Quillman v. Gurley

• Decision Date: 31 January 1889
• Citation: 5 So. 345,85 Ala. 594
• Parties: QUILLMAN v. GURLEY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

5 So. 345

85 Ala. 594

QUILLMAN v. GURLEY.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 31, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Madison county; H. C. SPEAKE, Judge.

Cabiniss & Ward, for appellant.

R C. Brickell, for appellee.

CLOPTON J.

This case, being an action of ejectment, was tried by the circuit court without the intervention of a jury. Under the statutes the parties may waive a trial by jury by agreement in writing, and submit the issue of fact to trial and determination by the court, in which case the finding of the court upon the facts has the same effect as the verdict of the jury. The finding of the court may be general or special unless a special finding of the facts is requested by both or one of the parties, and, if so requested, the court must state in writing the facts as it finds them, and such statement, with the judgment of the court, must be entered on the minutes. Either party has the right, by bill of exceptions, to reserve any ruling, opinion, or decision of the court, to which an exception could have been reserved if a trial by jury had not been waived, and is entitled to an appeal from the judgment of the court as if it had been rendered on the verdict of the jury. If there is a special finding of facts, the supreme court must, on appeal, examine and determine whether the facts are sufficient to support the judgment, (Code 1886, §§ 2743-2745;) the operation of the statute being that, when the parties waive a trial by jury and consent that the court may be the trier of facts, there shall be the same right of appeal and reservation of question for revision on appeal as if there had been a trial by jury and the judgment had been rendered on their verdict, and no other or greater. The appellate court cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment, except in the single instance of a special finding of the facts entered on the minutes, as provided by the statute. A comparison of the sections of the Code of 1886 with the corresponding sections, 3029-3031, Code 1876, shows that, while there is some change in the language and the collocation of phrases, there are no changes in any material respects. We must presume that by the substantial re-enactment the legislature intended the statutes should receive the same judicial construction which had been previously placed upon them. By the uniform construction of the sections of the Code of 1876, when the finding of the facts...