Quincy v. Joint School Dist. No. 41, Benewah County, 13172

• Decision Date: 01 December 1981
• Docket Number: No. 13172,13172
• Citation: 102 Idaho 764,640 P.2d 304
• Parties: , 2 Ed. Law Rep. 874 Ricky Allen QUINCY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 41, BENEWAH COUNTY, Idaho, and Juanita Fae Petrie, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 304

640 P.2d 304

102 Idaho 764, 2 Ed. Law Rep. 874

Ricky Allen QUINCY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 41, BENEWAH COUNTY, Idaho, and Juanita Fae Petrie, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 13172.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 1, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1982.

John Reid Tait and Paul C. Keeton, Lewiston, for plaintiff-appellant

Samuel Eismann, Coeur d'Alene, for defendants-respondents.

DONALDSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a civil action for personal injury suffered in a motorcycle-automobile collision. Plaintiff-appellant Quincy sustained the injury while riding a motorcycle and attempting to pass an automobile owned by defendant-respondent school district and driven by defendant-respondent Petrie. At the time of the collision, Petrie was the agent, servant and employee of the school district and was operating the vehicle as part of her employment by the school district.

Following trial, the jury returned a special verdict attributing eighty percent (80%) negligence to appellant and twenty percent (20%) negligence to respondent Petrie. The trial court had previously granted respondent school district's motion for involuntary dismissal as to any active negligence on its Judgment was entered against appellant and appellant's subsequent motion for a new trial was denied. This appeal followed. We affirm the decision of the district court.

part outside that of its employee Petrie and, therefore, the school district was not included in the special verdict form as a possible entity to which a percentage of the negligence could be attributed. The jury also determined the total damages sustained by appellant to be $50,000.

The basic facts are as follows. On January 28, 1976, Petrie in the course of her employment by the school district was driving an automobile, a 1964 Dodge sedan, from her residence enroute to the school building where she was to pick up a school bus and deliver children homeward. The automobile was owned and maintained by the school district and functioned as a shuttle car for school bus drivers. Petrie, while thus on her way to the school, interrupted her drive to conduct a matter of personal business and slowed the automobile to make a left turn into a private driveway. Petrie testified that she applied the brakes and activated the turn signal prior to initiating the turn. Quincy's motorcycle, coming from behind the automobile, collided with the left front fender of the automobile. Quincy was hurled from the motorcycle and sustained severe injuries.

The first assertion of error questions whether the school district was properly granted its motion for involuntary dismissal as regards the issue of active negligence on its part. From our review of the record, we agree with the conclusion of the district court that notwithstanding appellant's failure to set forth with particularity the factual grounds upon which his contention of active negligence by the school district rested, I.R.C.P. 59(a), no evidence was presented at trial sufficient to support such a contention. Moreover, the jury was advised that any negligence on the part of respondent Petrie would be imputed to the school district because of the employee-employer relationship. In light of the foregoing, we find no error in the district court ruling and we affirm the granting of the dismissal as made. See I.R.C.P. 41(b). There is no issue presented as to the applicability of I.C. § 49-1404.

The next assertion of error we deal with is that the district court erred in prohibiting the jury from receiving oral and written evidence as to the safe operation of vehicles by the employee drivers of a school district. This area is statutorily controlled by Chapter 15 of Title 33 of the Idaho Code, entitled "Transportation of Pupils." In looking to I.C. § 33-1501 et seq., it is apparent to this Court that the statutory requirements and the school district's response to those requirements through the compilation and adoption of safety rules and regulations, were intended to impact primarily upon the safety and adequate protection of the health of the pupils in the transportation of school pupils. In short, the safety rules were designed to prevent accidents in the transportation of pupils. In the instant case, the evidence discloses that respondent Petrie was not engaged in the transportation of pupils at the time of the accident. Nor was she driving a vehicle such as a school bus, which would require at the very least a driver's additional awareness of the oversize nature of the vehicle. Petrie was simply driving an ordinary automobile on her way to work. No pupils were present in the automobile. While the automobile was owned by the school district, the automobile was not functioning as a vehicle which would come under the purview of I.C. § 33-1501 et seq. ¹ and, therefore, the safety In the next assertion of error that we consider, it is contended by appellant that the district court erred in failing to dismiss for cause one John E. Pugh as a juror in the case. The record discloses that counsel for plaintiff twice challenged Mr. Pugh for cause. The first challenge came after Mr. Pugh stated that his wife was a bus driver for the school district, and that he had discussed the accident with her, and that he doubted he could disregard what his wife had told him. Questioning of Mr. Pugh by the court went as follows:

rules designed to control the operation of such vehicles have no relevance in establishing the standard of care owed to others, including appellant, by Petrie in the operation of the automobile under the circumstances of this case. The district court's disallowance of the admission of evidence pertaining to safety rules, regulations, manuals, training sessions and training assistance for the training of operators of school vehicles as being not relevant and material is therefore affirmed.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

BY THE COURT:

"Q. Mr. Pugh, of what you have heard, do you have a, has it caused you to form a present opinion as to the merits of the case.

"A. Well, no, not at present, but then I don't know if I could completely put out of my mind what my wife and I have talked about and-

"Q. Well, do you have a present opinion at this time?

"A. No, not really because I wasn't there myself.

"Q. Do you believe that you have any knowledge or know any of the facts of what happened in this accident.

"A. No.

"Q. Assuming that those facts are all presented during the evidence of this trial, can you and will you base your verdict solely upon the evidence introduced here in trial.

"A. Yes, I think.

"THE COURT: I deny the challenge."

Subsequent voir dire examination by appellant counsel revealed that Mr. Pugh believed he would probably discuss the case further with his wife. Again, he was challenged for cause. Again, the court questioned Mr. Pugh:

BY THE COURT:

"Q. You may not realize, but all of the jurors, not only you, the situation exists. The jurors will be under instruction when they go home tonight not to discuss the case with anyone and that includes family members or relatives. Do you believe that you can abide by that court order and instruction.

"A. Oh, yeah.

"Q. And in spite of that, would you abide by that court order in spite of some pressure from your spouse maybe to discuss it.

"A. Yeah.

"Q. Do you think you could handle the home situation if you were on the jury and as we have already instructed you once, but it will be repeated many times, not to permit anyone to discuss it with you. And if that should happen that you inform your wife that you cannot permit her to discuss it and you will have to cut "A. I imagine.

off that conversation. Do you think that you could do that.

"THE COURT: I will again deny your challenge, Mr. Tate."

I.R.C.P. 47(h) states that "(c)hallenges for cause shall be heard and determined by the court ...." (Emphasis added.) I.R.C.P. 47(i) states that "(v)oir dire examinations ... shall first be conducted by the court .... The court shall supervise voir dire examination of the jurors to insure a speedy, fair and thorough examination of the jurors." (Emphasis added.) These provisions together make it clear that the primary responsibility for voir dire and the selection of competent jurors rests upon the trial judge. "It is the trial court and not this Court which is in a position to determine first hand whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict." State v. Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 589 P.2d 5, 13 (1979). Certainly, it is the rule in Idaho that "factual determinations made by the district court will not be overturned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous." Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980).

In order to determine whether a juror should be excused for cause, the trial judge must weigh the pertinent facts and then decide if they justify exclusion of the juror pursuant to the standards set forth in I.R.C.P. 47(h). Although the voir dire of Mr. Pugh by plaintiff's counsel initially gave reason to challenge for cause, subsequent questioning by the court clarified the responses of Mr. Pugh so as to give the court ample basis for concluding that Mr. Pugh would serve as a fair and impartial juror. In view of these answers given by Mr. Pugh to the court's questions, it was clearly within the court's discretion to deny plaintiff's challenges for cause.

In the next assertion of error, the appellant alleges that there was not sufficient evidence to justify the verdict which attributed 80% of the negligence causing the accident to the appellant. The appellant argues that there was only one eyewitness to the accident and that her testimony was conflicting. Furthermore, the appellant argues that the respondent testified she observed nothing to indicate that the appellant had caused the accident. The appellant claims that this is clearly insufficient evidence to justify the verdict which attributed 80% of the negligence to ...