Quigley v. Abel
Decision Date | 02 November 2020 |
Docket Number | Civil Action 2:20-cv-5146 |
Parties | HARRY LAWRENCE QUIGLEY, Plaintiff, v. SETH ABEL, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This matter is before the Court sua sponte for an initial screen of Plaintiff's Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to "lower judicial access barriers to the indigent." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, "Congress recognized that 'a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.'" Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part:
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court's determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) ( ). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) "imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints." 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require "'detailed factual allegations,' . . . [a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'" is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell AtlanticCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct." Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints "'to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; "'courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.'" Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App'x 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
In addition, a federal court has limited subject matter jurisdiction. "The basic statutory grants of federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for '[f]ederal-question' jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for '[d]iversity of citizenship' jurisdiction." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006). Federal-question jurisdiction is invoked when a plaintiff pleads a claim "arising under" the federal laws, the Constitution, or treaties of the United States. Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332(a), there must be complete diversity, which meansthat each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant, and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
Plaintiff, who appears to reside in Huntington, West Virginia, is proceeding here without counsel. By order dated October 15, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.)
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), and 1986. He names as Defendants Seth Abel, Steven Galante, and Stephen Rasmussen in their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that these individuals all are employees of Nationwide Insurance Company. (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 4.) The exhibits attached to the complaint indicate more specifically that Mr. Abel is Nationwide's managing counsel (Id. at Ex. B); Mr. Galante is a claims specialist (Id.); and Mr. Rasmussen is the Chief Executive Officer (Id. at Ex. C).
Plaintiff's allegations detail an intricate and convoluted fact pattern arising in connection with litigation he filed in the Southern District of West Virginia. The first case, captioned as Quigley v. City of Huntington, West Virginia, Case No. 3:17-cv-1906, originally was assigned to United States District Judge Robert C. Chambers and United States Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 5-6.) Plaintiff asserts that this case currently is pending before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Id. at ¶ 5.) The second case, captioned as Quigley v. Williams, Case No. 3:18-cv-1323, was assigned to Chief United States District Judge Thomas E. Johnston and United States Magistrate Judge Robert W. Trumble.2 Plaintiff asserts that this case wasdismissed on appeal "by the biased federal appellate judge Thacker." (Id.) Plaintiff further states that this case is pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court. (Id.)
In Quigley v. Williams, Chief Judge Johnston, in adopting Magistrate Judge Trumble's recommendation that the complaint be dismissed, set forth factual background that also is relevant here.3 Chief Judge Johnston explained as follows:
Quigley v. Williams, 2019 WL 1858308, at *1-2 (record citations omitted). The dismissal of Plaintiff's claims was upheld on appeal. Quigley v. Williams 811 F. App'x 868 (4th Cir. 2020).
Having had no luck in prosecuting his claims of judicial bias within the Fourth Circuit, and not to be deterred, Plaintiff now has filed suit in this Court against the defendant employees of Nationwide, the City of Huntington's insurance company, arising from their alleged roles in retaining the...
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