Quinlan v. Breslin

Citation200 A. 989
Decision Date20 July 1938
Docket NumberNo. 8003.,8003.
PartiesQUINLAN v. BRESLIN.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Philip C. Joslin, Judge.

Action on the case by Robert E. Quinlan against Anna Breslin for malicious prosecution of the plaintiff on the criminal charge of assault and battery. To review a nonsuit granted at the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the plaintiff brings an exception.

Exception sustained and the case remitted for a new trial.

Charles A. Curran and Armenag Thomasian, both of Providence, for plaintiff. Briggs & Doyle and David P. Doyle, all of Providence, for defendant.

CAPOTOSTO, Justice.

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This is an action on the case for malicious prosecution of the plaintiff on a criminal charge of assault and battery. It was tried before a justice of the superior court, sitting with a jury, who, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit. The case is before us solely on the plaintiff's exception to this ruling.

The facts are practically undisputed. The evidence shows that the plaintiff was arrested by the police of the city of Cranston and delivered into the custody of the police of the city of Warwick on a private complaint for an alleged assault and battery on the person of this defendant. Upon entering a plea of not guilty in the criminal case, the plaintiff here was admitted to bail, and on the day fixed by the court he duly appeared with his attorney, ready for trial. On that day the prosecutrix, the defendant in the instant case, did not appear, but her attorney did. When the criminal case was called for trial, the attorney informed the court that the present plaintiff was not the person guilty of the assault and battery upon his client, as she had sworn in her private complaint which was then before the court. The court thereupon dismissed the complaint and discharged the defendant, the present plaintiff.

The plaintiff testified that he had never seen the defendant; that he was not in the city of Warwick at the place where the defendant claimed the alleged assault and battery was committed; and that on the day in question he was working in the city of Cranston. He further testified that, prior to his arrest, he received a letter from a firm of attorneys informing him that they were retained by the defendant "to bring prosecution—for damages" against him because of the alleged assault and battery but that he ignored this letter because he did not know the defendant and had not committed such offense. There was also testimony from the plaintiff tending to show direct damage to him as a result of the criminal case which the defendant had brought against him.

On this state of the evidence, the trial justice granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit on the grounds that the plaintiff had presented no evidence of the want of probable cause or of malice on the part of the defendant. In this stage of the case, the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence was not open to consideration by the trial justice. The nonsuit was improperly entered if, construing the testimony and the reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to the plaintiff in accordance with our well-established rule, such testimony and inferences raised issues of fact requiring explanation by the defendant.

Although public policy favors prosecution for crime, yet a person instituting such proceedings must act in good faith and upon reasonable grounds. Probable cause in a prosecution for crime is the existence of a state of facts sufficient to cause an ordinarily careful and prudent person to believe the accused guilty. Fox v. Smith, 25 R.I. 255, 55 A. 698. The issue on this point in the instant case was not whether the defendant had reasonable grounds to swear out a private complaint for assault and battery, but rather whether she had reasonable grounds to do so against this plaintiff. While it is true that the burden of proving want of...

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12 cases
  • Johnson v. Palange, 77-297-A
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • September 20, 1979
    ...careful and prudent person, could have reasonably believed that the South Kingstown ordinance was being violated. Quinlan v. Breslin, 61 R.I. 327, 330, 200 A. 989, 991 (1938); Accord, Cook v. Lester, 99 R.I. 28, 31, 205 A.2d 143, 145 In pertinent part section 1 of that ordinance makes it "i......
  • Nagy v. McBurney
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • October 11, 1978
    ...a showing of a lack of probable cause, DeFusco v. Brophy, 112 R.I. 461, 463 n. 1, 311 A.2d 286, 287 n. 1 (1973); Quinlan v. Breslin, 61 R.I. 327, 331, 200 A. 989, 991 (1938); Beaumier v. Provensal, 58 R.I. 472, 476, 193 A. 521, 522-23 (1937); Prosser, Supra at 855, but may not be drawn from......
  • Horton v. Portsmouth Police Dep't
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • June 6, 2011
    ...for the jury in a malicious prosecution action.” To support this assertion, Horton relies on this Court's opinion in Quinlan v. Breslin, 61 R.I. 327, 200 A. 989 (1938). In that case, the plaintiff brought an action in Superior Court alleging that the defendant maliciously prosecuted him on ......
  • Miller v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Ins.
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • September 7, 2010
    ... ... guilty." McBurney , 120 R.I. at 929-930, 392 ... A.2d at 367; see also Quinlan v. Breslin, ... 61 R.I. at 320, 200 A.2d at 991. The Restatement (Second) ... Torts § 675 (1977) explains the existence of ... ...
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