Quince v. State
Decision Date | 03 May 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 42,42 |
Citation | 319 Md. 430,572 A.2d 1086 |
Parties | Vincent Lamont QUINCE v. STATE of Maryland. Sept. Term 1989. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Nancy S. Forster, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Jillyn K. Schulze, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., both on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS and BLACKWELL, * JJ.
Vincent Lamont Quince challenges his conviction of unlawfully carrying a handgun on the ground that the .357 magnum pistol he was carrying in his waistband was discovered as a result of an impermissible search. The search in this case was a "pat-down" of the defendant's person, conducted immediately after a stop that the State contends was grounded on the reasonable and articulable suspicion of a police officer that the defendant was armed. The question before us is whether the information in the possession of the police officer, and in the possession of the police dispatcher who put out the call, was sufficient to justify the stop and pat-down search.
On 17 December 1987, Private First Class Robert Garland, Jr., was pursuing his duties as a member of the Towson State University Police Department. At that time, Officer Garland had approximately 10 years experience as a campus police officer. At 11:30 a.m. he received a radio call from the dispatcher that there was a "man with a gun at the lower dining room." Garland and other officers promptly proceeded to Newell Hall, on the east side of the campus, where the dining hall is located. En route, Officer Garland was given additional information by the dispatcher. He was told that the subject with a gun was a black male, wearing a dark jacket and dark slacks, and was accompanied by a black female. Additionally, Officer Garland was told that the complaint had been made by the manager of the dining hall; that the subject with the gun was a former employee of the dining hall who was in the area to pick up his final pay check; that this subject had been observed "wandering about the dining hall"; and, that several employees had informed the assistant manager, who in turn informed the manager, that the subject "always carried a firearm." Finally, the dispatcher told Officer Garland that the subject was leaving the dining hall and proceeding toward the bus stop located across the street.
Upon his arrival at Newell Hall, Officer Garland observed a black male at the bus stop, in the company of a black female. The black male was the defendant, Quince. Officer Garland drove past the bus stop and made a U-turn, to get a better view of Quince. Satisfied that Quince fit the description given by the dispatcher, Officer Garland, in the company of Lieutenant Wheatley, alighted from his vehicle and approached Quince. The officers had their guns drawn, but pointed downward at their sides.
Quince made no unusual movements, and responded promptly to the commands of the officers. He was told to turn around and place both hands against an adjacent telephone booth, which he did. Officer Garland asked Quince if he was armed, and Quince said that he was not. Garland then conducted a pat-down search for weapons, and found a loaded .357 magnum pistol in the defendant's left front waistband.
Quince was charged with unlawfully wearing or carrying a firearm. The defendant challenged the legality of the search and seizure by filing a timely motion to suppress. The motion was heard immediately before the commencement of trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Judge William R. Buchanan, Sr., found that Officer Garland relying upon the information given him by the dispatcher, had a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Accordingly, he denied the motion to suppress. Quince proceeded to trial before Judge Buchanan on an agreed statement of facts, and he was found guilty. He appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion. We granted Quince's petition for certiorari, and we now affirm.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court concluded that:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
The Court then defined the extent of that necessary authority:
The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.... And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. (Citations and footnotes omitted.)
Id. More recently, in U.S. v. Sokolow, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), the Court made clear that the level of suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk "is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." After noting that probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found," the Court said that "the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause." Id. See Adams v Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); see also Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 317-19, 568 A.2d 22 (1990); Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 659-67, 537 A.2d 235 (1988); Millwood v. State, 72 Md.App. 82, 87-93, 527 A.2d 803 (1987),cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 2033, 100 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988).
Although the necessity to strike a proper balance between the interests of the person and those of the government may require the imposition of additional restraints when the Terry stop is made solely to investigate a past crime, the Supreme Court has made it clear that strong concerns for public safety and for effective crime prevention and detection clearly justify the application of Terry principles where there exists reasonable suspicion of ongoing or imminent criminal activity. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228-29, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).
Applying these established principles of law to the facts of this case, we conclude that Judge Buchanan did not err in finding that Officer Garland had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Quince was unlawfully carrying a handgun, and consequently that the officers' stop and frisk was constitutionally permissible. Initially, the officer was told to respond to a complaint that there was a man with a gun in the lower dining hall. The officer learned that the complaint had been made by the manager of the dining hall. This information carries with it significant indicia of reliability.
The person furnishing the information is identified, and therefore can be held accountable for his actions. As Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out for the Court in Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 92 S.Ct. at 1923, a person intentionally making a false report to the police may be subject to criminal prosecution. See Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 150. Moreover, the complainant held a managerial post with the University--a fact that tended to independently bolster his personal credibility and to ensure his accountability...
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