Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Walters
| Decision Date | 15 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-0298,16-0298 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | QUICKEN LOANS, INC., Petitioner v. Marsha Gale WALTERS, administratrix FOR Sue WALTERS, Respondent |
Jeffrey J. Bresch, Esq., JONES DAY, Pittsburgh, PA
Carrie Goodwin Fenwick, Esq., GOODWIN & GOODWIN, LLP, Charleston, WV, Counsel for Petitioner
Sarah K. Brown, Esq., Bren Pomponio, Esq., MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE, Charleston, WV, Counsel for Respondent
Following a five-day trial in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, West Virginia, a jury found that Petitioner Quicken Loans, Inc. ("Quicken Loans") violated the "illegal loan" provision of the West Virginia Residential Mortgage Lender, Broker and Servicer Act, West Virginia Code § 31-17-8(m)(8)1 in originating a primary mortgage loan for Respondent Sue Walters2 and was liable to Ms. Walters for damages in the amount of $27,000.00. The jury found in favor of Quicken Loans on Ms. Walters's claim of fraud, and further found that Quicken Loans had not acted with malice.
Significantly, for purposes of this appeal, Ms. Walters had earlier settled her claims against co-defendants Kirk Riffe, an appraiser, and Bank of America N.A. ("BOA"), the entity that serviced the subject loan, for $75,000.00 and $23,000.00, respectively. Of these amounts, a total of $65,500.00 was designated to be paid to Ms. Walters or on her behalf, and $32,500.00 was designated as payment of attorney fees. In post-trial proceedings, the court below offset the settlement amounts designated to be paid to Ms. Walters against the $27,000.00 in damages awarded by the jury. Subsequently, in considering Ms. Walters's request for an award of attorney fees and costs, the court offset the settlement amounts designated as attorney fees against the fees sought by Ms. Walters's counsel. Thus, in total the court offset only $59,500.00 of the $98,000.00 paid by the settling defendants, against the total damages, costs and fees awarded against Quicken Loans.
In this appeal, Quicken Loans contends that the circuit court erred in allowing the illegal loan claim to go to the jury, arguing that W. Va. Code § 31-17-8(m)(8) applies only where there are two or more mortgages on the property and the aggregate principal amount of the mortgage loans exceeds the property's fair market value. Quicken Loans also contends that the court erred in awarding any attorney fees, arguing that Ms. Walters did not prevail because the jury's verdict was effectively wiped out by application of the offset. Alternatively, Quicken Loans argues that the award of attorney fees cannot be sustained under the principles articulated in this Court's seminal decision in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo , 176 W.Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986). Finally, Quicken Loans argues that the court erred in offsetting only a portion of the settlement monies received from appraiser Riffe and BOA against the total compensatory damages received by Ms. Walters, which damages include attorney fees and costs.
After careful review of the parties' briefs and arguments, the Appendix Record, and the applicable law, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In the summer of 2007, Ms. Walters called Quicken Loans seeking to refinance the existing mortgage loan on her home in Mabscott, Raleigh County, West Virginia. Ms. Walters, who was responding to a Quicken Loans advertisement, was interested in obtaining a lower interest rate and a lower mortgage payment.
On September 14, 2007, Quicken Loans originated a fixed-rate, 30-year mortgage loan in the amount of $136,000.00. As part of the loan approval process, Quicken Loans had contacted Title Source Inc., an entity described by Quicken Loans as "a related but independent company," which in turn contracted with Kirk Riffe, a licensed appraiser. In performing the appraisal, Mr. Riffe compared Ms. Walters's Mabscott home to properties in the Woodlawn neighborhood of Beckley, concluding that the home was worth $152,000.00. In fact, evidence at trial indicated that the fair market value of the property in September, 2007, was $64,000.00, and that Mr. Riffe's appraisal methodology was fatally flawed.
As of the date of closing of the Quicken Loans loan, no other mortgage loans existed on Ms. Walters's home; the purpose of the loan was to refinance her existing mortgage obligation, i.e., to pay off the existing mortgage loan and replace it with a loan carrying a lower rate of interest.
Immediately after originating the loan, Quicken Loans sold it to Countrywide Financial, which in turn sold it to BOA. Ms. Walters made regular payments on the loan for approximately twenty months, after which she found herself in financial difficulty and attempted, unsuccessfully, to work out a modification with BOA.
Thereafter, in December, 2011, Ms. Walters filed a lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Riffe and BOA, asserting three claims against Quicken Loans (unconscionable inducement, illegal loan, and fraud), two against Riffe (negligence and acceptance of a fee contingent on a predetermined conclusion), and one against BOA (illegal debt collection practice). In its answer, Quicken Loans admitted certain allegations, including, of relevance to this appeal, the principal amount of the loan. Further, Quicken Loans asserted affirmative defenses, including, of relevance to this appeal, that it had made the loan to Ms. Walters on reliance upon a bona fide written appraisal of the property made by Kirk Riffe, an independent third-party appraiser duly licensed or certified by the West Virginia Real Estate Appraiser Licensing and Certification Board, and prepared in compliance with the uniform standards of professional appraisal practice. Finally, Quicken Loans filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Ms. Walters's illegal loan claim failed as a matter of law because the statute on which the claim was based, West Virginia Code § 31-17-8(m)(8), applies only where there are two or more mortgages on the property whose aggregate total exceeds the property's fair market value.
The case was hotly contested for more than three years. The docket sheet for the litigation evidences voluminous written discovery, multiple dispositive motions, motions in limine , multiple hearings on motions, several court-led mediations, a motion to exclude "pattern and practice" witnesses and an evidentiary hearing on the motion, and the like. Ultimately, as noted above, Ms. Walters settled with Mr. Riffe and BOA and dismissed her claim against Quicken Loans for unconscionable inducement, deeming it duplicative. On March 2, 2015, Ms. Walters's case against Quicken Loans proceeded to trial on the two remaining claims (illegal loan, and fraud), resulting in a finding for Ms. Walters on the illegal loan claim, a finding for Quicken Loans on the fraud claim, and a finding that Quicken Loans had not acted with malice. As noted, the jury awarded Ms. Walters $27,000.00 in compensatory damages. In light of its finding on the fraud claim, the jury did not address the issue of punitive damages.
In post-trial proceedings, Quicken Loans filed a motion to correct the verdict pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting that the circuit court apply an offset of the Riffe/BOA settlement monies as follows: $27,000.00 to be offset against the jury's award of damages, and the remaining $71,000.00 to be offset against any attorney fees that might be awarded to Ms. Walters's counsel. Ms. Walters, in turn, filed a petition for an award of attorney fees, seeking $180,312.55 in fees and costs for 675 hours of work. After requiring Ms. Walters's attorneys to refine their billing entries, in order to allow the court to better distinguish work done and costs incurred on claims against settling defendants and claims in which Ms. Walters did not prevail, and following a hearing on both outstanding motions, the court below ruled that Ms. Walters had "suffered a single indivisible loss arising from the combined actions of Defendant Quicken Loans and the settling co-defendants, Bank of America and Kirk Riffe ... [and therefore] Defendant Quicken Loans is entitled to an offset as a matter of law"; and Ms. Walters prevailed on her claim based on a violation of the appraisal statute "regardless of the dollar amount of damages actually awarded...," and therefore was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs.
The court applied the offset not as Quicken Loans had requested but as follows: (1) the portion of the combined Riffe/BOA settlements payable to Ms. Walters or on her behalf ($65,500.00)3 was offset against the damages awarded by the jury against Quicken Loans, effectively wiping out the jury award; and (2) the portion of the settlements designated as attorney fees ($32,500.00) was offset against the fees and costs sought from Quicken Loans. The total amount of the fees and costs awarded to Ms. Walters's attorneys by the court, after application of the offset, was $156,653.38.
It is well established in this Court's jurisprudence that "[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review." Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.L. v. Charlie A.L ., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).
With respect to our review of an award of costs and damages, we have held that:
"[T]he trial [court] ... is vested with a wide discretion in determining the amount of ... court costs and counsel fees; and the trial ... determination of such matters will not be disturbed upon appeal to this Court unless it clearly appears that [it] has abused [its] discretion." Syl. Pt. 3, in part, Bond v. Bond , 144 W.Va. 478, 109 S.E.2d 16 (1959).
Syl. Pt. 1, Heldreth v. Rahimian , 219 W.Va. 462, 637 S.E.2d 359 (2006).
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