Queener v. Magnet Mills, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1942
• Citation: 167 S.W.2d 1,179 Tenn. 416
• Parties: QUEENER et al. v. MAGNET MILLS, Inc., et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

167 S.W.2d 1

179 Tenn. 416

QUEENER et al. v. MAGNET MILLS, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 5, 1942

Appeal from Chancery Court, Anderson County; J. H. WallaceChancellor.

Proceeding for certiorari by Edwin C. Queener and others against Magnet Mills, Inc., and the Commissioner of Labor to review an order of the Board of Review, affirming the Commissioner's ruling denying petitioners' claims for unemployment compensation.Decree for petitioners, and the Commissioner appeals.

Modified and affirmed.

Hammond Fowler, of Rockwood, and Charles G. Neese, of Nashville Tennessee, for appellant Commissioner of Labor.

Ladd & Carson, of Clinton, for appellee Queener et al.

T. A Wright, Jr., of Knoxville, for appellee Magnet Mills.

GREEN Justice.

The controversy here presented to the Court arises out of an effort by certain employees of Magnet Mills, Inc., to obtain unemployment compensation to which they contend they are entitled under chapter 1 of the Acts of the First Extra Session of the Legislature in 1936, section 6901.1 et seq., Williams' Code, section 6901(1) et seq., Michie's Code.Their claims were regularly presented according to the provisions of that Act and reached the Board of Review.That tribunal affirmed a ruling of the Commissioner of Labor denying the claims and the employees brought the case before the Chancery Court of Anderson County by a petition for certiorari.The chancellor reversed the order of the Board of Review and decreed in favor of the employees.The petition for certiorari made Magnet Mills, Inc., and the Commissioner of Labor defendants.The former acquiesced in the chancellor's decree but the Commissioner has appealed to this Court and assigned errors.

The employees made a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the Commissioner of Labor had no interest in the matter.This motion must be overruled.The Commissioner was made a partydefendant by the petition for certiorari and by section 6(h) of the Unemployment Compensation Acthe is deemed a party to any such proceedings as this.Furthermore, under section 9 of the Act the Commissioner administers the unemployment compensation fund and is a trustee thereof.

There is no controversy as to the facts of the case.These are developed in the testimony of T. A. Wright, vice president of the Mills, and in a stipulation entered into between Wright and the attorneys for the claimants.

Wright testified that about September 1, 1941, it was necessary for the Company to start operating on a part-time basis so as to get the maximum compensation for the employees and that operations were accordingly begun on a staggered system.That on Monday, September 8, the president of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, Branch 125, informed him (Wright) that a strike was going to be called on the next day, September 9, and that picket lines would be thrown around the plant.

According to Wright, on September 9, 10, 11, and 12 there was more or less violent picketing about the Mills.On September 10 the management met with a committee representing the American Federation of Hosiery Workers at which time the latter made a demand for a union contract, a fifteen per cent wage increase, and a week's vacation with pay.The witness said that the claimants in the present suit all worked for one or more of the days September 9, 10, 11, and 12.

Further testifying, Wright said that on September 12 Mills officials were advised by the sheriff of Anderson County that to avoid possible bloodshed and fighting, and perhaps rioting, he had agreed with an organizer of the United Mine Workers of America that if they would allow employees to go into work that morning without physical violence he would withdraw police protection from the plant on Monday the 15th and Tuesday the 16th.The plant management then called the employees who were working, advised them of the situation, and told them the plant would not open on September 15 and September 16 or until adequate law enforcement could be procured so as not to endanger their lives.On September 16 an agreement was worked out between the Union representatives and the Mills management that an election would be held to determine the bargaining agency for the employees and as the part of that agreement it was stipulated that the Mills should be closed until the election was held.The election was held on October 3, 1941, and the vote was 337 for Union representation and 525 against such representation.Thereafter the Mills opened on Tuesday, October 7, 1941.Wright said that with the exception of the departments designated as winders and reclaim-waste, which departments had three employees each, there were one or more employees on strike from every other department of the Mills.He further said that there were some twenty-eight departments in the Mills.

The stipulation of facts set out that all the claimants herein were eligible for benefits unless disqualified under the unemployment compensation law.That each and every claimant worked on one or more of the days September 9, 10, 11, or 12, 1941.That "no employee of this class was participating in, or directly interested in, any labor dispute, if any existed."That there was no labor dispute between the Magnet Mills, Inc., and any particular grade, class or craft.The stipulation contains other matters not material just here or covered in the testimony of Wright.

Section 5 of chapter 1 of the Acts of the First Extra Session of 1936, as amended by Pub.Acts 1939, c. 131, § 8, enumerates certain things which shall disqualify the unemployed from benefits.Among other disqualifications is the following and the exception thereto:

"(d) For any week with respect to which the commissioner finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute which is in active progress at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed, provided, that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner that--

"(1)He is not participating in or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused his total or partial unemployment; and

"(2)He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the labor dispute, there were members employed at the premises at which the labor dispute occurs, any of whom are participating in or directly interested in the dispute."

The Board of Review found that the unemployment of the claimants was due to a labor dispute in progress at the Mills and that claimants did not bring themselves within the exception of (1) and (2) of (d) above quoted.It was stipulated, as above stated, that claimants were not participating in or directly interested in the labor dispute but the Board of Review found that all of the claimants belonged to some grade or class of workers, one or more of which class or grade was participating in or directly interested in the dispute.

The chancellor found that the unemployment of the claimants was not due to a labor dispute within the meaning of the statute but was due to the withdrawal of police protection and the subsequent closing of the Mills.

We do not think it necessary to decide whether the unemployment of claimants was due to a labor dispute in the case before us.If a labor dispute existed in the sense of the statute, in our opinion claimants bring themselves within the exception to the disqualification set out in (d)(1) and (d)(2).

The record does not show in what manner the business of the Mills is divided into departments or just what a department is.The Board of Review, however, found that some employee in every department in which claimants worked was out on strike and that accordingly none of the claimants brought themselves within 5 (d)(2) of the Act.In other words, the Board construed "grade or class" to be equivalent to a department.We are not able to agree to this construction.We think such construction would in...