Quinn v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

• Decision Date: 29 March 2018
• Docket Number: No. 1–17–0834,1–17–0834
• Citation: 2018 IL App (1st) 170834,105 N.E.3d 106
• Parties: Patrick QUINN, Irene Robinson, Christopher Ball, Antwain Miller, Marc Kaplan, Daniel Morales–Doyle, and Jitu Brown, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, the Illinois State Board of Education, and the State of Illinois, Defendants–Appellees, (Patrick Quinn, Irene Robinson, Antwain Miller, Mark Kaplan, Daniel Morales–Doyle, and Jitu Brown, Plaintiffs–Appellants).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2018 IL App (1st) 170834

105 N.E.3d 106

Patrick QUINN, Irene Robinson, Christopher Ball, Antwain Miller, Marc Kaplan, Daniel Morales–Doyle, and Jitu Brown, Plaintiffs,

v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, the Illinois State Board of Education, and the State of Illinois, Defendants–Appellees,(Patrick Quinn, Irene Robinson, Antwain Miller, Mark Kaplan, Daniel Morales–Doyle, and Jitu Brown, Plaintiffs–Appellants).

No. 1–17–0834

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FOURTH DIVISION.

Opinion filed March 29, 2018

Thomas H. Geoghegan, Michael P. Persoon, and Sean Morales-Doyle, of Despres, Schwartz & Geoghegan, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.

Stephen H. Pugh and Kathleen R. Pasulka-Brown, of Pugh, Jones & Johnson, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee Board of Education of the City of Chicago.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Christina T. Hansen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees.

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In this appeal, plaintiffs, who are all Chicago residents, ask us to find unconstitutional section 34–3 of the School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/34–3 (West 2016) ). Plaintiffs claim this statute is unconstitutional because it denies Chicago residents the ability to vote for members of their school board, while residents of all other Illinois school districts may do so.¹ Plaintiffs argue that section 34–3, which permits the mayor of Chicago to appoint the members instead, violates our state constitution's guarantee of "free and equal" elections. Ill. Const. 1970, art. III, § 3 ("All elections shall be free and equal.").

¶ 2 In this appeal, plaintiffs attack a longstanding law that has been on the books for decades.

¶ 3 As plaintiffs allege in their complaint, since 1872, when the Chicago Board of Education was first created, the mayor of the City of Chicago has appointed its members. In 1988, the General Assembly passed a law that gave Chicago citizens more input into the selection process and also included council approval of the mayor's ultimate selections. Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education , 142 Ill. 2d 54, 94, 153 Ill.Dec. 177, 566 N.E.2d 1283 (1990). However, the 1988 law was declared unconstitutional by our supreme court just two years later. Fumarolo , 142 Ill. 2d at 100, 153 Ill.Dec. 177, 566 N.E.2d 1283 ("the entire Act must be declared unconstitutional"). In 1995, the state legislature eliminated the requirement of city council approval. 105 ILCS 5/34–3(b) (West 2016) ("No appointment to membership on the Chicago Board of Education that is made by the Mayor under this subsection shall require the approval of the City Council."). Now, over 20 years later, plaintiffs challenge this change and seek direct election of board members by the registered voters in the City of Chicago, which has never occurred since the Chicago School Board was created almost 150 years ago.²

¶ 4 This appeal is one of three challenges to the mayor's authority to appoint the members of the Chicago School Board.

¶ 5 First, on October 5, 2016, these same plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal district court, which challenged section 34–3 of the School Code under various federal statutes and federal constitutional provisions.

Quinn v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 234 F.Supp.3d 922, 928, 933, 934 (discussing federal equal protection clause ( U.S. Const., amend. XIV ) and Voting Rights Act ( 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012) ), federal due process ( U.S. Const., amend. XIV ), and Civil Rights Act of 1964 ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) respectively). The federal district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on February 13, 2017 ( Quinn , 234 F.Supp.3d at 936 ), and plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The federal appeal has been pending for a year, and no opinion has been issued.

¶ 6 Second, also on October 5, 2016, plaintiffs filed this complaint, which the circuit court of Cook County dismissed on February 27, 2017, and which is the subject of this appeal.

¶ 7 Third, a bill was introduced in the Illinois General Assembly on February 1, 2017, which would provide substantially all the relief plaintiffs are seeking here. 100th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 1774, 2017 Sess., § 5 (amending 10 ILCS 5/2A–1.2(d) to provide that, as of the year 2023, "members of the Chicago Board of Education shall be elected in a nonpartisan election"). The bill provides that "the City of Chicago shall be subdivided into 20 electoral districts by the General Assembly," with each district represented by one member and one additional member elected at large to serve as president of the Chicago school board. 100th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 1774, 2017 Sess., § 10 (amending 105 ILCS 5/34–3(b–5) ). The bill passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate in May 2017. The last reported action taken on the bill was a referral on September 28, 2017, by the House to the rules committee.

¶ 8 Although the complaints filed in both federal and state courts made race-based allegations ( Quinn , 234 F.Supp.3d at 934 ), the same cannot be said of the appeals. Plaintiffs have stated explicitly in their brief to this court and during oral argument that they are not raising any race-related claims in this court.³

¶ 9 Although city council approval was eliminated in 1995 when Mayor Richard M. Daley began his third term as mayor, plaintiffs chose not to sue until over 20 years later. However, whether or not this suit is politically motivated does not affect the purely legal question presented to this court, which is whether the appointment, by the mayor, violates the free and equal election clause of our state's constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. III, § 3 ("All elections shall be free and equal.").

¶ 10 In addition, we are not here to decide "the wisdom or unwisdom" of the legislature's choice of mayoral selection. "[T]he wisdom or unwisdom of legislative action in determining the means to be adopted to resolve an existing social problem is not for the judiciary to decide. Legislation will be upheld unless it is in violation of some constitutional limitation." Fumarolo , 142 Ill. 2d at 62–63, 153 Ill.Dec. 177, 566 N.E.2d 1283. Thus, the sole question for us is the constitutionality of the School Code provision.

¶ 11 For the following reasons, we do not find plaintiffs' arguments persuasive, and thus we cannot find the statute unconstitutional.

¶ 12 BACKGROUND

¶ 13 I. The Parties

¶ 14 On October 5, 2016, seven plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Chicago School Board) and the Illinois State Board of Education and State of Illinois (state defendants). As explained below, only the state defendants filed a response brief in this appeal, and only six of the seven plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. Christopher Ball, who was one of the original seven plaintiffs, was not named in the notice of appeal.

¶ 15 The lead plaintiff, Patrick Quinn, is the former governor of Illinois. The complaint in the case at bar alleges that all seven plaintiffs are Chicago residents and registered voters. The complaint further alleges (1) that four of the seven plaintiffs, namely, Antwain Miller, Daniel Morales–Doyle, Jitu Brown, and Christopher Ball, are "Chicago Public Schools parent[s]"; (2) that two of the seven plaintiffs, namely, Irene Robinson and Marc Kaplan, are "Chicago Public Schools grandparent[s]"; (3) that three of the seven plaintiffs, namely, Patrick Quinn, Daniel Morales–Doyle, and Jim Brown are Chicago property owners; and (4) that four of the plaintiffs, namely, Patrick Quinn, Irene Robinson, Marc Kaplan, Daniel Morales–Doyle, are current or former members of local Chicago school councils.

¶ 16 Defendant Chicago School Board is a school district in the State of Illinois. As to the State defendants, the Illinois State Board of Education is primarily responsible for administering the School Code, a portion of which is challenged in this appeal (and quoted in the next section), and the State of Illinois is responsible for adhering to its constitution, which requires elections to be free and equal. Ill. Const. 1970, art. III, § 3 ("All elections shall be free and equal.").

¶ 17 II. The Statute at Issue

¶ 18 The complaint in the case at bar sets forth several grounds for finding section 34–3 of the School Code ( 105 ILCS 5/34–3 (West 2016) ) unconstitutional under our state constitution. Since this statute is the crux of this lawsuit, we provide it here in full. Section 34–3 states in full:

"(a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1995, the terms of all members of the Chicago Board of Education holding office on that date are abolished and the Mayor shall appoint, without the consent or approval of the City Council, a 5 member Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees which shall take office upon the appointment of the fifth member. The Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees and its members shall serve until, and the terms of all members of the Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees shall expire on, June 30, 1999 or upon the appointment of a new Chicago Board of Education as provided in subsection (b), whichever is later. Any vacancy in the membership of the Trustees shall be filled through appointment by the Mayor, without the consent or approval of the City Council, for the unexpired term. One of the members appointed by the Mayor to the Trustees shall be designated by the Mayor to serve as President of the Trustees. The Mayor shall appoint a full-time, compensated chief executive officer, and his or her compensation as such chief executive officer shall be determined by the Mayor. The Mayor, at his or her discretion, may appoint the President to serve simultaneously as the chief executive officer.

(b) Within 30 days before the expiration of the terms of the members of the Chicago Reform Board of Trustees as provided in subsect

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