Quiles v. Parent

• Decision Date: 02 November 2018
• Docket Number: G054353
• Citation: 28 Cal.App.5th 1000,239 Cal.Rptr.3d 664
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Amanda QUILES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur J. PARENT, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

28 Cal.App.5th 1000

239 Cal.Rptr.3d 664

Amanda QUILES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Arthur J. PARENT, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

G054353

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

Filed November 2, 2018

Law Office of Stephen A. Madoni and Stephen A. Madoni, Newport Beach, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bryan Schwartz Law, Bryan J. Schwartz, Logan Starr, Oakland; Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Brill and Daniel H. Reiss, Los Angeles, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

FYBEL, J.

INTRODUCTION

In this latest chapter in what originated as a wage and hour class action, defendant Arthur J. Parent, Jr. (Parent) appeals from the amended judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Amanda Quiles on her individual claim for wrongful employment termination in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA; 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ). (All further statutory references are to title 29 of the United States Code unless otherwise specified.) In addition to the damages awarded by the jury, the amended judgment awarded Quiles $689,310.04 in attorney fees and $50,591.69 in costs of litigation.

Parent challenges the attorney fees and costs awards of the amended judgment only, arguing the trial court erred by awarding costs that were not statutorily authorized and by awarding attorney fees and costs that were jointly incurred by Quiles with her coplaintiffs for whom litigation remains pending. He also argues the trial court otherwise abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees and costs that were unrelated and unnecessary to Quiles’s successful FLSA claim.

We affirm. We hold, in this case of first impression, that federal law applies to the determination of what type of costs are recoverable by a prevailing party in an FLSA action filed in state court. Section 216(b) provides that any employer who wrongfully terminates the employment of an employee in retaliation for filing an FLSA action shall be liable for legal or equitable relief and shall pay the employee’s reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action. Federal courts have construed section 216(b) to authorize awarding a prevailing employee a broad measure of costs, which include copying, postage, and mediation expenses.

We reject Parent’s argument that the trial court erred by awarding Quiles mediation costs because the parties had contractually agreed to mediate the matter and divide the costs between them. The record shows that the parties agreed to each pay the mediation services provider half the costs of mediation, but Parent did not go through with any agreement to mediate, having failed to personally appear at the mediation or otherwise be available to participate in the mediation. Parent forfeited his argument that the trial court awarded expert witness fees that were unauthorized by the FLSA. He failed to raise that argument in the trial court which resulted in the issue not having been fully briefed and in depriving the trial court the opportunity to make that determination in the first instance.

We also reject Parent’s claim that the trial court erred by awarding Quiles costs she jointly incurred with other plaintiffs who continue to litigate their claims. The trial court painstakingly reviewed the lengthy record regarding Quiles’s requests for attorney fees and costs and awarded her what the court determined she reasonably incurred on her own behalf and in relation to her successful claim. Contrary to Parent’s argument, the trial court did not err by awarding Quiles attorney fees and costs she incurred in connection with the trial as to the joint employer issue. Having proven Parent’s status as her joint employer enabled Quiles to avail herself of the opportunity to pursue damages, penalties, attorney fees and costs against Parent for violating the FLSA by wrongfully terminating Quiles’s employment.

BACKGROUND

In November 2010, Quiles, along with other individuals, filed a proposed class action against, inter alia, Koji’s Japan Incorporated (Koji’s) and Parent (collectively defendants), asserting several state and federal wage and hour claims and violation of California’s unfair competition law. Plaintiffs amended their complaint several times to add, among other things, Quiles’s individual wrongful employment termination claim in violation of the FLSA.

In early 2015, the trial court presided over a bench trial to determine joint employer and alter ego theories of liability. At the beginning of the trial, defendants declared bankruptcy. Parent was fined over $50,000 for making a frivolous bankruptcy filing. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found Parent qualified as a joint employer under the FLSA.¹

A year later, the trial court conducted a jury trial of Quiles’s individual FLSA claim against defendants for wrongful employment termination. According to the parties’ joint statement of the case prepared for this phase of trial, "Quiles claimed that she was wrongfully terminated from her employment when Koji’s became aware that she was named as the representative claimant in this class action." Quiles sought damages for past loss of earnings and emotional distress. Defendants argued Quiles’s employment was terminated for "legitimate reasons, based on her disciplinary record alone."

The jury found in favor of Quiles on her wrongful employment termination claim, finding on the special verdict form: (1) Quiles’s lawsuit was a substantial motivating reason for her discharge; (2) defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to Quiles; and (3) defendants failed to prove that they would have made the same decision based upon a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason. The jury awarded Quiles economic damages for loss of past earnings in the amount of $3,000; non-economic damages, including emotional distress damages, in the amount of $27,500; and punitive damages in the amount of $350,000.

Quiles filed a request to withdraw as a class representative and requested dismissal of her individual claims other than her wrongful employment termination claim that had been tried. The trial court granted Quiles’s request and Quiles disclaimed any right to future recovery as a class member.

In April 2016, judgment was entered in Quiles’s favor and against defendants for the damages awarded by the jury, plus $3,000 in liquidated damages awarded by the trial court (§ 216(b) ), for a total damages award of $383,500.² Blank lines were included in the judgment for attorney fees and costs of litigation awards.

Defendants filed a motion for a new trial solely challenging the award of punitive damages. The trial court conditionally granted the new trial motion, subject to Quiles consenting to a reduction of the punitive damages award to $175,000. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 662.5, subd. (a)(2).) Quiles accepted the proposed reduction, bringing the total damages award down to $208,500.

In May 2016, Quiles filed a memorandum of costs and a supplemental memorandum of additional costs, which, together, sought a total costs award of $70,587.81. In June 2016, Quiles filed a motion seeking an attorney fees award in the total amount of $1,057,295.59 for the prosecution of her individual FLSA claim. The trial court summarized Quiles’s attorney fees request as comprised of the following: (1) for time spent up to May 22, 2013, $21,384.50 (a 90 percent discount off the total of $213,845 for 595.2 hours); (2) for time spent after May 22, 2013, $442,256.25 (a 50 percent discount off the total of $884,512.50 for 2,245.5 hours); (3) $419,217.5 for 1,009.4 hours for time spent solely on the wrongful employment termination action; (4) $25,600 for 51.2 hours of time spent by attorney William Crosby; (5) $170,395 for 270.6 hours of time spent by attorney Larry Organ; (6) less $2,600 (a reduction of 5.2 hours of Crosby’s time); (7) less $54,192.67 (a five percent discount off the subtotal of items (1) through (6) above); and (8) $30,105 for 76.1 hours for time spent to prepare the replies to "these motions" (presumably referring to Quiles’s motion for attorney fees and Parent’s motion to tax costs). Defendants filed a motion to strike or tax costs and an opposition to the motion for attorney fees.

Following a hearing on attorney fees and costs, the trial court awarded Quiles $689,310.04 in attorney fees by way of a detailed written ruling. In a separate order, the court awarded $50,591.69 in costs to Quiles. An amended judgment was entered which reflected the updated damage award (total of $208,500), the attorney fee award ($689,310.04), and the costs award ($50,591.69).

Parent alone filed a notice of appeal.³

DISCUSSION

I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT FEDERAL LAW APPLIED TO DETERMINE WHAT TYPES OF COSTS QUILES MAY RECOVER FOR PREVAILING ON HER FLSA CLAIM.

The FLSA provides for an award of prevailing party attorney fees and costs to an employee who proves retaliation under its provisions: "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 15(a)(3) of this Act [ 29 USCS § 215(a)(3) ]^{[4 ]} shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 15(a)(3) .... An action to recover the liability prescribed in the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. ... The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action." (§ 216(b).)

As we stated in Quiles I, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pages 145-146, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 858, "State procedural rules apply to federal causes of action in state court, unless the federal right is defeated thereby. ( Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131, 138 [108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123].) Generally speaking, the use of California postjudgment procedures to...