Quiller v. Wilson, 1:12cv426 (LO/JFA)
| Decision Date | 21 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | 1:12cv426 (LO/JFA) |
| Parties | Everette Nathaniel Quiller, Petitioner, v. Warden Wilson, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Everette Nathaniel Quiller, a federal inmate housed in the Eastern District of Virginia and proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") unlawfully forced him to sign a contract obligating him to make payments towards an assessment and criminal fine. On June 25, 2012, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment with a supporting memorandum of law and exhibits. Respondent provided petitioner with the notice required by Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) and Local Rule 7(K), and petitioner filed a response opposing the motion for summary on July 6, 2012. Respondent submitted a reply memorandum with additional exhibits on July 12, to which petitioner replied on July 19. Accordingly, the matter is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
The following material facts are uncontroverted. In 1999, Quiller was sentenced to serve twenty-five (25) years incarceration followed by three (3) years supervised release for hisconviction of using and carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. He was also ordered to pay a $200 assessment fee in full immediately, and to pay a criminal fine of $11,650.00. United States v. Quiller, Case No. 5:98CR00037-018 (E.D.N.C. July 12, 1999); Resp. Ex. A. On July 24, 2000, the district court reduced the incarcerative portion of Quiller's sentence to 225 months, and left all other terms of the original judgment and commitment order intact. Resp. Ex. B.
While Quiller was confined at FCI Estill, in South Carolina, he enrolled in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP") and began to make payments toward satisfaction of his court-imposed obligations. Resp. Ex. C - D. However, on May 7, 2004, Quiller filed a Request for Administrative Remedy, stating that he was "not satisfied" with the IFRP contract that he was "forced to sign under threat" of losing his prison job. Resp. Ex. F. He protested that he was told he would be placed in "refused" status even though he was "willing to pay half of [his] UNICOR pay each month [but] that is not enough for these people." He concluded that he did not believe that his situation was "fair" based on his understanding of the law, and he requested to be removed from IFRP refusal status and allowed to pay $25 or $50 per quarter toward his restitution balance, because he could not afford the $100 he had been ordered to pay. Id. Quiller unsuccessfully pursued his administrative remedies as to his claim, until ultimately relief was denied by the Administrator of National Inmate Appeals on the following holding:
Resp. Ex. F, Admin. Rem. No. 333133-A1, Sept. 10, 2004.
Petitioner then turned to the federal forum and filed a petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that he was "being force [sic] to pay fine from money that someone may or may not send [him]," so that "when no one sends [him] any money, [he] was being punished. ..." Resp. Ex. E at 1. On October 29, 2004, Magistrate Judge Joseph R. McCrorey issued a Report and Recommendation that Quiller's petition failed to state a claim and should be summarily dismissed. Resp. Ex. G. By Order entered January 6, 2005, United States District Judge G. Ross Anderson, Jr. adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. Quiller v. Chavis, Case No. 3:04-22735-BBC (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2005); Resp. Ex. H.
On February 2, 2011, Quiller was transferred to FCI Edgefield, also in South Carolina. While there, he initiated the grievance process, reiterating the same challenge he made to the IFRP while he was confined at FCI Estill that the BOP was "extorting" him by forcing him tomake payments on his fine pursuant to the IFRP, increasing his payments, and placing him on "refuse" status for his noncompliance. As before, the claim was found to be without merit at each level of the grievance process. Dkt. 1, Ex. 2. At the final appeal level to the BOP's Central Office, the Administrator of National Inmate Appeals responded to Quiller's claim as follows:
As of December 13, 2011, Quiller had paid the $ 200.00 assessment fee and had an outstanding balance of $ 9,657.11 on the criminal fine imposed by the North Carolina trial court. Resp. Ex. D. On February 8, 2012, he was transferred to FCI Petersburg. Resp. Ex. J. Without participating in the grievance process at that institution, he filed the instant § 2241 application on April 18, 2012, again reiterating the same challenge to the IFRP he has made twice before, and arguing that the BOP is extorting him by forcing him to make payments toward his court-orderedfine when he has no job or funds. Petitioner admits that "[t]his is the same problem that came up at the other prison ... F.C.I. Edgefield," that resulted in him "filing a complaint." Dkt. 1 at 3.
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of proving that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (). To meet that burden, the moving party must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact are present for resolution. Id. at 322. Once a moving party has met its burden to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to point out the specific facts which create disputed factual issues. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a district court should consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of that party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Those facts which the moving party bears the burden of proving are facts which are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine when, "the evidence ... create[s] [a] fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice." Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp.,759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only where no material facts are genuinely disputed and the evidence as a whole could not lead a rational fact finder to rule for the non-moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
Respondent is plainly entitled to the summary judgment he seeks, because Quiller's petition is successive.1 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death...
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