Quill v. Carolina Portland Cement Co.
Decision Date | 24 October 1929 |
Docket Number | 1 Div. 524. |
Citation | 124 So. 305,220 Ala. 134 |
Parties | QUILL v. CAROLINA PORTLAND CEMENT CO. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Mobile County; Joel W. Goldsby, Judge.
Motion of the Carolina Portland Cement Company to revive a judgment against J. Holcombe Quill. From a judgment granting the motion, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Pillans Cowley & Gresham, of Mobile, for appellant.
Gaillard Mahorner & Gaillard, of Mobile, for appellee.
The appellee brought suit in the Law and Equity Court of Mobile now merged into the circuit court, and on personal service on Mr. Quill obtained a judgment.
Upon that judgment, under the law having application and for a period of ten years thereafter, execution may issue thereon. Thereafter, for the period of ten years, a personal judgment, as it was, was subject to be revived as provided by statute. Mobile Drug Co. v. McCullough, 215 Ala. 682, 112 So. 238.
The character of scire facias or the order sought was thus declared in an early decision (Miller et al. v. Shackelford, 16 Ala. 95, 99): ( ) ."
That is, in such a proceeding a plea that seeks to go behind the judgment or defend against the original cause is subject to demurrer. Duncan, Adm'r, v. Hargrove, 22 Ala. 150; Bentancourt v. Eberlin, 71 Ala. 461.
This court has declared that after ten years and without revivor, and before expiration of the twenty-year period, such judgment would support an execution thereon and sale of lands levied upon thereunder, unless a seasonable motion to quash the execution was pressed upon the attention of the court. Leonard v. Brewer, 86 Ala. 390, 5 So. 306; Waldrop v. Friedman, 90 Ala. 157, 7 So. 510, 24 Am. St. Rep. 775, execution prematurely issued; De Loach v. Robbins, 102 Ala. 288, 14 So. 777, 48 Am. St. Rep. 46; Richards v. Steiner Bros., 166 Ala. 353, 52 So. 200.
The personal judgment against appellant in the instant case was not barred by the lapse of time, more than ten years and less than twenty, and was only subject to the enforcement as provided by section 7863 et seq. of the Code. It is provided by section 7863 that The legislature had the right to have fixed a longer or shorter period for the issue of execution, as twenty years rather than ten; or that for the revivor. It had the right to specify other reasonable terms for the revivor of a judgment rendered on personal service. The effect of our decisions is that the form and substance of the revivor, if granted, is "that plaintiff have execution of the judgment, etc., and that the old judgment "is simply called into action." Owens v. Henry (Owens v. McCloskey), 161 U.S. 642, 16 S.Ct. 693, 40 L.Ed. 837; Baker v. Ingersoll, 37 Ala. 503; and Drennen v. Dunn, 166 Ala. 213, 215, 52 So. 313, 314, 139 Am. St. Rep. 28, which is not a suit on a judgment.
In the last-cited case, Mr. Justice Sayre makes distinction between suits on judgments and those of a scire facias to revive a judgment, as follows:
In Baker v. Ingersoll, 37 Ala. 503, is contained the observation by Mr. Justice Walker as follows:
And in Mobile Drug Co. v. McCullough, 215 Ala. 682, 112 So. 238, 239, it is said:
It would appear from these declarations, and analogies of foregoing authorities, that the proceedings for scire facias are supplementary to or a continuation of the former proceedings and are to make effective the right of execution upon judgments theretofore rendered. In the instant case the judgment to be revived was rendered after personal service, a hearing, and adjudication according due process (section 7863, Code; Barron, Adm'r, v. Tart, 19 Ala. 78; Turner v. Dupree, 19 Ala. 198; Miller v. Shackelford, 16 Ala. 95, 99; Betancourt v. Eberlin, Adm'r, 71 Ala. 461, 466); and the revivor is had after the notice provided by the statute which offends no provision of organic law as to the rendition of personal judgments.
The situation, as stated by Mr. Chief Justice Stone, of the Statute of 1886, § 2923, is to the effect that, if ten years have...
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...a dormant judgment so as to enable the creditor to enforce by execution the judgment he has already obtained. Quill v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 220 Ala. 134, 124 So. 305 (citations Eatman v. Goodson, 58 So.2d at 131, 36 Ala.App. at 362 (emphasis added); see also Ala.Code Ann. § 6-2-32 ......