Quedens v. State

• Decision Date: 27 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. S06A0070.,S06A0070.
• Citation: Quedens v. State, 629 S.E.2d 197, 280 Ga. 355 (Ga. 2006)
• Parties: QUEDENS v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

280 Ga. 355

629 S.E.2d 197

QUEDENS v. STATE.

No. S06A0070.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 27, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gerald P. Word, Word & Taylor, P.C., Jerry Floyd Pittman, Carrollton, for Appellant.

Peter J. Skandalakis, Dist. Atty., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Stephen Michael Gray, Asst. Dist. Atty., Julie Amanda Adams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

BENHAM, Justice.

Connie King Quedens appeals the judgment of conviction entered against her on the jury's verdict finding her guilty of the malice murder of Willie "Fred" Wilkerson and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. After examining the record and transcript in light of her enumerated errors and finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of conviction.¹

Human skeletal remains were found in 2003 under 20 feet of debris in a filled well located approximately 100 yards from appellant's home on the Troup County property she owned. The remains were found in the remnants of a pair of pants with lip balm in the pocket and were wrapped, along with a corroded piece of pipe and a hacksaw blade, in a piece of carpeting that had extensive burn marks on it. Dentures were found in the well at or below the level where the skeletal remains were found.

The children of Fred Wilkerson, the man who had built the home in which appellant was living, who had been romantically involved with appellant in 1986-87, and who had not been seen or heard from since November 27, 1987, testified their father wore pants of the size found with the remains, wore dentures, and always carried a tube of the brand of lip balm found with the remains. A mitochondrial DNA ² comparison of one of the bones recovered from the well and an oral swabbing from the daughter of the missing man's sister led an expert in DNA analysis to conclude that Wilkerson could not be excluded as being the contributor of the bone sample since the sample had the same maternal lineage as the oral swabbing from Wilkerson's niece. Wilkerson's daughter testified she was not aware of any relative other than her father who was missing. A forensic anthropologist employed by the GBI testified the remains were those of a male and the skull contained an oblong defect consistent with having been shot in the back of the head. Based on all the factors, the expert opined that the remains were those of Fred Wilkerson.

Wilkerson's son testified his father and appellant were living together in the summer months of 1987 in the house his father had built, with the witness living in a basement apartment of the house. Wilkerson deeded his one-half interest in the property to appellant and, in early September 1987, the witness and his father were arrested on appellant's complaint and were required to leave the property. On November 25, 1987, Wilkerson filed a lawsuit against appellant in which he sought payment for the materials he had purchased and used to construct the home appellant was then sharing with her two sons and their father, whom she had divorced in August 1987. Wilkerson's son last saw his father the evening of November 27 in the apartment the two shared. Wilkerson's car, unlocked with the keys on the front seat and two uncashed payroll checks on the backseat, was located in a long-term parking lot at Atlanta's airport on December 24, 1987.

A woman who had been appellant's neighbor in 1987 testified appellant asked her to care for family pets during the 1987 Thanksgiving weekend because appellant, her former husband, and their two sons were going to Florida. On November 27, appellant called to cancel the pet care, saying her children and their father had left, but she was staying home alone "to protect her property." On November 28, appellant asked the neighbor's 19-year-old daughter to drive appellant's car to the Atlanta airport in order to provide appellant with transportation from the airport back to Troup County. Appellant said she had to drive an intoxicated friend to the airport in the friend's car, but the neighbor's daughter did not see appellant's friend or the friend's car during the trip to and from the Atlanta airport. A woman who worked with appellant in 1987 testified appellant told her on December 23, 1987, that appellant's boyfriend and house-building partner had left the home, leaving his car behind, when appellant had refused to give him her part of the house and property, and that she had noticed later the car was gone.

In 2003, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for appellant's home, including the filled well. During the execution of the search warrant, appellant told the officers she had not gone on the family Thanksgiving trip to Florida in 1987 because she had to work on Friday and Saturday of that week. When appellant was told about the witness who drove her from the Atlanta airport in 1987, appellant told the officers Wilkerson had come to her home at her invitation on November 27, 1987, to discuss settlement of his lawsuit against her; a marked police car had driven into appellant's driveway behind Wilkerson and a uniformed officer and a nurse had exited that vehicle; Wilkerson, the officer, and the nurse yelled at one another and then left in the police car; and appellant drove Wilkerson's car to the Atlanta airport the following day after receiving a phone call threatening her children if she did not do so. She stated that prior to Wilkerson's November 27 arrival, she had been cutting rods to place in closets. When appellant was told the law enforcement officers were going to dig up the well pursuant to the warrant, appellant told the officers if Wilkerson were found in the well she did not know anything about it. When searchers reported the discovery of the skeletal remains in the well, appellant was arrested.

A microanalyst for the forensic sciences and trace evidence division of the Georgia Crime Lab testified the corroded pipe found with the skeletal remains probably came from the closet rods found in appellant's home. Appellant's husband testified pursuant to an order granting him immunity and compelling his testimony.³ He stated that upon his return to the Troup County home following the 1987 Thanksgiving trip to Florida, he found on the downstairs floor a cocked and loaded Walther PPK .380-caliber gun that had been fired. In a 2003 conversation with appellant concerning division of marital property, appellant inquired about the gun and "was quiet about it" after the witness reminded her that was the gun "from 17 years ago during the Fred thing" and he had sold it at a gun show. Unbeknownst to the witness, appellant tape-recorded that conversation and the tape, discovered in appellant's purse when she was arrested a month later, was seized by the arresting officer and played to the jury.⁴

1. The evidence summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress the statements she made on September 30, 2003, during the execution of the search warrant at her home. Appellant maintains she was subjected to a custodial interrogation without having been advised of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). After presiding over a hearing conducted pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), the trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding appellant had not been in custody when she made the statements.

To establish that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements she made before being advised of her Miranda rights, appellant must show she was both in custody and interrogated when she made the statements. Ramsey v. State, 272 Ga. 28(2), 526 S.E.2d 842 (2000). The focus in the case at bar is on the first criterion — whether appellant was in custody. A person must be apprised of his Miranda rights prior to being questioned by law enforcement officers after being "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way...." Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. "A court should evaluate the second prong of the test objectively: an individual is in custody if a reasonable person in the place of the defendant would feel so restrained as to equate to a formal arrest. [Cits.]." Tolliver v. State, 273 Ga. 785, 786, 546 S.E.2d 525 (2001). Both the officer from the sheriff's department and the DA's investigator testified appellant was not under formal arrest during the execution of the search warrant, she moved about her home without restriction, she made and received telephone calls without restraint, and she was free to leave the property. The fact that she was the focus of the investigation did not require the law enforcement personnel to give Miranda warnings. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323-324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ("`Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. . . .' [Cit.]. . . . `The mere fact that an investigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings.' [Cit.].") We conclude the trial court did not err when it determined that a reasonable person in appellant's place would not have felt so restrained as to equate to a formal arrest. Tolliver v. State, supra, 273 Ga. at 786, 546 S.E.2d 525.

3. Appellant also contends the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence a videotaped conversation between appellant and the investigating officer from the sheriff's department. The conversation took place in the investigator's office three months after appellant was arrested, at a time when appellant was...