Quigley v. Rosenthal
| Decision Date | 17 October 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-1501.,04-1501. |
| Citation | 427 F.3d 1232 |
| Parties | William J. QUIGLEY and Dorothy Quigley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Saul F. ROSENTHAL, in his individual capacity and in his capacity as representative of the Anti-Defamation League, and the Anti-Defamation League, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Roberts & Owen, LLP, Denver, CO, with him on the briefs), for plaintiffs-appellants.
Shelley B. Don, (Watson W. Galleher with him on the brief), Don, Hiller & Galleher, P.C., Denver, CO, for defendants-appellees.
Before BRISCOE, HARTZ, Circuit Judges, and HERRERA, District Judge.*
Plaintiffs William and Dorothy Quigley appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for attorneys' fees and non-taxable litigation costs. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
The underlying factual and procedural history of this civil action is detailed in Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir.2003), and will not be repeated here. In sum, the Quigleys filed suit in federal court against defendants the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and Saul Rosenthal, the director of the ADL's Denver office, asserting various claims under federal and state law. Six of the Quigleys' claims, including claims under the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(d) and 2520(a) (), proceeded to trial in April 2000 and were submitted to a jury following approximately sixteen days of trial. On April 28, 2000, the jury found in favor of the Quigleys on five of those claims, including the claims under the Federal Wiretap Act, and awarded them damages in excess of $10,000,000.00.
On May 12, 2000, the Quigleys filed a motion for attorneys' fees and non-taxable litigation costs pursuant to the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)(3). On April 5, 2001, the district court issued an order denying the Quigleys' motion for fees without prejudice. In doing so, the district court stated as follows:
Upon review of plaintiffs' motion and defendants' response thereto, the procedural posture of this case, and taking into account the parties' inability to agree on even the minutest of issues, I am of the opinion that the adjudication of plaintiffs' motion at this time would run counter to the principles of judicial economy. In light of an almost certain appeal by defendants (and possibly a cross-appeal by plaintiffs) of the jury's verdict, as well as my rulings before, during, and after trial, I find that it would be a waste of this court's limited resources to address the issue of attorney fees prior to an appellate decision or other final resolution of this case. By staying my decision on this issue, I do not mean to suggest that I doubt the outcome of my rulings or the jury's verdict on appeal. Rather, I am merely recognizing that, in the event the Tenth Circuit was to reverse the jury's verdict on plaintiffs' wiretap claim — the only claim under which plaintiffs' [sic] could conceivably recover attorney fees — any action taken on plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees would be for naught. Moreover, I am convinced that, despite plaintiffs' assurances to the contrary, the adjudication of attorney fees in this case will erupt into "second major litigation."
For these reasons, and the additional reason that a ruling on plaintiffs' motion is unnecessary to perfect either party's right to appeal the substantive issues in this case, I conclude that plaintiffs' motion is not ripe for review at this time. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees and non-taxable costs is denied without prejudice. Plaintiffs may, consistent with this Order, renew their motion if future circumstances warrant. Furthermore, given plaintiffs' counsel's proclivity to view my rulings as an interactive process, whereby I rule on an issue and counsel submits subsequent commentary on that ruling in the form of a motion (or motions) to reconsider — much like the "Sentence First — Verdict Afterwards" type of procedure parodied in Alice in Wonderland — plaintiffs' counsel is hereby advised that any motion for reconsideration of this Order is denied prospectively.
App. at 547-48 (emphasis added). The district court's order ended with this verbiage: "Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees and non-taxable costs . . . is DENIED without prejudice." Id. at 548.
Defendants subsequently filed an appeal. This court affirmed in part and reversed in part, leaving intact the Quigley's judgment against defendants on their Federal Wiretap Act claims. Defendants then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. On March 1, 2004, the Supreme Court denied the defendants' petition. Rosenthal v. Quigley, 540 U.S. 1229, 124 S.Ct. 1507, 158 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004).
On March 11, 2004, the parties filed pleadings with the district court advising there had been complete satisfaction of the judgment on the merits against the defendants. Those pleadings indicated, however, that the satisfactions filed did not address, satisfy or release the defendants from the Quigleys' asserted claim for attorneys' fees. On June 14, 2004, the district court, on its own initiative, entered an "amended final judgment." App. at 568-78. The stated purpose of the amendment was to comply "with the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit filed with th[e district] court on September 22, 2003. . . ." Id. at 568.
On July 29, 2004, the Quigleys filed a pleading entitled "Plaintiffs' Request For A Hearing Upon Their Motion for Attorneys Fees And Litigation Costs And Plaintiffs' Amendments To Their Motion." Id. at 579-612. The pleading requested the district court to schedule a hearing on their original motion for fees and costs (i.e., the motion filed on May 12, 2000), and purported to update and amend that original motion to include requests for fees and costs incurred since the filing of the original motion. According to their proposed amendments, plaintiffs sought "a grand total of $6,377,945.20" in fees and "litigation costs in the amount of $133,431.10." Id. at 588.
On September 15, 2004, defendants filed a pleading entitled "Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amendments To Their Motion For Attorney Fees And Litigation Costs." Id. at 618. Defendants' motion asserted, in pertinent part, that "[p]laintiffs failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of F.R.C.P. 54(d)(2)(B) by not filing their Fee Claims within fourteen days of [the district court's] Final Amended Judgment [on June 14, 2004]. . . ."1 Id. at 619.
Plaintiffs filed a pleading in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss. In arguing that their July 29 pleading was timely filed, plaintiffs asserted that the district court "did not `rule on' [their original motion] for fees" or "establish `a new period for filing' [their] motion for fees," and thus "the logical construction of the [district court's] April 5, 2001 Order [wa]s that the [district court] . . . `deferred' ruling on [their original] motion for fees, specifically authorizing [them] to further prosecute their Motion if `future circumstances' warranted." Id. at 746, n. 1. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that, "were [the district court] to adopt [defendants'] unsupported position that a `second filing' was required, the [plaintiffs'] failure to have effected such a filing at some still undesignated deadline . . . must be considered `excusable neglect,' [and] not a basis for rejecting [their] fees application altogether." Id. at 748, n. 5.
On November 24, 2004, the district court issued an order and memorandum of decision granting defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' amendments to their motion for attorneys' fees and denying plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. In doing so, the district court began by noting that it had expressly dismissed without prejudice plaintiffs' original motion for attorneys' fees and costs. In light of that ruling, the district court concluded, it was not appropriate for plaintiffs to "file a request for a hearing upon a motion that [the district court] resolved years earlier," and "[s]uch a request c[ould] neither renew [p]laintiffs' initial motion, [ ]or relate back to [p]laintiffs' initial motion." Id. at 821. In other words, the district court emphasized, "[t]he `impression' from [its] order denying [p]laintiffs' initial motion for attorneys' fees was clear: if [p]laintiffs wished to receive attorneys' fees at the conclusion of the appeal, they would have to file a new motion in order to renew their request." Id. at 823. The district court further noted that it had entered an amended final judgment on June 14, 2004, in order to comply with the Tenth Circuit's mandate. Id. at 819. "In order for [p]laintiffs to bring before the court their request for fees," the district court concluded, they "were required to file a new motion for attorneys' fees within the statutory time period" set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), i.e., within fourteen days after entry of the amended final judgment. Id. at 820. Because plaintiffs' motion was filed approximately forty-five days after the entry of the amended final judgment, the district court concluded plaintiffs' motion (to the extent it was construed as a new motion for fees and costs) was untimely and plaintiffs were "not entitled to attorneys' fees unless they [could] show excusable neglect." Id. at 821-22. Finally, the district court noted that plaintiffs "ha[d] not even filed a proper motion for attorneys' fees after the entry of the amended final judgment," and thus had failed to establish excusable neglect. Id. at 822.
Plaintiffs assert two basic arguments on appeal. First, plaintiffs contend that "[n]either F.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2), nor the...
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