burden....
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