Queen, In re

• Decision Date: 14 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 23165,23165
• Citation: 196 W.Va. 442,473 S.E.2d 483
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: In re: Tina Perry QUEEN, Executrix of the Estate of Jo Ann Perry.

Page 483

473 S.E.2d 483

196 W.Va. 442

In re: Tina Perry QUEEN, Executrix of the Estate of Jo Ann Perry.

No. 23165.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted April 30, 1996.

Decided June 14, 1996.

[196 W.Va. 444] Syllabus by the Court

1. An adjudicative decision of the Correctional Officers' Civil Service Commission should not be overturned by an appellate court unless it was clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Review under this standard is narrow and the reviewing court looks to the Civil Service Commission's action to determine whether the record reveals that a substantial and rational basis exists for its decision.

2. An appellate court may reverse a decision of the Correctional Officers' Civil Service Commission as clearly wrong or arbitrary or capricious only if the Commission used a misapplication of the law, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that ran counter to the evidence before the Commission, or offered one that was so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of Commission expertise.

3. The "clearly wrong" and the "arbitrary and capricious" standards of review are deferential ones which presume an agency's actions are valid as long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence or by a rational basis.

4. "Substantial evidence" requires more than a mere scintilla. It is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. If an administrative agency's factual finding is supported by substantial evidence, it is conclusive.

David L. Grubb, Kelly & Grubb, Charleston, for Tina Perry Queen.

Charles W. Peoples, Jr., Huntington, for Wayne County Sheriff.

CLECKLEY, Justice.

Tina Perry Queen, as executrix of the estate of Jo Ann Perry, the respondent below, appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court of Wayne County reversing a decision of the Wayne County Correctional Officers' Civil Service Commission reinstating Jo Ann Perry to her position as a correctional officer. The circuit court found the Commission's determination was not supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondent below, Jo Ann Perry, ¹ was employed as a correctional officer for the Wayne County Sheriff's Office from October, 1991, to September, 1994, when she was discharged. Prior to her discharge, the respondent's brief indicates she had "never been warned, reprimanded, suspended, demoted or terminated in her nearly three years of employment with the Sheriff of Wayne County." According to the respondent, on September 11, 1994, she reported to work at 8:00 a.m., and, over the course of the next several hours, she was the subject of sexual advances or an assault by an inmate, was engaged in a dispute over her assignment to a "constant watch" of the prisoner who made the sexual advances, and began her menstrual cycle but was unable to shower or change because of a lack of facilities for female correctional officers.

Because of these events, the respondent repeatedly requested that her superiors provide a relief officer to finish her shift. The respondent then explained the events of the evening to James Jacques, another correctional officer, and again requested that he provide a relief officer or she would be forced to "walk out." The position of the Wayne County Sheriff's Department, the petitioner below, is that the respondent actually stated that she was going to quit. The respondent then claims she was told by Chief Correctional Officer Greg Potter to think the matter over but, if she wanted to quit, to leave her resignation on his desk. The respondent states she had no desire to quit, so she did not leave anything in writing on her supervisor's desk. However, she called to see if a The next day when she arrived at work, the respondent indicated that she spoke to the relief officer from the previous day who questioned why she was at work, considering she had been suspended. The Sheriff's Department contends there is no evidence in the transcript that the relief correctional officer made such a statement and there was also no evidence that the Sheriff's Department ever suspended the respondent. The respondent claims she then spoke to the Sheriff who told her if she wanted her job back, she would have to go through the Civil Service Commission. On October 17, 1994, the respondent requested a hearing before the Wayne County Civil Service Commission.

                [196 W.Va. 445] relief officer had been called.  Upon learning that a relief officer had arrived, the respondent states she spoke to the relief officer, Frank Pelfrey, "to verify his presence and then went home for the day."   The petitioner claims the record reflects that the respondent "intended to quit on September 11, 1994, in fact did so, and that her actions subsequent thereto supported the Sheriff's belief she had quit her position[.]"  Moreover, the petition asserts that the respondent did not inform the sheriff until three to four weeks later about her reasons for leaving the jail on September 11, 1994
                

During the intervening time period, the respondent claims that her public employee's insurance coverage was canceled, effective September 11, 1994. After the hearing was conducted, the Commission, on January 11, 1995, ² entered a final order signifying that the respondent was improperly terminated. The order indicated the respondent was to be reinstated immediately with full pay. The Sheriff apparently disobeyed the order because the respondent was neither reinstated nor did she receive any back pay. The Sheriff petitioned the circuit court for an appeal of the final order, but did not request a stay of the aforementioned order. The circuit court held a hearing on July 27, 1995, in which it reversed the decision of the Commission. The respondent appeals from this order.

II.

DISCUSSION

This is one of those employment disputes in which neither of the parties acquitted themselves with pure grace. Working through the detailed record of such a case causes one to understand better the ancient curse of a plague o' both their houses. See William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act 3, sc. 1. ³ Nevertheless, since the parties could not resolve their dispute, the Wayne County Correctional Officers' Civil Service Commission did. It is from its decision that this appeal emanates. The sole issue before this Court is whether the circuit court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the Civil Service Commission. ⁴ The respondent contends it is only appropriate to reverse the Civil Service Commission if the Commission's decision was clearly wrong or based upon a mistake of fact, which the respondent claims was not present in this case. Specifically, the respondent cites Syllabus Point 1 of Appeal of Prezkop, 154 W.Va. 759, 179 S.E.2d 331 (1971), where we held: "A final order of a police civil service commission based upon The respondent further argues that the Civil Service Commission's key finding was that she was improperly terminated. The circuit court reversed on the basis that there was no reasonable basis in evidence to support this finding. The respondent points to the record which she asserts indicates that, although she threatened to quit, she did not actually do so. Moreover, she claims she only threatened to quit if no relief officer was provided and, because one was provided and she knew one had been called in, she had no reason to quit.

[196 W.Va. 446] a finding of fact will not be reversed by a circuit court upon appeal unless it is clearly wrong or is based upon a mistake of law."

Our review of the circuit court's decision made in view of the Commission's action is generally de novo. Thus, we review the Commission's adjudicative decision from the same position as the circuit court. The Commission's adjudicative decision should not be overturned by either court unless it was clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. See Randolph County Bd. of Educ. v. Scalia, 182 W.Va. 289, 292, 387 S.E.2d 524, 527 (1989). Review under this standard is narrow and the reviewing court looks to the Commission's action to determine whether the record reveals that a substantial and rational basis exists for its decision. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376-77, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 1860-61, 104 L.Ed.2d 377, 394 (1989). We may reverse the Commission's decision as clearly wrong or arbitrary or capricious only if the Commission used a misapplication of the law, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that ran counter to the evidence before the Commission, or offered one that is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of Commission expertise. See generally Martin v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 195 W.Va. 297, 304, 465 S.E.2d 399, 406 (1995).

Whether the respondent quit or was fired is a question of fact committed to the discretion of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission found that she was fired. In this regard, we must first determine whether the Civil Service Commission's decision was based upon "substantial evidence" and, secondly, whether its findings and conclusions were adequately explained. If they were, the circuit court's order reversing the Commission must be set aside as a matter of law. In assessing whether the Civil Service Commission's decision was based upon substantial evidence, we are obliged to give reasonable deference to its factual findings. See Board of Educ. of County of Mercer v. Wirt, 192 W.Va. 568, 579, 453 S.E.2d 402, 413 (1994). "The 'clearly wrong' and the 'arbitrary and capricious' standards of review are deferential ones which presume the...