Quickley v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp.
| Decision Date | 13 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. CCB-12-321 |
| Parties | Sandra T. Quickley v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation and Maryland General Hospital, Inc. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff, Sandra T. Quickley, filed suit on behalf of herself and others, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., the Maryland Wage and Hour Law ("MWHL"), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401 et seq., and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL"), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501 et seq., and asserting a claim for unjust enrichment under Maryland common law. The putative class includes all persons employed at Maryland General Hospital ("MGH") within the three years prior to filing this action whose pay was subject to an automatic 30-minute meal period deduction. Defendants, University of Maryland Medical System Corporation ("UMMS") and MGH, filed a partial motion to dismiss all claims against UMMS, the class action allegations, and the unjust enrichment claim. The issues have been fully briefed, and no oral argument is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, defendants' motion will be denied.
Plaintiff, Sandra T. Quickley ("Quickley"), worked at Maryland General Hospital ("MGH") as a licensed practical nurse ("LPN") in the Medical Surgical Unit from January 20, 1992 until June 14, 2011. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10 & 27, ECF No. 20.) Quickley alleges MGHenforces a uniform policy whereby employees are subject to an automatic 30-minute deduction in their daily time records for a scheduled meal break, whether or not they receive the break. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) This policy applies to secretaries, housekeepers, custodians, clerks, porters, registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, nurses' aides, administrative assistants, anesthetists, clinicians, medical coders, medical underwriters, nurse case managers, nurse interns, nurse practitioners, practice supervisors, professional staff nurses, quality coordinators, resource pool nurses, respiratory therapists, senior research associates, operating room coordinators, surgical specialists, admissions officers, student nurse technicians, trainers, and transcriptionists employed at MGH. (Id. ¶ 23.) Nonexempt employees subject to the automatic deduction policy in the three years prior to the filing of this action are the putative class members. (Id.) According to Quickley, she and the putative class members are often required to work through all or part of their meal break but are not paid for the compensable work they perform during that time. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) As a result, Quickley and the class members are regularly undercompensated, in violation of state and federal law. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Quickley's pay statements reference "Maryland General Hospital University of Maryland Medical System." (Id. ¶ 10.) The University of Maryland Medical System Corporation ("UMMS") is a multi-hospital system, including, among others, MGH. (Id. ¶¶ 12 & 14.) Quickley asserts that UMMS and MGH are related organizations that share common membership, common ownership, governing bodies, trustees and/or officers, and benefit plans, all of which Quickley contends is dictated, controlled, and ratified by UMMS. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 20.) MGH employee numbers are integrated into the central UMMS payroll system, and MGH employee nametags bear the UMMS logo. (Id. ¶ 19.)
During Quickley's employment at MGH, the system used to track employee time changed. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 29-30.) Originally, MGH employees signed in and out on sign-in sheets at the beginning and end of each day. (Id. ¶ 29.) Employees were not required to sign out for meal breaks. (Id.) For the last several years, MGH employees have used a Kronos time system whereby they swipe their identification badges at the beginning and end of each day. (Id. ¶ 30.) Quickley's normal work hours were 7:00 AM to 7:30 PM three days a week. (Id. ¶ 31.) Employees starting at 7:00 AM were not allowed to clock in before 6:53 AM and could not clock out before 7:23 PM. (Id.) Within that window, Quickley was given two compensated 15-minute breaks and an uncompensated 30-minute meal break. (Id.) She did not clock out for any of these breaks. (Id.) Quickley was therefore paid for 12 hours of the 12.5-hour shift on the assumption that she was taking a 30-minute meal break. (Id. ¶ 32.)
Quickley avers she and her coworkers rarely took the full 30-minute meal break. (Id. ¶ 33.) Instead, they picked up food from the cafeteria and brought it back to the unit to eat while continuing to provide nursing services. (Id.) The 15-minute breaks, for which Quickley and her coworkers were compensated, were generally also spent in the unit. (Id.) Quickley contends that her supervisors regularly observed her and her coworkers working through their meal breaks and made no effort to ensure that she and the putative class members received a full, uninterrupted 30-minute break. (Id. ¶ 34.)
When Quickley and other nurses worked beyond 7:30 PM, which was common, they were required to complete a Kronos adjustment sheet explaining their extended hours. (Id. ¶ 35.) Quickley was not expected to include the unused meal break time in the adjustment sheet, and she was unaware of any other method for recording or reporting the time worked during meal breaks. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) As a result, MGH did not accurately track the actual hours Quickley andthe putative class members worked. (Id. ¶ 37.) Quickley contends that the Kronos system could have been modified to accommodate tracking of these additional hours because, for example, Kronos had a button the employee could push to track participation in continuing professional education classes. (Id. ¶ 38.) Kronos was never modified to create a button to cancel the automatic meal break deduction in whole or in part for those occasions on which employees worked through the break, nor was there any instruction as to how to track that extra work time. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39.) Quickley alleges that, in addition to witnessing missed meal breaks first-hand, defendants were aware, given the demands of the healthcare industry and the hospital staffing shortages, that Quickley and her coworkers were often having to work through their unpaid breaks. (Id. ¶ 41.)
Quickley argues that defendants bear the burden of ensuring that meal breaks are not improperly deducted from pay. Instead, she asserts, defendants expect employees to work through their unpaid breaks, witness them performing compensable labor during unpaid time, including after 7:30 PM, and fail to include that time in calculating pay. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 51-54.) As a result, Quickley and the putative class members regularly work in excess of 40 hours per week and do not receive statutory overtime wages. (Id. ¶ 55.)
Quickley filed suit on behalf of herself and others, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., the Maryland Wage and Hour Law ("MWHL"), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401 et seq., and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL"), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501 et seq., and asserting aclaim for quantum meruit under Maryland common law.1 Quickley seeks a permanent injunction against defendants' engaging in any employment policy that violates the MWHL; compensatory damages, including backpay and reimbursement for lost wages in an amount to be shown at trial; and attorneys' fees and costs. (Id. Prayer for Relief C & E.) Now pending before the court is defendants' partial motion to dismiss all claims against UMMS, the class action allegations, and the unjust enrichment claim. (ECF No. 22.)
Defendants move to dismiss part of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). "'[T]he purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint' and not to 'resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.'" Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999)). To survive a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 128 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the facts alleged in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244; Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). A complaint need not provide "detailed factual allegations," but it must "provide the grounds of [the plaintiff's] entitlement to relief" with "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombley, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
Defendants seek to dismiss UMMS as a defendant on the grounds that Quickley's allegations fail to show that UMMS shared joint employer status with MGH. The FLSA defines "employer" broadly: "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Indeed, the Supreme Court described the FLSA's definition of employer as "expansive." Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S. Ct. 427, 431 (1973); see also Gionfriddo v. Jason Zink, LLC, 769 F. Supp. 2d 880, 890 (D. Md. 2011). The MWHL also defines "employer" broadly to include "a person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of another employer with an employee." See Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-401(b). The MWPCL defines employer as "any person who employs an individual in the State or a successor of the person." Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501(b).
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