Quigley v. United States
Decision Date | 22 March 2012 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. DKC 11-3223 |
Parties | LYNNE C. QUIGLEY, et al. v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Presently pending and ready for review in this consolidated tort action are three motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission ("WSSC"). (ECF Nos. 13, 22, 27). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.
Three cases are consolidated in this action: Quigley v. United States, No. DKC 11-3223; Ochoa v. United States, No. DKC 11-3224; and Barbosa v. United States, No. DKC 11-3225. The allegations contained in the complaints for the three cases are largely identical and describe the same accident. (See ECF Nos. 1, 21, 26). The following allegations are taken from the original complaint filed by Plaintiffs Lynne C. Quigley, MilesC. Quigley, and the estate of Joseph Quigley (ECF No. 1), unless otherwise indicated.
At some point during the overnight hours of January 19, 2009, a water main maintained by WSSC burst under Ridge Drive near the intersection of 64th Street in the Bethesda area of Montgomery County, Maryland. After the main ruptured, WSSC increased the water pressure, which amplified the flow of water.1 Water from the main escaped into the street, where it collected and flowed into a storm drain at the intersection of Ridge Drive and 64th Street. The storm drain was maintained by Defendant Montgomery County ("the County"). Due to a breach in the storm drain, the water made its way down a hillside onto the adjacent Clara Barton Parkway ("the Parkway"), a limited access urban freeway maintained by Defendant United States through its Department of the Interior and National Park Service.
On January 20, 2009, the temperature in the vicinity was below freezing. As a result, the water from the burst main that had collected on the Parkway froze into ice. The ice covered both westbound lanes of the Parkway for approximately 200 yards.There was no other appreciable rain, sleet, snow, or other precipitation in the area.
Around 5:24 a.m. that day, decedent Joseph Quigley was driving eastbound on the Parkway. At about the same time, Defendant Marcelo Pepe was driving westbound. Plaintiff Adriana Ochoa and Plaintiff Pollyana Barbosa were passengers in Mr. Pepe's vehicle. (ECF No. 21, at 3; ECF No. 26, at 3). Mr. Pepe encountered the ice caused by the burst main, lost control of his vehicle, crossed the median into the eastbound lanes, and collided with Mr. Quigley's vehicle. Mr. Quigley sustained injuries from which he eventually died. In Mr. Pepe's vehicle, Ms. Ochoa sustained injuries. (ECF No. 21 ¶ 32). Ms. Barbosa, who was originally in the back seat, was ejected from the vehicle and landed on top of the burning exhaust system of the vehicle, all of which caused injuries and first-, second-, and third-degree burns. (ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 32, 35).
On November 11, 2011, Plaintiffs Lynne C. Quigley and Miles C. Quigley, individually and as personal representatives of the estate of Joseph Quigley ("the Quigley Plaintiffs"), brought a wrongful death and survival action against Defendants in thiscourt.2 Their original complaint contains six counts: (1) strict liability against WSSC; (2) negligence against WSSC and a Doe Defendant employee of WSSC; (3) strict liability against the County; (4) negligence against the County and a Doe Defendant employee of the County; (5) negligence against the United States; and (6) negligence against Mr. Pepe.3 Separately, Ms. Ochoa and Ms. Barbosa filed complaints asserting identical counts.
On December 13, 2011, WSSC filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against it in each of the three actions. (ECF Nos. 13, 22, 27).4 The Quigley Plaintiffs, Ms. Ochoa, and Ms. Barbosa, respectively, opposed WSSC's motions. (ECF Nos. 19, 25, 34). The three cases were consolidated for all purposes by court order on January 4, 2012. (ECF No. 20). On January 18,2012, WSSC filed one omnibus reply to all three oppositions. (ECF No. 31).5
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff's complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007). That showing must consist of more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" or "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, the court must consider all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and must construe all factual allegations inthe light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. , 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). In evaluating the complaint, the court need not accept unsupported legal allegations. Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989). Nor must it agree with legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged, but it has not 'show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Thus, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
WSSC moves to dismiss the three complaints on largely identical bases. As to Ms. Barbosa's claims, however, WSSC advances one additional argument regarding the sufficiency of her notice to WSSC under the Local Government Tort Claims Act("LGTCA"). That argument will be addressed first, and then WSSC's substantive arguments as to Plaintiffs' claims will be addressed.
WSSC seeks dismissal of Ms. Barbosa's claims against it on the ground that she failed to comply with the notice requirements of the LGTCA. (ECF No. 27-1, at 11-12). The Barbosa complaint recites that:
Ms. Barbosa argues that, although she may not have strictly complied with the notice statute, she substantially complied with it. (ECF No. 34, at 19-21). Alternatively, Ms. Barbosa contends that the notice requirement should be waived for good cause and lack of prejudice to WSSC. (Id. at 21-24).
The LGTCA provides that "an action for unliquidated damages may not be brought against a local government or its employees unless the notice of the claim required by this section is given within 180 days after the injury." Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304(b). For WSSC, which is listed as a "local government" in section 5-301(d)(7), "the notice shall be given in person or by certified mail . . . by the claimant or the representative of the claimant, to . . . corporate authorities." Id. § 5-304(c). Hansen v. City of Laurel, Md. , 420 Md. 670, 694 (2011).
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