Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Construction, Inc.
Decision Date | 09 September 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 145,145 |
Citation | 388 Md. 675,882 A.2d 288 |
Parties | QUESTAR HOMES OF AVALON, LLC v. PILLAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., et al. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Ferguson, Jr. (Kimberly T. Owens of Ferguson, Schetelich & Ballew, P.A., Baltimore), on brief, for appellant.
Andres K. O'Connell (John A. Rego of Anderson & Quinn, LLC, Rockville), on brief, for appellees.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.
The case before us involves the propriety of Circuit Court Orders staying all litigation between a general contractor, Questar Homes of the Avalon Courtyard, LLC ("Questar"), appellant, plaintiff in a third-party complaint, and forty third-party defendant subcontractors and suppliers, appellees,1 pending arbitration proceedings where it is evident that certain of those forty third-party defendants may never have agreed to arbitrate with Questar, waived their right to arbitration, chose to litigate their claims in lieu of arbitration, or never had the right to initiate arbitration. Questar presents one question for our review:
"Did the trial court err when it compelled arbitration and stayed all litigation between appellant and all forty appellees after hearing arguments on only two appellees' motions to dismiss without regard to whether the remaining thirty-eight appellees moved to compel arbitration, waived their right to arbitration, or had no right to arbitration?"
We hold that the Circuit Court erred when in its Orders it directed that all litigation stemming from Questar's third-party complaint be stayed between Questar and all third-party defendants pending the outcome of arbitration. While the Orders were correct in effect as to the two third-party defendants that brought the motions to dismiss and petitions to compel arbitration, it appears that numerous other third-party defendants in the suit, for whatever reasons, either waived, relinquished or never possessed a right to demand arbitration.
Questar is in the business of residential and commercial construction. It acted as the general contractor during the construction of a residential single-family home community in Baltimore County known as Avalon Courtyard Homes. On June 3, 2003, after completion of Avalon Courtyard Homes by Questar, the Council of Unit Owners of the Avalon Courtyard Homes Condominium, Inc. ("Council of Unit Owners") filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against six defendants, including Questar, alleging that the named defendants defectively designed and constructed Avalon Courtyard Homes. Specifically, the Council of Unit Owners alleged (1) negligence; (2) breach of implied warranties under Md.Code (1974, 2003 Repl.Vol.), § 10-203 and § 11-131 of the Real Property Article; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act; (5) breach of express warranty; (6) breach of contract; and (7) negligent repairs against Questar.2
In response to the Council of Unit Owners' claim against it, Questar filed, on December 3, 2003, a third-party complaint seeking indemnity and/or contribution from the forty subcontractors, suppliers and manufacturers that performed various work and furnished a variety of housing goods during the construction of Avalon Courtyard Homes.3 Of these forty third-party defendants named in the suit, thirty-seven of them had entered into identical subcontract agreements with Questar to perform certain work and labor for the construction of Avalon Courtyard Homes. These subcontract agreements contained the following arbitration clause:
Of the three remaining third-party defendants, the record indicates that no arbitration agreement existed between Questar and M.I. Home Products, Inc., a manufacturer of windows, and that Questar's purchase contracts with Barber & Ross Company and Specialty Screen & Window Company, both suppliers of construction materials, contained a separate arbitration provision, which granted to Questar the right to demand arbitration but contained no provision granting the supplier the right to demand arbitration:
In reaction to Questar's third-party complaint against them, fifteen of the third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss or petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the subcontract and purchase agreements.4 Questar thereafter invited these fifteen third-party defendants to enter into a stipulation, to be filed with the Circuit Court, wherein Questar conceded the existence of the arbitration clause in the pertinent subcontract and purchase agreements and agreed, pending arbitration, to stay its claims against those third-party defendants entering into the stipulation. Ten of those fifteen third-party defendants entered into this stipulation.5
Of the remaining five third-party defendants that filed a motion to dismiss or petition to compel arbitration, two of them, namely, Louis Badolato, Inc. and Sun Ventures Contracting, Inc., withdrew their motions, intending to waive the arbitration provision and litigate the case in the Circuit Court. Two others, Pillar Construction, Inc. ("Pillar") and Wayne Drywall Company, Inc. ("Wayne Drywall"), opted to argue their motions before the Circuit Court rather than enter into the stipulation with Questar.
On August 30, 2004, Pillar and Wayne Drywall argued their motions to dismiss Questar's third-party claims and to order arbitration before the Circuit Court. The court heard argument from counsel for Questar, Pillar and Wayne Drywall. That same day, following the conclusion of counsels' arguments, the Circuit Court issued two Orders, both of which stated:
Questar, contending that the Orders of the Circuit Court were overbroad in that they improperly stayed all litigation between Questar and each third-party defendant in favor of arbitration, thereafter appealed the decision of the Circuit Court to the Court of Special Appeals. On March 11, 2005, prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a Writ of Certiorari to address this contention. Questar v. Pillar, 385 Md. 511, 869 A.2d 864 (2005).
As we recently observed in Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386 Md. 412, 872 A.2d 735 (2005):
"A trial court's order to...
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