Quince v. State, s. 10306 and 10307
| Decision Date | 02 April 1962 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 10306 and 10307,s. 10306 and 10307 |
| Citation | 179 A.2d 485,94 R.I. 200 |
| Parties | General QUINCE v. STATE of Rhode Island. Titus WARD v. STATE of Rhode Island. Eq. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Goodman, Semonoff, Gorin & Blease, Ralph P. Semonoff, Abedon, Michaelson & Stanzler, Milton Stanzler, Richard A. Skolnik, Providence, for plaintiffs.
J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., John R. Cosentino, Special Counsel, for State.
These are privileged actions against the state for damages. They were specially authorized by House Resolutions Nos. 1418 and 1486. See Rhode Island Acts and Resolves, January Session 1960, pp. 1221, 1226. The actions and the resolutions are identical. The cases were therefore tried together before a justice of the superior court and resulted in a decision for each plaintiff in the sum of $2,500. All the parties excepted thereto all have brought the cases here by their bills of exceptions. Since the actions and the facts upon which they are based are identical, we shall hereinafter discuss the questions raised by such exceptions as though only one case were here, but our decision will apply to both.
The plaintiff argues that the damages are grossly inadequate in that they fail to compensate him fully for the indignities to which he was subjected by the state. On the other hand defendant contends that such alleged indignities were incidental to lawful procedure on its part and therefore were not compensable at all. For this reason it urges that the damages are grossly excessive to the extent that the trial justice awarded compensation for the alleged indignities.
The plaintiff, a migrant farm laborer, happened to witness a homicide on which the state brought a criminal prosecution. It took plaintiff into custody as a material witness and upon his failure to furnish bail had him committed by the district court of the third judicial district to the adult correctional institutions. Thereafter on his petition for habeas corpus we found that he had been illegally committed and ordered his discharge. See Quince v. Langlois, 88 R.I. 438, 149 A.2d 349.
The record discloses that at his apprehension he was handcuffed, fingerprinted and photographed and thereafter confined with convicted criminals, compelled to take his meals with them and to wear prison garb. His unlawful imprisonment with these accompanying indignities and humiliations lasted for 158 days. For about three months during that period he was denied access to persons outside the adult correctional institutions. When finally he was accorded an opportunity for such access he filed the petition for habeas corpus in this court.
The trial justice found that as a result of such unlawful commitment plaintiff actually lost $1,250. He then considered the humiliating circumstances attendant upon plaintiff's confinement in the adult correctional institutions and the consequent deprivation of his right of personal liberty. It would appear from his decision that he did not deem the humiliating circumstances of serious concern as an element of damage and rested his finding almost solely on plaintiff's loss of liberty which he evaluated also in the amount of $1,250. The plaintiff strenuously argues that this is a gross undervaluation of the right of personal liberty and submits that to be reasonable in the circumstances it should be $10,000. He asks this court to award him an additur commensurate with the true value of his loss.
At the oral argument a question was posed from the bench as to whether the resolution authorizing the superior court to try and determine plaintiff's claim was intended to provide for review in this court of the trial justice's decision and if so did it include authority to grant an additur. At our suggestion supplementary briefs on this question have been filed but they have not resolved the problem. However, we have resolved it in the affirmative, although not without some misgiving.
While the legislative resolution designates only the superior court as the forum to try and determine plaintiff's claim against the state, we think the legislature intended to afford as ample an opportunity for the claimant to receive an ultimate judicial determination on the law and the facts as is afforded in any action at law commenced as of right in the superior court. We think support for such view may be found in the absence from the resolution of a limitation of the amount of damages that may be awarded.
The resolution is an act of grace voluntarily giving legal sanction to an otherwise unenforceable moral obligation. In such legislation it is customary for the legislature to fix an argitrary limit on the damages. Our general assembly, however, was apparently content in the present instance to leave the amount of damages to untrammeled...
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Marrapese v. State of RI, Civ. A. No. 80-0167.
...all varieties of governmental immunity. See Markham v. State of Rhode Island, 99 R.I. 650, 210 A.2d 146 (1965); Quince v. State of Rhode Island, 94 R.I. 200, 179 A.2d 485 (1962); Miller v. Clarke, 47 R.I. 13, 129 A. 606 (1925) (municipal immunity); Wixon v. Newport, 13 R.I. 454, 43 Am.Rep. ......
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U.S. v. Awadallah
...garb added the grossest insult to injury. Such maltreatment cannot be fully compensated for by pecuniary damages. Quince v. State, 94 R.I. 200, 179 A.2d 485, 487 (1962). The grand jury already has the ability to ask a court to subpoena an individual who must then testify or face criminal sa......
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Kelaghan v. Roberts, 79-64-A
...and an application of our experience in the affairs of life and our own knowledge of social and economic matters. Quince v. State, 94 R.I. 200, 204-05, 179 A.2d 485, 487 (1962); Cartier v. Liberty Laundry, Inc., supra at 14, 139 A. at 474." 112 R.I. at 757-58, 315 A.2d at The jury here retu......
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Laird v. Chrysler Corp.
...state adhered strictly to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Markham v. State, 99 R.I. 650, 210 A.2d 146 (1965); Quince v. State, 94 R.I. 200, 179 A.2d 485 (1962). A plaintiff had to obtain special enabling legislation from the General Assembly in order to sue the state or a local gove......