Quick v. Crane
| Decision Date | 17 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 15701,15701 |
| Parties | Lori QUICK, Nicholas Lee Quick, a minor, and Natalee Quick, a minor, by Lori Quick, their guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs, v. James R. CRANE, Johnny L. King, Fred Arthur Turner, Rollins Leasing Corporation, Sigman Meat Company and Does I Through X, Defendants. James R. CRANE, Defendant-Cross-Claimant, Respondent Cross-Appellant, v. Johnny L. KING, Respondent, and Fred Arthur Turner, Rollins Leasing Corporation, and Sigman Meat Company, Cross-Defendants, Appellants-Cross-Respondents. James R. CRANE, Defendant-Cross-Claimant, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Lori QUICK, Personal Representative of the Estate of Rick Quick, Third-Party Defendant. Johnny L. KING and Jill King, husband and wife, Defendants-Cross-Claimants, Counter-Claimants, Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Fred Arthur TURNER, Rollins Leasing Corporation, Sigman Meat Company, Cross- Defendants, Counter-Defendants, Third-Party-Defendants-Appellants, and James R. Crane, and Lori Quick, Personal Representative of the Estate of Rick Quick, Cross-Defendants, Counter-Defendants, Third-Party-Defendants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
William D. Faler and Curt R. Thomsen of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, Idaho Falls, for cross-defendants, counter-defendants, third-party-defendants-appellants, Turner, et al.
James B. Green, Esq. and Steven V. Richert, Esq., of Green, Service, Gasser & Kerl, Pocatello, for defendant-cross-claimant, respondent-cross-appellant Crane.
John C. Souza of Whittier & Souza, Pocatello, for respondent, King.
This case arises out of an accident that occurred on Interstate 86 near Pocatello, Idaho, in the early morning hours of January 3, 1981. Visibility was poor due to patches of fog. Defendant-appellant, Fred Arthur Turner, was driving a tractor-trailer rig leased by his employer, defendant-appellant, Sigman Meat Company, from defendant-appellant, Rollins Leasing Corporation. According to testimony at trial, Turner had either slowed to around 5 to 10 mph or had completely stopped in the right lane of traffic after he had entered a thick patch of fog. A van owned by respondent, James Crane, collided with the rear of the tractor-trailer rig. A white Nova driven by Penny Caldwell then collided with the van, and a pickup driven by Roger Orme collided with the Nova. Several other vehicles were subsequently involved in this chain reaction of rear-end collisions, but are not involved in this litigation. All the occupants of the van--James Crane, Johnny King and Rick Quick--were injured. Quick subsequently died.
Lori Quick, Rick Quick's widow, then filed a wrongful death action against many of the parties involved in the collision. Numerous cross-claims and counterclaims were asserted, but by the time the case came to trial on June 4, 1984, most of the claims between the parties had been settled. The trial, therefore, was based only on the claims of Crane and King (hereinafter plaintiffs) against Turner, Sigman Meat Company and Rollins Leasing Corporation (defendants). The trial lasted 7 days and resulted in a verdict in favor of Crane and King. A special verdict was returned which provided as follows:
Party Percent of Liability
----- --------------------
Turner, Sigman Meat
Co. and Rollins
Leasing Corp. 87%
Johnny King 9%
James Crane 2%
Rick Quick 1%
Penny Caldwell 1%
The jury verdict awarded Crane $1,000,000 (one million dollars) in damages and King, $100,000 (one hundred thousand dollars) in damages. Each of these awards were subsequently reduced based on each plaintiff's proportion of negligence and settlements they entered into.
After most of the defendants' post-trial motions were denied they filed this appeal and have raised what we have categorized as six separate issues. Crane raises another issue in his cross-appeal. Because each issue is based on different facts, we will elaborate on any additional facts as we address each issue. The issues raised on appeal are:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions for judgment n.o.v., for new trial based on the sufficiency of evidence, and for new trial or remittitur based on the alleged excessiveness of damages;
2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting King--who had undergone hypnosis treatment prior to trial--to testify along with two witnesses who had performed the hypnosis 3. Whether the trial court erred in prohibiting the disclosure of certain settlement agreements to the jury;
4. Whether the trial court erred in preventing the admission of evidence relating to the plaintiff's non-use of seat belts;
5. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on present value calculations of future lost wages and future medical expenses as well as on the delineation of special and general damages; and
6. Whether comments by counsel for Crane during closing argument violated I.C. § 10-111.
The issue raised in Crane's cross-appeal is:
Whether the trial court erred in its method of crediting certain amounts Crane received in settlements against his total verdict.
Defendants raise several interrelated issues based on the trial court's denial of their motions for judgment n.o.v., a new trial and a remittitur of damages. First, they argue that since the evidence adduced at trial put the rate of speed at which the van was traveling at between 25 mph and 38 mph, the van was necessarily traveling unreasonably fast for the foggy conditions. Therefore, defendants assert, no reasonable jury could have found that the driver and occupants of the van could be only a total of 12% negligent, and the truck driver 87% negligent. Hence, a judgment n.o.v. based on I.R.C.P. 50(b) or a new trial based on I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) should have been granted.
Second, appellants argue that the damages awarded to Mr. Crane were so excessive that they could only have been the result of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Hence, a new trial based on I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) or a remittitur of damages should have been granted.
In this case, the trial judge heard extensive arguments from counsel but made only a brief statement when he ruled from the bench on all of the defendants' motions. The total extent of the judge's remarks on the motions were:
The complete lack of guidance as to the trial judge's bases for his decision is the main problem we face in this appeal. We will address this problem in turn, but must first set forth and clarify the standards by which a trial judge rules on motions for judgment n.o.v., new trial based on I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) and (6), and remittitur of damages.
A motion for judgment n.o.v. based on I.R.C.P. 50(b) is treated as simply a delayed motion for a directed verdict and the standard for both is the same. Yazzie v. Sullivent, 561 F.2d 183, 188 (10th Cir.1977). In making the motion, the defendants necessarily admitted the truth of all of the plaintiffs' evidence and every legitimate inference that could be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-53, 678 P.2d 41, 44-45 (1984). Whether that evidence is sufficient to create an issue of fact is purely a question of law. Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 4, 592 P.2d 57, 60 (1979); Sheets v. Agro-West, Inc., 104 Idaho 880, 883, 664 P.2d 787, 788 (Ct.App.1983). The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is made, but whether there is substantial evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party. Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974). Hence, the trial judge is not free to weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses and make his own separate findings of fact and compare them to the jury's findings as he would in deciding on a motion for a new trial. Gemeiner supra 100 Idaho at 4, 592 P.2d at 60. Rather, the trial judge must view all of the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in favor of the non-moving party, and decide if there was substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury, or, in other words, that there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached. Stephens, supra 106 Idaho at 253, 678 P.2d at 45; Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733, 639 P.2d 429, 431 (1981). Thus, the function of I.R.C.P. 50(b) is to give the trial court the last opportunity to order the judgment that the law requires.
In determining whether a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. should have been granted, the appellate court applies the same standard as does the trial court which passed on the motion originally. Gmeiner, supra 100 Idaho at 4, 592 P.2d at 60. Whether a verdict should be directed, as noted above, is purely a question of law and on those questions, the parties are entitled to full review by the appellate court without special deference to the views of the trial court. 1 Wright & Miller, 9 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2536 at 595 (1971 & Supp.1985); Carey v. Jackson, 603 P.2d 868, 877 (Wyo.1979).
Hence, this Court must review the record of the trial below and draw all inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine if there was substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury. Based upon our review of the record on this standard, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury.
There was evidence adduced at trial that the reasonably safe rate...
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