Quemada v. Arizmendez (In re Estate of Ortega)
| Decision Date | 14 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 38831.,38831. |
| Citation | 288 P.3d 826,153 Idaho 609 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Estate OF Richard Enriquez Ortega. Danielle QUEMADA, Personal representative of the Estate of Richard Enriquez Ortega, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Efren A. ARIZMENDEZ, Gilbert Acosta, Jr., Respondents. |
Douglas E. Fleenor, Boise, for appellant.
James M. Runsvold, Caldwell, for respondents.
This is an appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, Efren Arizmendez and Gilbert Acosta. Danielle Quemada, the daughter and personal representative of Richard Ortega (Decedent), initiated this action to set aside two quitclaim deeds. We affirm.
The Decedent and Celia Ortega were married in 1985. The two began living apart in 1999, but were not legally divorced until June of 2009. During their marriage, the couple acquired four parcels of real property. On December 30, 2008, the Decedent and Celia Ortega executed four quitclaim deeds, conveying the properties to Acosta.1 The properties included: a home located at 2081 Hill Road in Homedale (the Hill Road property); a home located at 28901 El Paso Drive in Caldwell (the El Paso Drive property); and two rental properties. At that time the Decedent was residing at the Hill Road property and Celia Ortega was residing at the El Paso Drive property. The day after the deeds were executed, Acosta properly recorded them. On February 24, 2009, Acosta conveyed the Hill Road property to Arizmendez.2 The El Paso Drive property was later conveyed to Celia Ortega.
At the time of the Decedent's death, November 13, 2009, he had three children: Richard Ortega, Jr., Denise Mota, and Quemada. Elizabeth Ortega3 was the mother to all three of the Decedent's children. On January 12, 2012, Arizmendez filed a petition to adjudicate the intestacy of the Decedent and to be appointed as the personal representative of the Decedent's estate. The proceeding was assigned to the magistrate court. Thereafter, Quemada filed a petition for appointment as personal representative, which was granted. On April 20, 2010, Quemada filed a verified Petition, invoking the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), I.C. §§ 15–8–101 to 305, to set aside two of the deeds. She alleged that the deeds to the Hill Road and El Paso Drive properties should be set aside because the Decedent signed them based on Celia Ortega's fraudulent misrepresentations, undue influence, and design to intentionally interfere with inheritance.
Both Arizmendez and Acosta answered the Petition, asserting defenses of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under TEDRA and failure to state a claim under I.R.C.P. 12(b). Finding that it lacked jurisdiction over quiet title actions, the magistrate court transferred the proceedings to the district court under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(2).
During a telephonic status conference, the district court granted Quemada leave to file an amended petition narrowing the issues in dispute, and the parties stipulated to waive a jury trial. Quemada filed an unverified4 Amended Petition on November 9, 2010. Quemada's Amended Petition was identical to the original Petition, except that it left out the intentional interference with inheritance cause of action. On January 3, 2011, the district court ruled, in response to a Rule 12(b) motion of Respondents, that Quemada could not pursue a claim for damages, nor any claim against Celia Ortega, having failed to allege either in the Amended Petition.
The Respondents answered the Amended Petition on January 26, 2010, and shortly thereafter they moved for summary judgment. Their motion was supported by a memorandum and affidavits from Arizmendez, Acosta, and Celia Ortega. A hearing on the summary judgment motion was held on March 25, 2011. Subsequent to the hearing, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision, finding that no genuine issues of material fact existed, and that Respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.5 Quemada appealed to this Court.
"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment." Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B.V., 148 Idaho 89, 101, 218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). We "construe all disputed facts, and draw all reasonable inferences from the record, in favor of the non-moving party." Nava v. Rivas–Del Toro, 151 Idaho 853, 857, 264 P.3d 960, 964 (2011). However, where an action will be tried before the court without a jury "[t]he trial judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the non-moving party, but rather the judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the uncontroverted evidentiary facts, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." Vreeken, 148 Idaho at 101, 218 P.3d at 1162.
Quemada argues the district court erred by not finding that a presumption of undue influence existed between the Decedent and Celia Ortega based on a relationship of confidence. She asserts that under Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho, 571, 575, 759 P.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1988), a husband and wife occupy a confidential relationship as a matter of law. Quemada relies on this Court's holding in McNabb v. Brewster, 75 Idaho 313, 272 P.2d 298 (1954), to support her argument that a presumption of undue influence existed.
Conversely, Respondents argue that the district court did not err by failing to find a presumption of undue influence. Respondents point out that the presumption is implied between a grantor and a grantee and argue that the presumption cannot be applied in this case because, based on the evidence, the grantor (the Decedent), and the grantee (Acosta), did not have a confidential relationship of any kind. Alternatively, Respondents argue that even if the presumption were found and the burden shifted, the facts in the record disprove two of the four elements of undue influence, overcoming the presumption.
In Bongiovi v. Jamison , we stated, "McNabb held that if a grantor and grantee have a confidential relationship, and the grantor reposes trust in the grantee, and the evidence otherwise creates an inference of fraud or overreaching, then the burden of persuasion shifts to the proponent (beneficiary) of the conveyance to show by clear and convincing evidence that no undue influence was exercised." 110 Idaho 734, 736, 718 P.2d 1172, 1174 (1986). The deed at issue in McNabb conveyed a family farm. McNabb, 75 Idaho at 315, 272 P.2d at 298. The deed was executed by a husband and wife and granted 160 acres to Brewster, one of their two daughters. Id. The husband was eighty-five and suffered from incurable cancer. Id. The wife, eighty-nine, was sickly, bedridden, and suffered from hallucinations. Id. Neither could read nor write. Id. This Court found that both were "infirm, forgetful, childish and senile." Id. As a result of their poor physical and mental condition, Brewster moved in with her parents for the purpose of caring for them. Id. at 316, 272 P.2d at 299. After residing with her parents for three months, Brewster took them to a real estate office where they conveyed the farm to her in return for continued care. Id. The Court noted that Brewster frequently cursed at her mother and called her vile names and that Brewster exercised "complete dominion" over her mother. Id. The mother was subsequently hospitalized and Brewster terminated care giving. Shortly thereafter, the mother passed away. Id. at 318, 272 P.2d at 301. The Court in McNabb held that the circumstances were sufficient to indicate the presence of fraud and overreaching, triggering a presumption of undue influence. Id. at 326, 272 P.2d at 306.
McNabb 's presumption of undue influence has been criticized and substantially eroded by subsequent decisions. See Bongiovi, 110 Idaho 734, 718 P.2d 1172; Kelley v. Wheyland, 93 Idaho 735, 471 P.2d 590 (1970) ; Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 606 P.2d 473 (1980). These cases have so limited the circumstances where the presumption of undue influence is applied that a deed "contestant must now come forward with so much evidence of overreaching to obtain the presumption of undue influence that, were that quantum of evidence available, the contestant would almost certainly prevail without the presumption." Bongiovi, 110 Idaho at 737, 718 P.2d at 1175. We need not winnow through those limiting circumstances, however, because one thing all of the cases have in common is that the presumption, or whatever is left of it, only applies where there is a confidential relationship between a grantor and a grantee. That is not the case here. There is no evidence in the record of a confidential relationship between the Decedent and Acosta. Indeed, one of the affidavits...
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