Queen v. Queen
Citation | 521 A.2d 320,308 Md. 574 |
Decision Date | 01 September 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 59,59 |
Parties | , 55 USLW 2535 David M. QUEEN v. Dora M. QUEEN. , |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
Richard D. Albright, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Paula J. Peters, Annapolis, for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J. and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH, McAULIFFE and ADKINS, JJ.
(2) 'Marital property' does not include property:
(i) acquired before the marriage;
(ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party;
(iii) excluded by valid agreement; or
(iv) directly traceable to any of these sources."
The primary issue in this case is whether a lump sum workers' compensation award for permanent partial disability for injury sustained during the marriage constitutes marital property within the contemplation of § 8-201(e).
David and Dora Queen were married on October 26, 1964 and had three children during the course of their nearly twenty-year marriage, one of whom was an emancipated adult at the time the divorce proceedings began. After the wife first left the family home in late December of 1982, the parties separated and reconciled periodically throughout the first half of 1983. On July 23, 1984, the wife filed a complaint for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii from the husband. The two minor children of the parties, Peter, age six, and Hope, age sixteen, were then under the wife's care and custody.
On April 28, 1982, before the initial separation, the husband sustained an injury to his neck and shoulders while working as an assistant pressman at Saul Lithograph Co., Inc. He had worked for this employer since 1970, but was discharged in November of 1982, shortly after he was injured. The husband received $276.70 per week in workers' compensation benefits from May 1982 to September 1983; the benefit amount was then reduced to $143.32 per week from September 1983 to June 1984. On June 18, 1984, the husband received a lump sum permanent partial disability settlement of $60,000, less $5,000 in attorney's fees and costs. The husband deposited the award in a separate bank account in his name only.
The Circuit Court for Calvert County (Bowen, J.) granted the wife's prayer for absolute divorce on August 12, 1985. The court determined that the marital property consisted of the parties' house in College Park, furniture acquired during the marriage, and the husband's fully vested, noncontributory, profit-sharing retirement plan. The husband was ordered to pay $300 monthly for child support.
The court entered a supplemental judgment on November 12, 1985. It determined that the lump sum permanent partial workers' compensation award was marital property. The court did not award alimony to the wife. After adjusting the equities of the parties in the marital property, the court ordered the husband to pay $33,490 to the wife. Custody of the minor child was permanently awarded to the wife on December 13, 1985. The husband appealed, challenging both the marital property and child custody awards. We granted certiorari before consideration of the appeal by the Court of Special Appeals to review the important issues raised in the case.
In undertaking to define the reach of the term "marital property" under § 8-201(e), we observed in Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 125, 437 A.2d 883 (1981), quoting Diffendall v. Diffendall, 239 Md. 32, 36, 209 A.2d 914 (1965) that "property" ordinarily embraces " 'everything which has exchangeable value or goes to make up a man's wealth--every interest or estate which the law regards of sufficient value for judicial recognition.' " Moreover, when used without express or implied qualifications, we have said that property " 'may reasonably be construed to involve obligations, rights and other intangibles as well as physical things.' " Unkle, supra, 305 Md. at 595, 505 A.2d 849 (quoting Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 686, 26 A.2d 767 (1942)).
In Deering, supra, we held that a spouse's pension rights, to the extent accumulated during the marriage, constituted a form of "marital property" subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution of marriage. 1 We reasoned that pensions are similar to other types of employee benefits "acquired" during the marriage, such as stock options and profit-sharing plans. We noted also that both spouses have the same retirement expectations regarding pensions as they would had they used the contributions to the pension plan to buy other deferred income assets. Moreover, we stated that the fact that a pension right might be conditioned upon the occurrence of certain events, such as continued employment did not "degrade that right to an expectancy [because] ... [t]he law has long recognized that a contingent future interest is property." Id. 292 Md. at 128, 437 A.2d 883 (quoting In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 638 n. 8, 544 P.2d 561, 566 n. 8 (1976)). Thus, under Deering, it is immaterial whether the retirement plan was vested or not, contributory or noncontributory. Rather, the critical issue was " 'whether a property right has been acquired during the marriage and whether equity warrants its inclusion in the marital estate in light of its limitations.' " Id., 292 Md. at 127, 437 A.2d 883 (quoting Weir v. Weir, 173 N.J.Super. 130, 413 A.2d 638, 640 (1980)).
We again addressed spousal rights to a pension plan in Lookingbill v. Lookingbill, 301 Md. 283, 483 A.2d 1 (1984). At issue there was a work-related disability pension plan to which the husband had been making obligatory contributions. We held that the rationale of Deering supported the conclusion that a disability plan, in appropriate circumstances, may constitute marital property. We stated:
Lookingbill, supra, 301 Md. at 289, 483 A.2d 1.
One year later in Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985), we concluded that a professional degree or license is not marital property. We reasoned that neither possessed the essential characteristics of either a present or a future property interest. We there said:
Archer, supra, 303 Md. at 357-58, 493 A.2d 1074.
Most recently, we held that an inchoate tort claim for personal injury that accrued while the spouses were separated, but before they divorced, was not "marital property". Unkle, supra, 305 Md. at 587, 505 A.2d 849. In that case, the husband suffered two broken legs in an accident at an amusement park during the period of the couple's separation. We stated that an unliquidated tort claim for money damages is a chose in action and thus potentially assignable, but that this fact alone did not determine whether the claim constituted marital property. We explained:
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