Quigley v. Winter
| Decision Date | 09 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-CV-4053-DEO.,06-CV-4053-DEO. |
| Citation | 584 F.Supp.2d 1153 |
| Parties | Jaymie QUIGLEY, Plaintiff, v. Dale WINTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Allison Dana Balus, Christopher R. Hedican, Scott P. Moore, Baird Holm, LLP, Omaha, NE, for Plaintiff.
Robert B. Deck, Deck Law, Sioux City, IA, for Defendant.
Pending before the Court are defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, motion for new trial, motion to alter or amend judgment (Docket No. 68) and plaintiff's motion for attorney fees (Docket No. 71). The plaintiff here, Jaymie Quigley, filed a lawsuit against the defendant, Dale Winter, under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. ("Fair Housing Act" or "FHA"), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216.1 et seq., alleging discrimination on the basis of sex. This Court held a jury trial in this case commencing on April 14, 2008, and ending with a jury verdict on April 21, 2008.
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Specifically, the jury found that the defendant sexually harassed the plaintiff, discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of sex, and coerced, intimidated or interfered with the plaintiff in the exercise of her rights. The jury awarded the plaintiff $13,685.00 in compensatory damages and $250,000.00 in punitive damages, the latter after having found that the defendant's conduct was motivated by evil motive or intent or that he was reckless or callously indifferent to the plaintiff's rights. The jury also awarded the plaintiff $400.00 for her breach of contract claim.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) allows a party to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law if "for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence . . . ." "A judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if `a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.'" Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Group, Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 899-900 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting FED. R.CIV.P. 50(a)(1)). In reviewing the motion, the Court must "grant [the nonmoving party] all reasonable inferences and view the facts in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party]." Id. at 900 (citing Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 833 (8th Cir.2001)). The Court must grant judgment as a matter of law "when the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the verdict." Day v. Toman, 266 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 634 (8th Cir.1998)). "The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict which should not lightly be set aside." Dominic v. DeVilbiss Air Power Co., 493 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir.2007)).
At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence that female tenants were discriminated against and that male tenants were not. The plaintiff, as well as three former female tenants, all testified that they were harassed. Male tenants were not treated in a similar manner. Plaintiff's witness, Pat Johnson, an investigator from the Sioux City Human Rights Commission, testified that other women (but not men) had complained to her about similar treatment from Mr. Winter. Also, Ms. Quigley testified that her problems with Winter occurred when her boyfriend moved out of her house, i.e., that Winter did not harass her when there was a male presence. The jury is allowed to infer based upon this that male and female tenants were treated differently.
The plaintiff also set forth evidence that she was sexually harassed. The plaintiff testified that the defendant stroked his hand on her bare stomach and said that his, "eagle eyes haven't seen everything yet." She also testified that he rubbed his groin area often when in her presence, made comments about the size of Ms. Quigley's 14-year old sister's breasts in her presence and stood unnecessarily close to her, requiring her to come into close contact with him when trying to move away. Ms. Quigley also testified that, on occasion, he would rub up against her when passing by. She testified that he stroked her arm while driving and showing her properties. She also testified that he would come to her home unannounced and lounge on her sofa and she believes that he had entered her bedroom in her absence and moved her bathrobe to a place where she never leaves it.
The defendant seems to argue, as he did at trial, that what the plaintiff testified to was not true so he is therefore entitled to post-trial relief. He also seems to argue that his "glib comments" and unwanted touchings were not so bad as to entitle Ms. Quigley to a jury verdict. The defendant submitted sexual harassment cases in an employment setting to argue that Mr. Winter would have needed to harass Ms. Quigley much more in order for his conduct to be actionable. The Court is not persuaded that sexual harassment at work is akin to sexual harassment in one's own home by one's own landlord who just so happens to also have a key to the house. A tenant should be able to feel secure in her own home, and there was testimony from Ms. Quigley that she was not.
The defendant also argues that the Eighth Circuit does not recognize a cause of action for sexual harassment causing a hostile housing environment. The plaintiff first argues that the defendant is barred from making this argument now as he did not advance it in a "pre-verdict motion". The Court is persuaded that the defendant adequately presented this issue to the Court during the trial proceedings. However, the Court also believes that the Eighth Circuit has established a cause of action for sexual harassment causing a hostile housing environment. Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir.2003), states that, "disability harassment in the housing context is actionable under the FHA." And, as the plaintiff points out, this holding was based on the fact that, "some federal courts have permitted claims under the FHA when sexual harassment causes a hostile housing environment." Id. Thus, the Court is persuaded that the Eighth Circuit recognizes this cause of action.
The question this Court must answer when ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law is whether there is a complete absence of probative facts that support the jury verdict, without questioning the plaintiff's credibility. The Court is persuaded that the facts set forth above would support the jury's verdict if it, as it obviously did, found the plaintiff and other witnesses credible. For these reasons, the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states in pertinent part:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.
"[A]uthority to grant a new trial . . . is confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court." Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980). The trial court is not, however, "`free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.'" Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aalco Wrecking Co., 466 F.2d 179, 186 (8th Cir.1972) (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944)). Ultimately, "[w]hen through judicial balancing the trial court determines that the first trial has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, the court may order a new trial, otherwise not." White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 780 (8th Cir.1992).
If a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of a claim with respect to which that party has the burden of proof, then the opposing party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1492 (8th Cir.1997). Ultimately, the necessary proof that the nonmoving party must produce is not precisely measurable, but the evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994).
The defendant claims that the Court should not have given the quid pro quo harassment instruction to the jury because there was no evidence presented of the same. "`Quid pro quo' harassment occurs when housing benefits are explicitly or implicitly conditioned on sexual favors." Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir.1993).
Ms. Quigley testified that when she requested that Mr. Winter return her housing security deposit, his response was to stroke her bare stomach with his hand and say, "my eagle eyes haven't seen everything yet." The plaintiff's theory was that Mr. Winter was intimating that he would only return the security deposit if Ms. Quigley engaged in some sort of sexual act with him. Mr. Winter did not, in fact, ever return Ms. Quigley's deposit; and it became a claim in this case. The Court is persuaded that this...
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...that [plaintiff] lives alone and [defendant] trespassed into her home uninvited and completely unexpectedly."); Quigley v. Winter , 584 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1157 (N.D. Iowa 2008) ("A tenant should be able to feel secure in her own home, and there was testimony from [plaintiff] that she was not."......